Dispatches from Purple America

Ramming Through Radical Nominee Takes Back Seat to Ramming Through Obamacare

2010-03-25T17:28:00.002-04:00

Senate debate on the health care reconciliation bill forced Democrats to postpone yesterday’s hearing for Goodwin Liu, President Obama’s controversial nominee to the Ninth Circuit (which covers the western states). Senate Judiciary Committee chairman Patrick Leahy accused Republicans of “exploiting parliamentary tactics and Senate Rules” — GOP senators have stopped consenting to afternoon hearings for the duration of the health care debate – to delay Liu’s appointment “at the expense of American justice.”

Nothing could be farther from the truth. Despite the postponement, Liu’s confirmation is proceeding at breakneck speed. His hearing was scheduled only 28 days after his nomination, while the average Obama appointee waited 48 days for a hearing and the average Bush appointee waited 135 days. And Senate Democrats themselves cancelled all hearings Tuesday afternoon so they could attend the ObamaCare signing ceremony at the White House.

Moreover, Leahy’s intent is not so much to urge the timely vetting of judicial nominees, but to further the government’s Blitzkrieg takeover of civil society – before the Democrats’ congressional majorities turn into pumpkins this November. As Liu stated in a January interview with NPR, “now we have the opportunity to actually get our ideas and the progressive vision of the Constitution and of law and policy into practice.”

According to Liu, that progressive vision includes constitutional rights to health care, education, housing, and welfare payments. Liu states outright that “rights to government assistance” are “essential to liberty.” He defends this contradiction by claiming that “experiences of other nations suggest that the existence of such rights is compatible with constitutionalism.”

Liu’s hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee thus concerns much more than a seat on a federal appellate court (just when you thought the Ninth Circuit couldn’t get more radical). The Washington Post has noted that the hearing might serve as a test of Goodwin Liu as a Supreme Court nominee. With so much potentially at stake, postponing Liu’s hearing to ensure it receives the Senate’s undivided attention — and any other legal method of stopping or delaying by even one day his ascension to the bench — serves “American justice” rather than betraying it.

CP: Cato's blog

Is the Health Care Lawsuit For Real?

2010-03-25T10:25:00.000-04:00

The Hill asked me the following question:

Thirteen state attorneys general have filled a lawsuit claiming that the new healthcare reforms are unconstitutional. Is this a real legal challenge or a political stunt?

Here’s my response:

The challenge is very real—and necessary—but we are in uncharted territory here
so it’s difficult to predict how courts will react.
The strongest and most important legal argument attacks the constitutionality of the individual mandate to buy a certain approved health insurance plan. Never before has the federal government—or any other—tried to force Americans to buy a particular good or service. Never before has it said that every man, woman, and child alive has to purchase a particular product, on penalty of civil or criminal sanction or
forfeiture. And never before have courts had to consider such a breathtaking assertion of raw power — not even during the height of the New Deal, when the
Supreme Court ratified Congress’ regulation of what people grew in their backyards on the awkward theory that such behavior affected interstate commerce.
The individual health care mandate is an even greater expansion of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. And it cannot be justified under the Necessary and Proper or General Welfare Clauses either, because these provisions guide the exercise of Congress’ enumerated powers without adding to them. In short, if the challenges to this health care “reform” fail, nobody will ever be able to claim plausibly that the Constitution limits federal power.

You can read here the responses of other pundits — including several non-lawyers, curiously.

CP: Cato's blog

If You Think Obamacare is Bad...

2010-03-24T17:20:00.001-04:00

Today the Senate Judiciary Committee will hold a hearing for the nomination of 39-year-old Berkeley law professor Goodwin Liu to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Liu’s confirmation would compromise the judiciary’s check on legislative overreach and push the courts not only to ratify such constitutional abominations as the individual health insurance mandate but to establish socialized health care as a legal mandate itself.

Yesterday Cato legal associate Evan Turgeon and I published an op-ed on the Liu nomination in the Daily Caller. Here are some highlights:

While Liu purports to develop an original approach [to constitutional
interpretation], his nuanced methodology fails to generate a novel result. He
may “suggest a more cautious and discriminating judicial role than one that is
guided by a comprehensive moral theory,” but it is impossible to imagine a case
in which Liu would reach a different outcome than a judge employing the
(disfavored) “Living Constitution” analysis. And this is not surprising, given
that the stated purpose of Liu’s scholarship is to establish legal
justifications for “rights” foreign to the Enlightenment tradition on which our
republic rests — those that make demands on others (unlike, say, the right to
free speech, which makes no demands on anyone).
....
Even more dangerously, Liu’s approach flouts the Constitution’s very
purpose: protecting individual rights by limiting government power. As the
branch responsible for interpreting the Constitution, the judiciary must defend
citizens’ inalienable rights, such as the rights to life, liberty, and property,
from infringement by government actors. Liu’s approach turns that role on its
head. He views the judiciary not as a safeguard against state tyranny, but as a
rubber stamp for any legislation that reflects popular opinion. And it’s a
one-way ratchet: Liu would likely rule that the next Congress could not repeal
Obamacare because it is precisely the kind of “landmark legislation” — to borrow
progressive Yale law professor Bruce Ackerman’s phrase — that cannot be
undone.

As a member of the ACLU and chairman of the American Constitution Society,
it is no secret what kind of rights Liu would find justified by “collective
values.” Liu lists “education, shelter, subsistence, health care and the like,
or to the money these things cost” as examples of affirmative rights he would
seek to establish in law — to constitutionalize beyond a future legislature’s
reach.

Read the whole thing. Also read Ed Whelan’s series of posts on Liu at NRO’s Bench Memos blog. (I don’t agree with Ed on everything, but he’s doing a workmanlike job on this important nomination, as he did on Harold Koh.)

And if all the above isn’t enough, here’s Liu in the 2006 Yale Law Journal:

On my account of the Constitution’s citizenship guarantee, federal
responsibility logically extends to areas beyond education. Importantly,
however, the duty of government cannot be reduced to simply providing the basic
necessities of life….. Beyond a minimal safety net, the legislative agenda of
equal citizenship should extend to systems of support and opportunity that, like
education, provide a foundation for political and economic autonomy and
participation. The main pillars of the agenda would include basic employment
supports such as expanded health insurance, child care, transportation
subsidies, job training, and a robust earned income tax credit.

As Evan and I wrote:

We don’t expect a president of either party to appoint judges who adhere
100 percent to the Cato line — though that would be nice — so we do not object
to every judicial nominee whose philosophy differs from ours.

Goodwin Liu’s nomination, however, is different. By far the most extreme of
Obama’s picks to date, Liu would push the Ninth Circuit to redistribute wealth
by radically expanding — and constitutionalizing — welfare “rights.”

The Senate needs to understand who it’s dealing with here.

CP: Cato's blog

Individual Mandate Is Constitutional – If You Rewrite the Constitution

2010-03-23T17:17:00.000-04:00

House Judiciary Committee Chairman John Conyers (D-MI) was asked on Friday where in the Constitution Congress gets the power to force people to buy health insurance. He said, “Under several clauses, the good and welfare clause and a couple others.”

As it happens, there is no “good and welfare clause” — which Conyers should know, as both judiciary chairman and a lawyer. But even if you excuse his casual use of constitutional language, what he probably means — the General Welfare Clause of Article I, Section 8 — is not a better answer. What that clause does is limit Congress’s use of the powers enumerated elsewhere in that section to legislation that promotes ”the general welfare.” (So earmarks are arguably unconstitutional, though you can make a colorable argument that, when considering a pork bill as a whole, with all parts of the country getting something, that monstrosity is collectively in “the general welfare” — maybe.) In any event, the General Welfare Clause doesn’t give Congress any additional powers — and I’d be curious to know what the other “several clauses” are.

Conyers also noted that, “All the scholars, the constitutional scholars that I know . . . they all say that there’s nothing unconstitutional in this bill and if there were, I would have tried to correct it if I thought there were.” Well, Mr. Conyers, to start let me introduce you to three constitutional scholars — not fringe right-wing kooks or anything like that, but respected people who publish widely — who think Obamacare is unconstitutional. Now will you try to “correct” the bill?

For a survey of the various constitutional issues attending Obamacare, see Randy Barnett’s oped from Sunday’s Washington Post.

CP: Cato's blog

Taxpayer Choice + Parental Choice = Education Reform That's Constitutional

2010-03-22T15:55:00.002-04:00

Arizona grants income tax credits for contributions made to school tuition organizations (“STO”). These STOs must these donations for scholarships that allow students to attend private schools. This statutory scheme broadens the educational opportunities for thousands of students by enabling them to attend schools they would otherwise lack the means to attend.
The Ninth Circuit held that the tax credit program violated the Establishment Clause because many of the STOs — as it happens, a decreasing majority — provide scholarships for students to attend parochial schools. Counsel for the defendants, including the Institute for Justice, asked the Supreme Court to review the case — and indeed to summarily reverse the Ninth Circuit, based in part on a 2002 case (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris) rejecting a similar challenge to a school voucher program. Cato filed a brief, joined by the Foundation for Educational Choice and the American Federation for Children, supporting this request.

Our brief argues that the funds received by STOs are the product of individual taxpayers’ “genuine and independent choice” — the touchstone by which the Court judges the religious neutrality of statutes allowing for taxpayer money to fund religious education. Moreover, the tax credit scheme is indistinguishable from similar charitable tax deduction programs that the Court has previously held to pass constitutional muster. While the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Arizona parents feel pressured to send their kids to parochial schools due to limited scholarships available for secular schools, it failed to consider that the share of STO money available to secular schools was nearly twice as large as the share of families choosing to send their children to secular schools.

Far from being an impediment to parental freedom, the autonomy Arizona grants to taxpayers and STOs is ultimately essential to it. More generally, should the lower court’s opinion be allowed to stand, the progress made to broaden the educational opportunities of students across the country will be stifled.

The name of the case is Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn. The Court will likely decide before it breaks for the summer whether to take it up — and, indeed, whether to summarily reverse the Ninth Circuit.

CP: Cato's blog

Scalia Can No Longer Call Himself an Originalist

2010-03-09T14:47:00.002-05:00

As I blogged last week, the Supreme Court didn’t seem amenable to Privileges or Immunities Clause arguments in last week’s gun rights case, McDonald v. Chicago. This is unfortunate because the alternative, extending the right to keep and bear arms via the Due Process Clause, continues a long-time deviation from constitutional text, history, and structure, and reinforces the idea that judges enforce only those rights they deem “fundamental” (whatever that means).

It was especially disconcerting to see Justice Antonin Scalia, the standard-bearer for originalism, give up on his own preferred method of interpretation — and for the sole reason that it was intellectually “easier” to use the “substantive due process” doctrine.

Josh Blackman and I have an op-ed in the Washington Examiner pointing out Scalia’s hypocrisy. Here’s a choice excerpt:

Without the Privileges or Immunities Clause … the Court must continue
extending the un-originalist version of substantive due process to protect the
right to keep and bear arms. To give original meaning to the Second Amendment,
it must ignore the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment!

Yet this is the line Scalia took last week: Instead of accepting the plain
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause—which uncontrovertibly protects
the right to keep and bear arms—the justice chose a route that avoids disturbing
a 140-year-old precedent rejected by legal scholars of all ideological
stripes.

In 2008, Scalia wrote, “It is no easy task to wean the public, the
professoriate, and (especially) the judiciary away from [living
constitutionalism,] a seductive and judge-empowering philosophy.” But at the
arguments in McDonald, he argued that while the Privileges or Immunities Clause
“is the darling of the professoriate,” he would prefer to follow substantive due
process, in which he has now “acquiesced,” “as much as [he] think[s it is]
wrong.”

Put simply, if the opinion Scalia writes or joins matches his performance last week, he can no longer be described as an originalist (faint-hearted or otherwise). A liberty-seeking world turns its weary eyes to Justice Clarence Thomas — who has expressed an openness to reviving the constitutional order the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to create — to convince his wayward colleague that the way to interpret legal text is to look to its original public meaning.

Read the whole thing. CP: Cato's blog

Gun Rights Secure, Liberty Less So

2010-03-02T18:11:00.001-05:00

This morning the Court heard argument in McDonald v. Chicago, the case asking whether the right to keep and bear arms extends to protecting against actions by state and local governments. Just as importantly, it asked whether the best way to extend that right would be through the Due Process Clause of Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (because the Second Amendment doesn’t apply directly to the states).

From the initial questioning through the end, it was quite clear that those living in Chicago — and, by extension, New York, San Francisco, and other places with extreme gun restrictions — will soon be able to rest easy, knowing that they will be able to have guns with which to protect themselves. Unfortunately, the Court did not seem inclined to adopt the arguments propounded by petitioners’ counsel Alan Gura (and supported by Cato) that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was the way to go. Chief Justice Roberts expressed reluctance at having to overturn the 1873 Slaughterhouse Cases and other justices joined in concerns over how activist judges would use the Clause if the Court revived it — even if that were the path that hewed more closely to the constitution’s true meaning.

This turn of events is unfortunate because reviving the Privileges or Immunities Clause, far from giving judges free reign to impose their policy views, would actually tie them closer to the text, structure, and history of the Constitution. As it stands now — and as it seems will be the case after McDonald is decided — many of our most cherished rights are protected only to the extent that judges are willing to label them as sufficiently “fundamental” to warrant such protection. That is an unprincipled jurisprudence and one that hurts the rule of law.

In short, it is a shame that the Supreme Court seems to be wasting a perfect opportunity to bring constitutional law closer to the Constitution. It is an even greater shame that it is wasting this chance to use guns to protect liberty.

CP at Cato's blog

Using Guns to Protect Liberty

2010-03-01T18:08:00.002-05:00

Tomorrow the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in McDonald v. Chicago — the Second Amendment case with implications far beyond gun rights. The Court is quite likely to extend the right to keep and bear arms to the states and thereby invalidate the Chicago handgun ban at issue, but the way in which it does so could revolutionize constitutional law.

In response to the oppression of freed slaves and abolitionists in southern and border states after the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafters sought to protect individual rights from infringement by state and local governments. The amendment’s Due Process Clause and Privileges or Immunities Clause provided overlapping but distinct protections for these rights. The Court decided in the 1873 Slaughter-House Cases, however, that the Privileges or Immunities Clause only protected Americans’ rights as national, not state, citizens. This reactionary holding eviscerated the clause, rendering it powerless to protect individual rights from state interference.

McDonald provides the Court an opportunity to overturn the Slaughter-House Cases and finally restore the Privileges or Immunities Clause to its proper role as a check against government intrusion on individual rights. Doing so would secure Americans’ natural rights, such as the freedom of contract and the right to earn an honest living, without enabling judges to invent constitutional rights to health care or welfare payments. For a more detailed discussion of McDonald’s potential implications, and how the Court should rule, see my recent op-ed here.

I will also be participating in several public events this week on McDonald, the Fourteenth Amendment, and firearm regulation. Today at 4:00 p.m., I will be speaking at a Cato policy forum, which will be broadcast live on C-SPAN and which you may watch online here. Tomorrow at 3:30 p.m., I will participate in a post-argument discussion of McDonald at the Georgetown University Law Center, which event is cosponsored by the Federalist Society and the Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy (where Josh Blackman and I recently published a lengthy article on the subject). And on Wednesday at noon, I will be participating in a Cato Capitol Hill briefing on McDonald and the future of gun rights at the Rayburn House Office Building, room B-340 (more information here).

CP at Cato's blog

Keeping Pandora's Box Sealed

2010-02-22T18:05:00.000-05:00

The moment everyone was waiting for has arrived: The article Josh Blackman and I wrote, “Keeping Pandora’s Box Sealed: Privileges or Immunities, The Constitution in 2020, and Properly Extending the Right to Keep and Bear Arms to the States,” has officially come out in the Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy. (I previously blogged about this article here, among other places, and here’s a recent reference on Reason’s blog.) The journal thought enough of our work to publish it on page 1 of issue 1 of this year’s volume.

We’re also grateful to the journal editors for expediting the editing and publication process generally so that the article would come out in time for the McDonald v. Chicago argument. Indeed, that strategy is already paying off, with “Keeping Pandora’s Box Sealed” having been cited in the petitioners’ reply brief — not to mention Cato’s amicus brief. The Georgetown JLPP has been cited in Supreme Court opinions the past two terms, so we’re cautiously optimistic about our chance to continue this trend.

In addition to reading the article (also available on SSRN), you can also attend various presentations I’m giving in the next two weeks about McDonald v. Chicago and properly extending the right to keep and bear arms to the states:

Feb. 23 at lunch – University of New Mexico Law School (sponsored by the Federalist Society) – “McDonald v. City of Chicago and Properly Extending the Right to Keep and Bear Arms”
Feb. 25 at 1:30pm EST/10:30 PST – ABA Continuing Legal Education Teleconference – “Beyond Gun Control: McDonald v. City of Chicago and Incorporation of Bill of Rights” (registration fee, 1.5 hours of CLE credit)
Mar. 1 at 4pm – Cato Institute Policy Forum – “McDonald v. Chicago: Will the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Apply to the States?“
[Mar. 2 at 10am - Supreme Court argument in McDonald]
Mar. 2 at 3:30pm – Georgetown University Law School – Post-Argument Discussion of McDonald and “Keeping Pandora’s Box Sealed” (sponsored by the GJLPP and the Federalist Society)
Mar. 3 at 12pm – Cato Institute Hill Briefing in B-340 Rayburn House Office Building - “McDonald v. Chicago: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Future of Gun Rights“

You can also listen here to a half-hour podcast about “Keeping Pandora’s Box Sealed” that I recently recorded with the Independence Institute’s David Kopel (also a Cato associate policy analyst).

CP at Cato's blog

NRA Shoots Itself in the Foot

2010-02-08T10:29:00.002-05:00

I previously blogged about the NRA’s misbegotten motion, which the Supreme Court granted, to carve 10 minutes of oral argument time away from the petitioners in McDonald v. Chicago. Essentially, there was no discernable reason for the motion other than to ensure that the NRA could claim some credit for the eventual victory, and thus boost its fundraising.

Well, having argued that petitioners’ counsel Alan Gura insufficiently covered the argument that the Second Amendment should be “incorporated” against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the NRA has now filed a brief that fails even to reference the four biggest cases regarding incorporation and substantive due process. That is, the NRA reply brief contains no mention of Washington v. Glucksberg (1997), Benton v. Maryland (1969), Duncan v. Louisiana (1968), or Palko v. Connecticut (1937). (The NRA did cite those cases in its opening brief.) What is more, it also lacks a discussion of Judge O’Scannlain’s magisterial Ninth Circuit opinion in Nordyke v. King (2009), which the Supreme Court might as well cut and paste regardless of which constitutional provision it uses to extend the right to keep and bear arms to the states!

I should add that the petitioners’ reply brief does cite all of those aforementioned cases (as well as the “Keeping Pandora’s Box Sealed” law review article I co-authored with Josh Blackman). I leave it to the reader to determine whether it is Alan Gura or the NRA who is better positioned to argue substantive due process — or any other part of the McDonald case.

For more on the rift between the McDonald petitioners and the NRA, see this story in today’s Washington Post (in which I’m quoted, full disclosure, after a lengthy interview I gave the reporter last week).

(Full disclosure again: Alan Gura is a friend of mine and of Cato, and I suppose I should also say that I’ve participated in NRA-sponsored events in the past.)

CP at Cato's blog.

Socialists Shouldn’t Have to Admit Libertarians Into Their Club

2010-02-04T10:58:00.002-05:00

Hastings College of the Law, a public law school in California, has a policy prohibiting discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, disabilities, age, sex or sexual orientation.” In 2004, the Christian Legal Society, a religious student organization at the school, applied to become a “recognized student organization” — a designation that would have allowed CLS to receive a variety of benefits afforded to about 60 other Hastings groups. While all are welcome to attend CLS meetings, CLS’s charter requires that its officers and voting members abide by key tenets of the Christian faith and comport themselves in ways consistent with its fundamental mission, which includes a prohibition on “unrepentant” sexual conduct outside of marriage between one man and one woman.

Hastings denied CLS registration on the asserted ground that this charter conflicts with the school’s nondiscrimination policy. CLS sued Hastings, asking for no different treatment than is given to any registered student group. The district court granted Hastings summary judgment and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether Hastings’s refusal to grant CLS access to student organization benefits amounted to viewpoint discrimination, which is impermissible under the First Amendment.

Yesterday Cato filed an amicus brief supporting CLS — authored by preeminent legal scholar Richard Epstein – in which we argue that CLS’s right to intimate and expressive association trump any purported state interest in enforcing a school nondiscrimination policy. While Hastings may impose reasonable restrictions on access to limited public forums, it should not be allowed to admit speakers with one point of view while excluding speakers who hold different views. Our brief also discredits Hastings’s assertion that its ability to exclude the public at large from school premises renders their content-based speech restrictions constitutional.

We urge the Court to safeguard public university students’ right to form groups – which by definition exclude people – free from government interference or censorship. (Of course, our first choice would be for the government to get out of the university business and our second choice would be to stop forcing taxpayers to pay for student clubs, but given those two realities — as in the case at hand – freedom of association is the way to go.)

CP at Cato's Blog

When Individuals Form Corporations, They Don’t Lose Their Rights

2010-02-03T10:09:00.000-05:00

The blogosphere has been abuzz on the heels of the Supreme Court’s landmark Citizens United decision. Hysteric criticisms of the speculative changes to our political landscape aside — including the President’s misstatements in the State of the Union — one of the most common and oft-repeated criticisms is that the Constitution does not protect corporations. Several “reform” groups have even drafted and circulated constitutional amendments to address this concern.

This line of attack demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of both the nature of corporations and the freedoms protected by the Constitution, which is exemplified by the facile charge that “corporations aren’t human beings.”

Well of course they aren’t — but that’s constitutionally irrelevant: Corporations aren’t “real people” in the sense that the Constitution’s protection of sexual privacy or prohibition on slavery make no sense in this context, but that doesn’t mean that corporate entities also lack, say, Fourth Amendment rights. Or would the “no rights for corporations” crowd be okay with the police storming their employers’ offices and carting off their (employer-owned) computers for no particular reason? — or to chill criticism of some government policy.

Or how about Fifth Amendment rights? Can the mayor of New York exercise eminent domain over Rockefeller Center by fiat and without compensation if he decides he’d like to move his office there?

So corporations have to have some constitutional rights or nobody would form them in the first place. The reason they have these rights isn’t because they’re “legal” persons, however — though much of the doctrine builds on that technical point — but instead because corporations are merely one of the ways in which rights-bearing individuals associate to better engage in a whole host of constitutionally protected activity.

That is, the Constitution protects these groups of rights-bearing individuals. The proposition that only human beings, standing alone, with no group affiliation whatsoever, are entitled to First Amendment protection — that “real people” lose some of their rights when they join together in groups of two or ten or fifty or 100,000 — is legally baseless and has no grounding in the Constitution. George Mason law professor Ilya Somin, also a Cato adjunct scholar, discusses this point here.

In any event, as Chief Justice Roberts said in his Citizens United concurrence: “The First Amendment protects more than just the individual on a soapbox and the lonely pamphleteer.” Justice Scalia makes the same point, explaining that the text of the Constitution “makes no distinction between types of speakers.” The New York Times isn’t “an individual American” but its speech is still protected under the First Amendment (regardless of any exemption for “media corporations” — whatever those are in a world where conglomerates own interests not limited to media, not to mention the advent of blogs and other “new” media).

A related line of attack is that individuals acting through corporations should be denied their freedom of speech because corporations are “state-created entities.” The theory goes that if a state has the power to create corporations, then it has the power to define those entities’ rights. Somin rebuts the weakness of this argument here, correctly pointing out that nearly every newspaper and political journal in the country is a corporation.

In short, the contention that the First Amendment does not protect corporations ignores the fact that there is no constitutional difference between individuals and groups of individuals, however organized. Still, I give credit to the groups who are proposing constitutional amendments that would limit corporate rights: at least they recognize that, after Citizens United, there is no basis upon which to argue that the First Amendment does not protect corporate political speech. The Free Speech Clause, after all, is blind as to the nature of the speaker.

For further concise refutations of the basic arguments against Citizens United, see here (points 3-6 address issues relating to corporations and their rights).

CP at Cato's blog

NRA Cares More about NRA Than Gun Rights, Liberty, Professional Courtesy

2010-01-26T10:07:00.000-05:00

Yesterday the Supreme Court granted the NRA’s motion for divided argument in McDonald v. Chicago. What this means is that Alan Gura’s 30 minutes of argument time on behalf of Chicagoland gun owners just became 20, with 10 going to former Solicitor General Paul Clement, whom the NRA hired at the last minute to pursue this motion and argument. (Full disclosure: Alan Gura is a friend of mine, and of Cato.)

The NRA’s motion was premised on the idea that Alan had not fully presented the substantive due process argument for selective incorporation of the Second Amendment — presumably out of an outsized concern for the Privileges or Immunities Clause arguments about which I’ve previously blogged and written a law review article. This is a highly unusual argument and is a facial slap at Alan’s abilities as an advocate. Sadly, it’s also typical of how the NRA has behaved throughout this case and before that during the Heller litigation — sabotaging Alan at every turn and showing again and again that, even in the face of winning arguments that fully support its legal positions, the NRA prefers to seek glory for itself rather than presenting the strongest case for its purported constituency of gun owners.

Alan rightfully opposed the NRA’s motion because the group’s participation at argument adds nothing substantive to the case. No one will ever know why the motion was granted, as the Court need not (and did not) provide any reasons. Nonetheless, it’s a safe bet that this is solely a testament to Clement’s talent and reputation (notably, the motion was not filed by any of the NRA’s other excellent attorneys, who briefed and argued their case in the lower courts and in a cert petition and brief before the Supreme Court).

I have great respect for Paul Clement, and have worked with him by filing amicus briefs in two cases he’s already argued this term, but I do take issue with his repeated suggestion that the motion’s purpose — and the reason behind its granting — was so that “all the avenues to incorporation, including the due process clause, are fully explored at the argument.” This kind of comment — again impugning Alan’s litigation strategy — is uncalled for, and renews concerns over the NRA’s conduct.

Throughout this case, Alan has consistently and forcefully advocated for the Second Amendment’s incorporation under the Due Process Clause. That didn’t change when his case was taken up by the Supreme Court. The thing is that the due process arguments are not all that complex, and simply do not merit the same care and attention in the briefs as arguments based on the Constitution’s actual text and history. A first-year law student who’s taken constitutional law – let alone a Supreme Court clerk – could write a due process incorporation argument in her sleep! In any event, the oral argument will be driven by the justices’ questions, not by any long soliloquies by counsel. Alan’s — and all attorneys’ — job is to be ready for anything.

If the NRA were concerned about the final outcome of the case, it would be unlikely to attack Alan’s strategy or question his preparation (an odd way to be “helpful” to one’s side). It is not a stretch to predict that this case will be favorably decided at least in part on due process grounds, however, so what we are seeing here is likely an attempt by the NRA to position itself as responsible for such a victory – and that Alan isn’t.

Ultimately, then, the NRA is engaging here in fundraising, not liberty-promotion or ethical lawyering.

CP at Cato's blog

The Government Should Have Less Power to Tax and Spend, Not More Power to Regulate Speech

2010-01-22T16:41:00.003-05:00

Yesterday, The Hill asked various pundits and politicos to respond to the Supreme Court’s Citizens United ruling. The Big Question (as their periodic feature is called) was, “Will corporate money change campaigns?” You can read my response here.

Today, that same newspaper invited me to blog some further thoughts on the Citizens United decision. Here’s what I wrote:

Critics of yesterday’s decision say the sky of American democracy is falling. Supporters—including myself—say it’s a great day for the republic and a vindication of the freedom of speech. How can this be? Are nonprofit think tanks and advocacy groups like my own Cato Institute, the ACLU, the NRA, and many other odd bedfellows who supported Citizens United all in the pockets of Wall Street, Big Oil, insurance companies, and others that President Obama assails as corrupting our politics? Leaving aside the issue of why the politician who got more of his campaign funding from Goldman Sachs than any other source would be going after the very industries that most support him, the asymmetry in this debate rests on the myth that money is an evil in the political system, and that therefore the American people want so-called campaign finance reform to “clean up” government.

Money is no more an evil in politics than it is in life generally. Some people may not like mud-slinging attack ads, but some people also don’t like SUVs, the Super Bowl, the Jay Leno Show, and many other things that people spend money on—including donations to Cato, the ACLU, the NRA, etc. The problem with money in politics isn’t the money, but rather the politics. So long as the government is powerful enough to dole out tax breaks, subsidies, stimulus funds, regulations, earmarks, and a whole host of other goodies (and baddies), those that stand to benefit (and lose) will spend money on the political process. The way to get rid of this behavior and spending—which is constitutionally protected in a whole host of ways: freedom of speech, freedom of association, the right to petition the government for redress of grievances, etc.—is to reduce the government’s power to affect so many people’s lives and transform economic incentives for businesses big and small. Reduce the size of government and K Street will melt away.

Finally, as my colleague Roger Pilon points out, 26 states have minimal campaign finance laws, with no evidence that those states have more corruption—or a more unequal “political playing field”—than states that strictly regulate. And that’s because the real reason we have campaign finance regulations—the dirty little secret behind the whole convoluted regime—is that it’s an incumbency protection racket. From the so-called “millionaire’s amendment” that the Supreme Court struck down in 2008 to the limits on corporate and union advocacy that the Court struck down yesterday, McCain-Feingold and all other campaign finance legislation—passed by self-interested politicians—is designed to make it harder for challengers. After-all, incumbents have the benefit of name recognition, taxpayer-funded travel to and around their home districts and states, taxpayer-funded campaign literature disguised as informational flyers touting all the great things a congressman is doing, and a host of other advantages.

The First Amendment is not a “loophole” for big business and those of us who want freer speech—without bureaucrats deciding who gets to speak when and how much—are not corporate shills. Free speech is the very foundation of our democracy, and we are stronger today for the Citizens United decision.

CP: Cato's blog

Supreme Court Ruling on Hillary Movie Heralds Freer Speech for All of Us

2010-01-21T15:44:00.001-05:00

Today the Supreme Court struck a major blow for free speech by correctly holding that government cannot try to “level the political playing field” by banning corporations from making independent campaign expenditures on films, books, or even campaign signs.

As Justice Kennedy said in announcing the opinion, “if the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits jailing citizens for engaging in political speech.”

While the Court has long upheld campaign finance regulations as a way to prevent corruption in elections, it has also repeated that equalizing speech is never a valid government interest.
After all, to make campaign spending equal, the government would have to prevent some people or groups from spending less than they wished. That is directly contrary to protecting speech from government restraint, which is ultimately the heart of American conceptions about the freedom of speech.

No case demonstrates this idea better than Citizens United, where a nonprofit corporation made no donations to candidates but rather spent money to spread its ideas about Hillary Clinton independent of the campaigns of primary opponent Barack Obama, potential general election opponent John McCain, or any other candidates. Where is the “corruption” if the campaign(s) being supported have no knowledge, let alone control over what independent actors do? — be they one person, two people, or a large group?

Today’s ruling may well lead to more corporate and union election spending, but none of this money will go directly to candidates — so there is no possible corruption or even “appearance of corruption.” It will go instead to spreading information about candidates and issues. Such increases in spending should be welcome because studies have shown that more spending — more political communication — leads to better-informed voters.

In short, the Citizens United decision has strengthened both the First Amendment and American democracy.

CP: Cato's blog

Scott Brown and the Future Supreme Court Vacancy

2010-01-20T15:47:00.002-05:00

Josh Blackman and Lyle Denniston offer some thoughts on the effect of Scott Brown’s Massachusetts earthquake on the looming retirement of — and the nomination of a replacement for — Justice John Paul Stevens. Josh and Lyle both latch onto the idea that Brown’s providing the 41st vote to sustain a potential Republican filibuster could cause President Obama to nominate someone more moderate than would be the case if the Democrats had maintained their super-majority. Lyle goes on to speculate that both Obama and Senate Democrats, looking to this fall’s election, will generally want to tack right in the face of an emboldened GOP and impatient electorate.

I think this sort of analysis is a misapplication of otherwise correct political analysis to the sui generis event that is a Supreme Court nomination. Yes, Scott Brown’s presence in the Kennedy people’s seat will change the dynamic of the health care debate, definitively kill cap and trade, otherwise alter the Democrats’ legislative agenda — and even affect lower court nominees. But I’m not so sure it will affect Obama’s calculus in picking a new Supreme Court justice.

Here’s why: Despite having been a constitutional law professor — whom I did not have when I was in law school, though I passed him in the halls a few times — the president has not really tried to advance his ideological agenda in the courts. It’s bizarre, really, that judicial nominations have not at all been a priority for this administration given that few people pay attention to lower court appointments and this could have been a place where the president could have thrown some bones to his base at little political cost (and certainly far less cost than the rest of his domestic agenda).

Moreover, based on the Sotomayor nomination, we see that when it comes to the Supreme Court, Obama is much more about affirmative action than appointing either the best-qualified Democrats or the most ”progressive” ones (or both, to provide a counterweight to Justice Scalia). (Note that Sotomayor at the time of her nomination was nowhere near the best or most left-wing member of the federal judiciary.) Even with a filibuster-proof Senate majority, we would have been unlikely to see a Cass Sunstein or Harold Koh pick — though each took not insignificant heat and delay in being confirmed to regulatory czar and head State Department lawyer, respectively. (And Larry Tribe is too old.)

With Sonia Sotomayor, Obama hit the “twofer” of a woman and a Hispanic (the first unless you count Benjamin Cardozo). With the Stevens replacement, women and minorities are still slightly preferred but the key “diversity” quota to fill is “non-judge” — and, per the above, a non-controversial one on whom the president won’t have to spend much political capital.

And so, while the prohibitive favorite — solicitor general Elana Kagan (and a woman) – is no surprise, you heard it here first that the other likely nominees, in no particular order, are Janet Napolitano (DHS secretary, woman), Deval Patrick (Massachusetts governor, black), Jennifer Granholm (Michigan governor, woman), Kathleen Sullivan (former Stanford dean, lesbian), Amy Klobuchar (senator, woman), and Akhil Amar (Yale law professor, South Asian). I’ll comment on their relative merits in future posts, but nobody on that list is both a radical and an intellectual heavyweight, and the list has not changed with Scott Brown’s election (though the indirect spotlight during the campaign on Gov. Patrick’s unpopularity might have hurt his chances).

CP: Cato's blog

Is Justice Kennedy Libertarian?

2010-01-14T17:19:00.000-05:00

Early last year, Cato hosted a book forum for Helen Knowles’s The Tie Goes to Freedom: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy on Liberty. This really is a remarkable book, with an ambitious goal: trying to make coherent sense of the oft-frustrating “swing justice.” And now I have a lengthy review of it that just came out in the latest issue of the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Politics (where Bob Levy also has an essay, on the aftermath of District of Columbia v. Heller).

Knowles makes the provocative argument that Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence is “modestly libertarian.” I think that this argument, in the limited ways Knowles makes it — with respect to free speech, equal protection, and individual dignity — is probably sound. Still, that deduction is a small discovery considering the broad swath of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Moreover, it says little about whether Kennedy is faithful to the Constitution, which is a stronger measure of libertarianism (as Randy Barnett described at Cato’s 2008 Constitution Day Conference in his B. Kenneth Simon Lecture in Constitutional Thought, reprinted in the latest Cato Supreme Court Review).

Here’s how I conclude:

Good on speech and race, bad on government power, and ugly on abortion and the
death penalty, Justice Kennedy is a sui generis enigma at the heart of the
modern Supreme Court. However new Justice Sonia Sotomayor affects the
Court’s dynamics, it is unlikely that Justice Kennedy will shift from his role
as the deciding vote in most controversial cases. Helen Knowles has thus
done us a great service in deconstructing Justice Kennedy’s faint-hearted
libertarianism and helping us better understand the “sweet mystery” of his
jurisprudence.

For details on how I reached this conclusion, read the full review (which you can also download from SSRN). I should add that Knowles’s book is more useful to us Court-watchers than Frank Colucci’s Justice Kennedy’s Jurisprudence: The Full and Necessary Meaning of Liberty — whose shortcomings I won’t detail but instead refer you to Eric Posner’s thoughtful critique.

CP: Cato's blog

Actually, Justice Breyer, the Constitution Enumerates Specific Powers, not Limitations on Otherwise Plenary Federal Power

2010-01-13T10:59:00.002-05:00

Yesterday I went to the Court to watch the argument in United States v. Comstock, which I blogged about previously and in which Cato filed an amicus brief. As I also blogged previously, Cato’s arguments so concerned the government that the solicitor general spent four pages of her reply brief going after them.

At issue is a 2006 federal law that provides for the civil commitment of any federal prisoner after the conclusion of his sentence upon the appropriate official’s certification that the soon-to-be-released prisoner is “sexually dangerous.” The problem is that, while states have what’s called a “police power” to handle this sort of thing — to appropriately deal with with threats to society from the dangerously insane and so forth — the federal government’s powers are limited to those enumerated in the Constitution. And I’m sorry, there’s no power to civilly commit people who have committed no further crime beyond those for which they’ve already been duly punished.

The government, having abandoned its Commerce Clause argument — a big loser in the lower courts — relied at the Supreme Court on the Necessary and Proper Clause. This clause says that Congress shall have the power to “make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution [the specific powers listed in Article I, section 8], and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States.”

In other words, we have a government of delegated and enumerated, and therefore limited powers. As Ryan Lirette put it in National Review Online last week, ”Congress may not search every corner of our country looking for problems to vanquish. Instead, Congress must be able to justify each law it passes with a specific congressional authorization.”

The solicitor general contends that civilly committing the sexually dangerous is “necessary and proper” to regulating the federal prison system — which itself is not an enumerated power but ancillary to enforcing federal criminal laws that Congress is appropriately empowered to make. At the argument, Solicitor General Kagan further justified the relevant provision as related to “responsibly” releasing federal prisoners.

I don’t think her “cascading powers” theory of the Necessary and Proper Clause is a winner — for reasons I describe in my recent podcast — and Justice Scalia also wasn’t convinced. Justice Breyer, however, at one point asked where the Constitution prohibited the federal government from “help[ing] with” a problem it identified (see page 31 of the transcript) and in general was hesitant to find limits to congressional action to solve big policy areas.

Breyer has it all backward: We don’t operate on the premise that the government has full plenary power to do whatever it thinks is best, for the “general welfare,” for “the children,” for “society,” or for any particular group, checked only by specific prohibitions. Instead, our system of government — our constitutional rule of law — provides for islands of government involvement in a sea of liberty. It is individual people who can do whatever they want that isn’t prohibited by law, not the government.

And so we’ll see soon enough which vision of the relationship between citizen and state the Supreme Court embraces. Along with Justice Breyer, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg also were not very sympathetic to the federalism and libertarian arguments ably presented by federal public defender G. Alan DuBois. Along with Justice Scalia, Justice Alito was (refreshingly) skeptical of undue government power — and one would expect (the silent) Justice Thomas to be in that category as well. Justice Sotomayor also asked some interesting questions inquiring into the federal government’s ability to hold someone indefinitely — including on the relationship of that power to the Commerce Clause authority underlying most federal exercise of power — so she could go either way. Finally, the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy were, uncharacteristically, not all too active — seeming to question both sides equally — so it’s hard to predict how the Court will ultimately rule.

CP: Cato's blog

Supreme Court Lets Eminent Domain Abuse Continue

2010-01-12T17:11:00.003-05:00

Yesterday, the Supreme Court decided not take up an important takings case, the infelicitously titled 480.00 Acres of Land v. United States. As I blogged previously, Cato filed an amicus brief in the case in the hopes that the owner of the “480.00 Acres of Land,” Gil Fornatora, would ultimately receive the “just compensation” to which he is constitutionally entitled. The Court also missed the chance to correct the pattern of due process abuse that is apparently rampant in Florida. The case involved the federal government maneuvering to unjustly drive down property values before taking land for (legitimate) public use — in this case expanding the Everglades — thus greatly diminishing the compensation it was obligated to pay the owners. Fox News recently had a report about the case, in which I briefly appeared.

Interestingly — and sadly – since the Fox News report, my voicemail and email inbox has been receiving story after story of individuals who have experienced injustices similar to that of Mr. Fornatora. While it is unfortunate that this case has come to an end, the number of calls and emails leads me to believe that more cases like this will be making their way through the federal judiciary and that, eventually, this abuse will be halted.

To that end, while Cato does not involve itself directly in litigation, on the subject of takings and eminent domain abuse I can certainly recommend our friends at the Institute for Justice and Pacific Legal Foundation. Specifically on the type of “condemnation blight” at the heart of the Fornatora case, feel free to contact PLF’s Atlantic (Florida) office at (772)781-7787 or write to Pacific Legal Foundation, 1002 SE Monterey Commons Blvd., Suite 102, Stuart, FL 34996. Steven Gieseler was the attorney who presented the Fornatora case to the Supreme Court, and who got me involved.

In other eminent domain news, George Will had an excellent column on January 3 condemning the pernicious Atlantic Yards land grab.

CP: Cato's blog

Michigan Court Inexplicably Tosses Suit, Endorses Forcible Enlistment of Day-Care Workers into the State Government

2010-01-07T19:16:00.001-05:00

When lawyers and other commentators say that a court did not properly explain its decision, it’s typically for hyperbolic effect. But, in a bizarre move, a court in the failed great state of Michigan has dismissed an economic liberty case brought by our friends at the Mackinac Center Legal Foundation for reasons the court quite literally did not explain. The court simply denied the plaintiffs’ complaint and that was that.

Home-based day care owners Sherry Loar, Michelle Berry, and Paulette Silverson have all been taxed by the Michigan Department of Human Services because, according to the state, they are somehow employees of the state and (further!) must pay union dues. because this baseless assertion comes directly from the state DHS, an executive department, among the significant constitutional objections to the case presents separation of power problems. (Ok, I haven’t studied the Michigan Constitution, but I assume they separate their powers there.) Enough ridiculous laws are passed by state legislatures — more than 40,000 last year alone – we don’t need state executive agencies getting into the act.

Yet, the Michigan Court of Appeals has nothing at all to say about the case.

Inexplicable — and unpardonable.

CP: Cato's blog

Properly Extending the Right to Keep and Bear Arms to the States

2009-12-22T12:15:00.003-05:00

I recently blogged about an interesting op-ed in which Ken Klukowski and Ken Blackwell of the American Civil Rights Union argue that the Supreme Court need not overturn The Slaughter-House Cases while “incorporating” the right to bear arms against the states. (Josh Blackman fisked the article in more depth here.) This piece was essentially a distillation of the ACRU’s amicus brief in McDonald v. City of Chicago, which ultimately argues, like Cato’s brief, that Chicago’s gun ban is unconstitutional.

It has come to my attention, however, that I mischaracterized one aspect of the Kens’ op-ed (sorry about that): while they are indeed against overturning Slaughter-House, the authors still seek to apply the Second Amendment right through the Privileges or Immunities Clause (like Cato and most libertarians), rather than through the Due Process Clause (like many conservatives and gun rights proponents). This is the ACRU’s main argument, and it is based largely on Ken Klukowski’s recent law review article – indeed, the brief’s body cites Klukowski article some 20 times, often for propositions that find no further support in case law or academic literature. (Josh has also provided a short critique of the ACRU brief/Klukowski article, so I won’t do that here.)

In any event, this clarification gives me an opportunity to name and outline the five possible ways a justice could come down in the McDonald case:

“Extreme Anti-Gun” — Affirm the lower court in its entirety, deciding that it correctly interpreted Supreme Court precedent, that reconsideration of this precedent is unwarranted, and therefore that neither the Second Amendment nor the right to bear arms it protects extends to people in the states (as opposed to in federal territories, like the District of Columbia). I can’t imagine that any justice will vote for this way; even those who dissented in Heller generally support the selective incorporation of rights against the states.
“Conventional Liberal” – Affirm the lower court in part but clarify that while the Second Amendment is indeed “incorporated” as against the states via the Due Process Clause, Chicago’s gun ban is still okay — possibly under a test weighing the individual right against the city’s interest in reducing gun violence. There may be one to four votes for this position: Justice Breyer likes balancing tests; Justice Stevens may feel that his hometown’s regulations are justified; and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor may feel the same way about New York.
“Conventional Conservative” — Reverse the lower court, “incorporate” the Second Amendment via the Due Process Clause — adopting an analysis akin to that of Ninth Circuit Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain in the Nordyke case — and strike down Chicago’s gun ban. The NRA’s brief primarily advocates this position, as do many conservatives fearful of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. There may be one to eight votes for this position: The “minimalist” Chief Justice Roberts may be hesitant to overturn longstanding precedent; Justice Scalia may decide that the devil he knows (substantive due process) is better than the one he doesn’t (privileges or immunities); Justice Kennedy may feel vested in his own expansive “fundamental rights” jurisprudence under the Due Process Clause (see my review of a book analyzing that jurisprudence); Justice Alito may share one or more of the above sentiments; and one or more of the aforementioned liberals may decide to “bite the bullet” and go along with this position.
“Mend Slaughter-House, Don’t End It” — Reverse the lower court, overturn three old precedents — Cruikshank (1876), Presser (1886), and Miller (1894), which were decided at a time when none of the rights in the Bill of Rights was considered to apply to the states – “incorporate” the Second Amendment via the Privileges or Immunities Clause without touching Slaughter-House, and strike down Chicago’s gun ban. This is the ACRU position, and while I don’t think it’s textually or historically supportable – a scholarly consensus across ideological lines holds that Slaughter-House was both wrongly decided and forecloses any significant application of the Privileges or Immunities Clause — it could emerge as a political “compromise.” (If Justice O’Connor were still on the Court, I could maybe see her advancing this position.)
“Originalist/Libertarian” — Reverse the lower court, overturn Slaughter-House and the three aforementioned cases, extend the right to keep and bear arms to the states (which is technically distinct from “incorporating” the Second Amendment), and strike down Chicago’s gun ban. This is Cato’s position – as well as that of the liberal Constitutional Accountability Center on behalf of eight leading constitutional law professors from across the political spectrum – and there will be one and may be up to all nine of the justices here: Justice Thomas has long said that he’d like to revisit Slaughter-House in the appropriate case, and he surely led the push to grant a cert petition whose question presented called for briefing about the Privileges or Immunities Clause; any of the others who seriously grapple with the arguments in Alan Gura’s brilliant petitioners’ brief (and those of his amici, us included) will also have to go this way despite their various political qualms.

In short, I see at least five votes in favor of extending the right to keep and bear arms to the states, but it’s an open question as to whether the Court will do that via the Due Process of Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Now, you may ask why, if I’m so confident that the fifth option above is correct, don’t all conservatives qua self-professed “originalists” gravitate towards it (and, conversely, why some liberals qua “living constitutionalists” do). That’s an unlawyerly matter of policy preferences: as the Kens’ op-ed details, conservatives (and some libertarians), while wanting to extend Heller’s interpretation of the Second Amendment to the states, are wary of opening a Pandora’s Box of positive rights (health care, housing, welfare, etc.), as well as the perpetual culture-war bogeymen (abortion, gay marriage, pornography, etc.). Liberal intellectuals, meanwhile, are holding their nose at having to extend gun rights because they feel that’s the only concession they have to make to achieve their utopic constitutionalization of the entire progressive agenda.

While libertarians share the conservative concern about positive rights — as well as legal, if typically not policy, qualms about courts’ handling of social issues (e.g., that Roe v. Wade is bad law even if some libertarians are pro-choice; that Lawrence v. Texas is good law but achieved through Kennedy-esque hand-waving rather than sound legal reasoning) – many of us see the benefits of being able to protect economic liberties and other natural rights. For example, unlike conservatives, we generally like Lochner, the 1905 case that struck down on “liberty of contract” grounds a New York law limiting bakers’ hours.

Yes there’s a danger — particularly if President Obama gets to replace not only Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, but also Scalia and Kennedy – that overturning Slaughter-House will open the aforementioned Pandora’s Box, but: 1) that danger isn’t necessarily mitigated by somehow managing to use the Privileges or Immunities Clause without overturning Slaughter-House; 2) the danger is no different than under the current substantive due process doctrine; and 3) if we are to remain originalists not just in overturning Slaughter-House but in future jurisprudence, the progressives’ arguments fail, the danger is averted, and the Box stays sealed. Josh Blackman and I wrote our article, “Keeping Pandora’s Box Sealed: Privileges or Immunities, The Constitution in 2020, and Properly Extending the Right to Keep and Bear Arms,” in part to address the valid concerns (sketched in the Kens’ op-ed) about the consequences of truly reviving the Privileges or Immunities Clause.

While we won’t assuage the staunchest social conservatives – (adult) pornography is protected speech (but even more so is political advertising!) – we should mollify many faint-hearted originalists. Anyone who thinks the Constitution is a “dead” document, whose text is to be interpreted according to its original public meaning, has to admit that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects something more than what Slaughter-House said it did.

To see how all this works in greater detail, read our Pandora’s Box article, which I’ve previously discussed here , here, and here. And again, Cato’s amicus brief is here; see also this law review article by its principal author, Cato adjunct scholar Timothy Sandefur.

CP: Cato's blog

Vague Laws Defy the Rule of Law

2009-12-18T10:45:00.000-05:00

Following Enron’s downfall, the federal government charged company CEO Jeffrey Skilling with “honest services fraud” connected to the alleged manipulation of Enron’s market value (and other securities irregularities). This charge — also at issue in two other cases before the Court this term — is based on a statute which says, in its entirety: “For the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”

Skilling was convicted, and his conviction was upheld by the Fifth Circuit. The Supreme Court agreed to review the application of the “honest services fraud” statute to Skilling (as well as the issue of potential jury bias stemming from pretrial publicity in Houston). Cato, joined by the Pacific Legal Foundation, filed an amicus brief supporting neither party, arguing simply that vague statutes such as the one at issue here offend due process.

We take no position on whether Skilling committed a crime, or even the crime at issue here (whatever that may be). Instead, we argue that the Court should clarify that the constitutional prohibition on vague laws protects sophisticated and unsophisticated defendants alike in the realm of economic regulation, as well as in criminal law. The due process requirements of fair warning and definiteness apply equally in the contexts of white collar business crimes, business torts, and civil regulations.

Vague laws involve three basic dangers: First, they may harm the innocent by failing to warn of the offense. Second, they encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement because vague laws delegate enforcement and statutory interpretation to individual government officials. Third, because citizens will take extra precautions to avoid violating the law, vague laws inhibit our individual freedom.

For more on this issue, see Tim Lynch’s posts here and here, Gene Healy’s op-ed, or the related policy forum and podcast.

CP: Cato's blog

Supreme Court Erases Legal Precedent for Auto Bailout

2009-12-16T11:53:00.002-05:00

On Monday the Supreme Court released its last orders for the calendar year. Of particular note — apart from the non-release of the long-awaited decision in the Citizens United campaign finance case — the Court dismissed the cert petition in Indiana State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC as moot and vacated the underlying Second Circuit opinion. While this is not the ideal outcome – particularly for the Indiana creditors — it is in its own way an important decision preserving the integrity of bankruptcy law.

To recap: In January, Chrysler stood on the brink of insolvency. Purporting to act under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, the Treasury Department extended the car company a $4 billion loan using funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Still in a bad financial situation, Chrysler initially proposed an out-of-court reorganization plan that would fully repay all of Chrysler’s secured debt.

The Treasury rejected this proposal and instead insisted on a plan that would completely eradicate Chrysler’s secured debt, hinging billions of dollars in additional TARP funding on Chrysler’s acquiescence. When Chrysler’s first lien lenders refused to waive their secured rights without full payment, the Treasury devised a scheme by which Chrysler, instead of reorganizing under a chapter 11 plan, would sell its assets free of all secured interests to a shell company, the New Chrysler.

Chrysler was thus able to avoid the “absolute priority rule,” which provides that a court should not approve a bankruptcy plan unless it is “fair and equitable” to all classes of creditors. The forced reorganization amounted to the Treasury redistributing value from senior, secured creditors to debtors and junior, unsecured creditors. The government should not have been allowed, through its own self-dealing, to hand-pick certain creditors for favorable treatment at the expense of others who would otherwise enjoy first lien priority.

While the Court’s ruling prevents the creditors from collecting what would have otherwise been considered their rightful portion of the liquidation, it also erases a terrible precedent from the federal judiciary’s books and reaffirms years of settled bankruptcy law. A decision upholding the Second Circuit’s ruling would have undercut the established practices of bankruptcy and introduced even more uncertainty into a still-uneasy market.

To put it more broadly, the bankruptcy laws are in place to ensure that debts are paid in an established and fair manner and not at the whim of whatever political actors happen to be in power at the time. Taking away that assurance stifles investment and thereby hurts the economy.

Cato joined the Washington Legal Foundation, the Allied Educational Foundation, and George Mason law professor Todd Zywicki on a brief supporting the creditors’ petition that you can read here. And you can watch Cato’s policy forum on the auto bailout here.

Keeping Pandora's Box Sealed

2009-12-11T17:27:00.000-05:00

In today’s Washington Times, Ken Klukowski and Ken Blackwell co-authored an op-ed about McDonald v. Chicago and the Privileges or Immunities Clause titled, “A gun case or Pandora’s box?”

If that title sounds familiar, it should. Josh Blackman and I have co-authored a forthcoming article called “Opening Pandora’s Box? Privileges or Immunities, The Constitution in 2020, and Properly Incorporating the Second Amendment." As Josh put it in his reply to the Kens, “imitation is the most sincere form of flattery.”

Going beyond the title, there are several errors in the piece, which I will briefly recap:
First, the Kens argue that the Supreme Court should uphold the Slaughter-House Cases, out of a fear that reversal — and thereby a reinvigoration of Privileges or Immunities — would empower judges to strike down state and local laws. What they neglect to mention is that it has been the role of the judiciary since Marbury v. Madison to strike down laws that violate the Constitution. There is near-universal agreement across the political spectrum that Slaughter-House was wrongly decided, causing the Supreme Court to abdicate its constitutional duty by ignoring the Privileges or Immunities Clause for 125 years. The Kens want to continue this mistaken jurisprudence.

Next, the Kens describe the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a general license for courts to strike down any law they do not like. This is not accurate. Neither the Privileges or Immunities Clause nor any other part of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers judges to impose their policy views. Instead, “privileges or immunities” was a term of art in 1868 (the year the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified) referring to a specific set of common law, pre-existing rights, including the right to keep and bear arms. The Privileges or Immunities Clause is thus no more a blank check for judges to impose their will than the Due Process Clause — the exact vehicle the Kens would use to “incorporate” the Second Amendment.

To set the record straight, Josh and I are working on an op-ed — not so much to respond to the Kens’ flawed analysis but to present the correct historical and textual view of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. To see our arguments in greater detail, read our article and Cato’s McDonald brief, both of which I’ve previously blogged about here , here, and here.

CP: Cato's blog

Health Care Mandate Is Unconstitutional — and Don’t Leave Home Without the Cato Constitution

2009-12-10T16:02:00.002-05:00

Yesterday the Heritage Foundation released a new paper on the unconstitutionality of the proposed health care mandate. Think tanks aren’t normally in the habit of promoting their peer institutions’ work, but this paper is incredibly timely and its lead author is Cato senior fellow Randy Barnett. You really should go read it.

Interestingly, at the event unveiling the paper, Eugene Volokh (of UCLA Law School and the Volokh Conspiracy blog) at one point wanted to quote the Constitution and realized he wasn’t carrying one! Eugene asked if anyone had a Heritage Constitution. Former Attorney General Ed Meese, now chairman of Heritage’s Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, saved the day by passing Eugene his… handy, dandy, Washington Post-bestselling Cato Constitution. It seems that General Meese likes our version because it’s smaller and so fits easier into your pocket. (I would add that it also features the Declaration of Independence — as does Heritage’s — as well as a preface by my boss, Roger Pilon.)

You can watch the entire health care event, which features Senator Orrin Hatch along with Randy and Eugene, here (the Constitution bit starts at about 40:15; I ask a question at 1:04:46). The bottom line — beyond the health care abomination — is that you should always carry your Cato pocket Constitution wherever you go. Like Josh Blackman, I keep one in every suit jacket (as well as backpacks, totebags, briefcases, and roll-aboards). You never know when you — or someone else — may need it.

They also make great stocking stuffers and gifts for any night of Hanukkah (as does the latest Cato Supreme Court Review, though you may need a slightly larger stocking).

CP: Cato's blog

Supreme Court Wastes Time, Money, and Opportunity to Protect Property Rights and Due Process

2009-12-09T10:54:00.003-05:00

Yesterday the Supreme Court released its first four opinions in cases argued this term, the latest first-opinion release in recent history. The only one that interests me — and it’s not Justice Sotomayor’s maiden effort — is the civil forfeiture case, Alvarez v. Smith.

Civil forfeiture, the practice in which the police seize cars, money and other kinds of property that they say has some connection to crime, can raise various legal and policy issues — from property rights to due process. The question in Alvarez was the basic one of whether people seeking to get their property back are entitled to a prompt hearing before a judge.

I blogged about the case here, and Cato adjunct scholar Ilya Somin wrote about it here. Cato’s also filed a brief in the case supporting the individuals whose property was seized.

Unfortunately, because all underlying disputes had been resolved by the time of oral argument — cars had been returned and the individuals have either forfeited their cash or accepted the state’s return of some of it — the Court determined the case to be moot. It thus vacated the lower court’s opinion and remanded with instructions for that court to dismiss the case.

And that’s a shame. While the dispute does seem to be moot with respect to the particular petitioners, this is obviously a situation “capable of repetition” but “evading review” — along the lines of that little-known case of Roe v. Wade. That is, just like the case of a pregnant woman is moot within nine months, disputes over civil forfeiture get resolved one way or the other long before the slow turn of litigation reaches the Supreme Court. By avoiding the merits of this case, the Court guarantees that the important constitutional questions presented by this case remain perpetually unresolved.

What is more, by vacating the Seventh Circuit’s opinion – an extraordinary remedy — the Court deprives Illinoisans of a well-reasoned and just ruling that could be used as precedent in future cases. It also – and this is no small matter — wastes the time, effort, and resources of the parties and their attorneys, taxpayers (who obviously paid for the petitioners’ legal work here, as well as that of the judiciary), and, of course, amici (including Cato).

Justice Stevens was correct in his partial dissent: if the Court disagrees with the argument I made in the preceding paragraph, it should have applied the general rule against vacating judgments that have become moot because the parties settled. The proper disposition here would have been to DIG the case — dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted (which allows the lower court ruling to remain on the books undisturbed).

CP: Cato's blog

Big Out-of-Control Government Has Had Better Days at the Supreme Court

2009-12-07T16:37:00.002-05:00

This morning at the Supreme Court, the federal government argued for the continued existence of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB, pronounced peek-a-boo) — and by extension the nefarious financial regulatory scheme known as Sarbanes-Oxley. Cato filed a brief supporting a free market advocacy group and an accounting firm, who sued PCAOB for violating both the Appointments Clause and general constitutional separation-of-powers principles.

Passed with scant deliberation in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 established PCAOB to oversee the accounting practices of the nation’s public companies. As my piece with Cato legal associate Travis Cushman details today, PCAOB enjoys the rare authority to make its own laws, collect taxes, inspect records, prosecute infractions, make judgments, and impose sanctions.

Traditionally, independent agencies that serve such executive functions must be accountable to the president. PCAOB members, however, may only be removed “for cause” by members of the Securities and Exchange Commission, who in turn may only be removed “for cause” by the president. I previously blogged about the case, Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, here, here, and here.

As far as how the argument went, I think the forces of limited constitutional government have eked out a 5-4 victory. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor were extremely hostile to the challengers’ argument, while the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Alito were supportive. (Scalia at one point joked that he had no less power than the president — meaning not very much — to influence PCAOB.) Justice Stevens only spoke up once but seemed to show a leaning towards the government position. Justice Thomas, while remaining silent, can be expected to support the view of D.C. Circuit Judge Brett Kavanaugh — whose blistering yet scholarly dissent likely prompted the Court to take up the case.

And so the ruling rests, as often happens with the most interesting cases, on the shoulders of Justice Kennedy. I remain cautiously optimistic that Kennedy will decide to uphold constitutional checks and balances and strike down what has become an unholy new branch of government.

Two curious notes from the argument: 1. Petitioners’ counsel Michael Carvin referenced Cato’s brief in discussing PCAOB’s overreach internationally — seeking to regulate even foreign accounting standards – without oversight from the State Department or the SEC, let alone the president; 2. PCAOB brought its own lawyer to argue alongside the solicitor general, begging the question: if PCAOB is subservient to the SEC and/or the president, why does it need its own counsel to represent its own views?

CP: Cato's blog

Adding Free Speech Insult to Property Rights Injury

2009-12-07T16:34:00.001-05:00

My friend and former law firm colleague Mark Sigmon — who co-authored Cato’s brief in the New Haven firefighters case — is representing a man facing daily fines for displaying a large political message on his house.

David Bowden was upset about the way he had been treated by the town of Cary, NC, regarding damage to his property during a road-widening project. This past July, Bowden hired someone to paint “Screwed By The Town of Cary” on the front of his house. A few weeks ago, the town gave Bowden seven days to remove the sign or face daily fines — $100 for the first day, $250 for the second, $500 for each subsequent day – for violating a local sign ordinance. That’s when Mark, who’s affiliated with the ACLU of North Carolina, filed a lawsuit on Bowden’s behalf. The complaint alleges that the town violated Bowden’s rights to free speech and to petition his government under the First Amendment and similar provisions of North Carolina’s constitution.

While the facts of this case are a bit colorful – and I’m sure Mark is enjoying the notoriety (here’s his appearance on Fox & Friends) — this is no laughing matter. The town appears to be compounding the damage it did to a resident’s property rights by now violating his rights to speech and political expression. At least now the town has agreed to refrain from enforcing its ordinance and levying fines until the case is resolved — which is essentially a capitulation to Bowden’s request for a preliminary injunction.

For more news on this story go here, here, and here. And you can read the ACLU’s press release and access all the legal pleadings in the case here.

CP: Cato's blog

Cato's Legal Arguments Worry U.S. Government

2009-12-04T09:25:00.002-05:00

Last month, Cato (joined by Cato senior fellow Randy Barnett) filed a brief in United States v. Comstock, a case regarding the constitutionality of a law authorizing the federal government to civilly commit anyone in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons whom the attorney general certifies to be “sexually dangerous.” The effect of such an action is to continue the certified person’s confinement after the expiration of his prison term, without proof of a new criminal violation.

As I wrote in a previous blog post, “the use of federal power here is unconstitutional because it is not tied to any of Congress’s limited and enumerated powers.” Moreover, the government’s reliance on the Necessary and Proper Clause (Article I, Section 8), “is misplaced because that clause grants no independent power but merely ‘carries into execution’ the powers enumerated elsewhere in that section.” The commitment of prisoners after their terms end simply cannot fit into one of the enumerated powers.

While we of course hope that the Supreme Court pays attention to our brief, we know that Solicitor General Elana Kagan, at least, is concerned enough about our arguments to spend several pages of the government’s reply brief addressing them (see pages 5-9).
For more on Comstock, see its case page on SCOTUSwiki, which now has all the briefs and will around the Jan. 12 argument date be populated with argument previews and reviews, as well as links to media coverage.

CP: Cato's blog

Likely Supreme Court Tie Would Be a Loss to Property Owners

2009-12-02T18:11:00.003-05:00

Today the Supreme Court heard argument in Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause challenge involving beachfront property that I previously discussed here.

Essentially, Florida’s ”beach renourishment” program created more beach but deprived property owners of the rights they previously had — exclusive access to the water, unobstructed view, full ownership of land up to the “mean high water mark,” etc. That is, the court turned beachfront property into “beachview” property. After the property owners successfully challenged this action, the Florida Supreme Court – “SCOFLA” for those who remember the Bush v. Gore imbroglio – reversed the lower court (and overturned 100 years of common property law), ruling that the state did not owe any compensation, or even a proper eminent domain hearing.

As Cato adjunct scholar and Pacific Legal Foundation senior staff attorney Timothy Sandefur noted in his excellent op-ed on the case in the National Law Journal, “[T]he U.S. Constitution also guarantees every American’s right to due process of law and to protection of private property. If state judges can arbitrarily rewrite a state’s property laws, those guarantees would be meaningless.”

I sat in on the arguments today and predict that the property owners will suffer a narrow 4-4 defeat. That is, Justice Stevens recused himself — he owns beachfront property in a different part of Florida that is subject to the same renourishment program — and the other eight justices are likely to split evenly. And a tie is a defeat in this case because it means the Court will summarily affirm the decision below without issuing an opinion or setting any precedent.

By my reckoning, Justice Scalia’s questioning lent support to the property owners’ position, as did Chief Justice Roberts’ (though he could rule in favor of the “judicial takings” doctrine in principle but perhaps rule for the government on a procedural technicality here). Justice Alito was fairly quiet but is probably in the same category as the Chief Justice. Justice Thomas was typically silent but can be counted on to support property rights. With Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor expressing pro-government positions, that leaves Justice Kennedy, unsurprisingly, as the swing vote. Kennedy referred to the case as turning on a close question of state property law, which indicates his likely deference to SCOFLA.

For more analysis of the argument, see SCOTUSblog. Cato filed an amicus brief supporting the land owners here, and earlier this week I recorded a Cato Podcast to that effect. Cato also recently filed a brief urging the Court to hear another case of eminent domain abuse in Florida, 480.00 Acres of Land v. United States.

CP: Cato's blog

Virginia Messes With Yoga Instructors' Chi

2009-12-02T14:08:00.001-05:00

Not to be too much of a megaphone for the Institute for Justice, but the “merry band of litigators” has struck again, this time going after the rigid rules stopping Virginians from finding inner peace. It seems that in the fair commonwealth, you need a permit to teach yoga, which process entails paying $2500 and getting your “curriculum” approved by state bureaucrats, as well as other barriers to entry. For more details, see IJ’s case page and read this editorial in the Richmond Times-Dispatch. Also, check out IJ’s video.

CP: Cato's blog.

We Should Not Praise Stalin, But Bury Him

2009-11-25T17:24:00.001-05:00

Although the debate has been raging for months, it has just come to my attention that the man responsible for the second-most number of murders ever – after Mao, of course, with Hitler a distant third – is to have his bust placed at the National D-Day Memorial in Bedford, Virginia.
Defenders of the Stalin bust argue that, whether we like it or not, our uneasy alliance with the Soviet Union during the war is a part of history and should be recognized. Furthermore, they say that his visage is in no way glorifying the man or his deeds.

This argument misses the point entirely. Memorials are monuments to fallen heroes, not historical dioramas. There is no statue of Stephen Douglas at the Lincoln Memorial, no bust of Wendell Willkie at the FDR Memorial, and no plaques honoring Allied dead at our WWII Memorial. Moreover — and perhaps most importantly from a historical perspective – Stalin had no role in D-Day; the invasion of Normandy by U.S., British, Canadian, Australian, Free French, and other Western forces.

While there is no question that Stalin, by virtue of commanding the army fighting on the Eastern Front, played an indispensable role in defeating Hitler, it should escape no one’s memory that he too was an evil, mass-murdering despot.

Stalin and communism should be universally reviled in the very same way as Hitler and Nazism. (Note also that Stalin only fought the Germans because Hitler invaded the USSR in violation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that divided Eastern Europe and enabled the Reich’s western incursions in the first place.)

Finally, no one doubts or discounts the bravery of the Russian and other Soviet soldiers fighting in defense of their homeland and families, far removed from the politics of terror that permeated their government — including my maternal grandfather, a tank captain who helped take Berlin. Accordingly, if we are to honor the Soviet role at our D-Day Memorial, we should honor the common Red Army soldiers — whom Stalin treated as disposable bullet-stoppers, many of whom he murdered after the war because they had witnessed the world beyond communism – not the tyrant and the murderous system they represented.

You can read about the collective amnesia — if not willful blindness — about the evils of communism that has set in among Western elites in Paul Hollander’s excellent Cato Development Policy Analysis.

CP: Cato's blog

The Nets Finally Win!

2009-11-24T16:44:00.002-05:00

Unfortunately, that win comes as another blow to property rights:

The last major obstacle to a groundbreaking for the $4.9 billion Atlantic
Yards development in Brooklyn fell Tuesday when New York’s highest court, the Court of Appeals, dismissed a challenge to the state’s use of eminent domain on behalf of the developer, Bruce C. Ratner.

Mr. Ratner, whose 22-acre development has been delayed for three years by a flurry of lawsuits, the collapse of the credit and real estate markets and a glut of luxury housing, plans to begin selling tax-free bonds next month to finance the development’s cornerstone project: an 18,000-seat basketball arena for the New Jersey Nets at the intersection of Flatbush and Atlantic Avenues near downtown.

Given the high-profile nature of the would-be new tenants of the land, this is the most famous property rights case currently being litigated, but it’s the same ol’ story: rich company wants land on the cheap, company gets the government to seize the land, property owners lose their land for the benefit of another private party for a decidedly not public use.

And, as I allude to in this post’s title, this loss comes to the 0-13 New Jersey Nets. (Even the Redskins can win a game without getting the government to bail them out!)

While the story goes on to promise all this new office space and buildings to go on the newly acquired land, we know from recent experience that a successful deal doesn’t automatically trigger the jobs and benefit promised. To give you an idea what the rest of Brooklyn is looking like:

If construction begins in the coming weeks as expected, Atlantic Yards will
stand out in a city where 530 different construction projects are stalled, sitting lifeless and without adequate financing in virtually every neighborhood.

One would think that if there was such a guarantee of money to be made, investors would be funding one of those 530 other projects in the city.

And if you think a brand spanking new stadium is more likely to bring in business to the immediate area, just ask the shop owners around the new Yankee Stadium how business was this year — when that team put up the best record in baseball and won the World Series. (NB: Go Red Sox!)

In any event, Cato continues the fight for the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. We filed a brief in a case coming before the Court next week, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, which can be found here; and just yesterday filed a brief urging the Court to consider 480.00 Acres v. United States, which you can read here.

HT: Jonathan Blanks CP: Cato's blog

Battle of the Ilyas and More on the Chicago Gun Case

2009-11-24T15:43:00.003-05:00

Josh Blackman, my coauthor on “Opening Pandora’s Box? Privileges or Immunities, The Constitution in 2020, and Properly Incorporating the Second Amendment,” has inaugurated a series of podcasts devoted to law and liberty. He’s already has an interview with PLF’s Timothy Sandefur (also a Cato adjunct scholar) and the Independence Institute’s David Kopel (also a Cato associate policy analyst). Tim authored Cato’s brief in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the case seeking to extend Second Amendment protections to the states — and about which I blogged yesterday.

Well, now Josh has come up with a bit of a twist on the podcast medium: he invited George Mason law prof Ilya Somin (also a Cato adjunct scholar) and me to engage in a contest based on the trivia challenge Sixth Circuit Judge Danny Boggs issues his clerkship applicants. The winner of this “Battle of the Ilyas” would receive the free and exclusive right to the Ilya name — because apparently it’s too confusing to have two libertarian lawyers named Ilya in the same metropolitan area/professional circle. It was a lot of fun, and while I won’t tell you the outcome here, you can easily find that out and listen to the conference call we had about it.

Finally, after this “Battle of the Ilyas,” Josh asked me to record a podcast about McDonald — which inspired our article — and United States v. Comstock (another important case in which Cato filed a brief, and which I blogged about here). Happy listening!

CP: Cato's blog

A Special Kind of Eminent Domain

2009-11-24T09:33:00.001-05:00

In federal eminent domain cases, the “scope of the project” rule requires that in determining “just compensation” under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, any increase or decrease in property value caused by the federal project be disregarded. As it turns out, the federal government had discussed the idea of expanding Everglades National Park for over 30 years, and also induced the local government to enact tougher zoning standards that decreased the value of the property that was to be taken for this purpose. This type of behavior is a special kind of eminent domain abuse called “condemnation blight.”

The Everglades-related federal actions forced Gilbert Fornatora to watch the value of his South Florida property decline until the federal government finally condemned it — and paid him much lower compensation than he would otherwise have received. Then, once condemnation proceedings began, the government manipulated the hearing schedule by front-loading ill-prepared owners who lacked counsel, thereby setting a low valuation precedent that would then be applied to the later parties with representation, like Fornatora. The Eleventh Circuit sided with the government, so Fornatora petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case.

Cato filed an amicus brief supporting this petition, arguing that property owners have virtually no “scope of the project” protection if they must prove that the government’s sole or primary purpose for pre-condemnation action was to depress property values for later eminent domain proceedings. A more workable test, consistent with due process, is merely to require evidence of a nexus between the government’s actions and the depressed property value. The Court should also hear this case to ensure that just compensation proceedings comport with the due process, equal protection, and general fairness standards the government is required to follow in a variety of other settings.

The Court will be deciding early in the new year whether to hear the case, which has the ungainly name of 480.00 Acres of Land v. United States.

CP: Cato's blog

Cato Files Brief to Extend Second Amendment Rights, Provide Protections for Privileges or Immunities

2009-11-23T09:31:00.003-05:00

Last year, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court confirmed what most scholars and a substantial majority of Americans long believed: that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms. Heller led to the current challenge to Chicago’s handgun ban, which raises the question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment protects that right against infringement by state and local governments. The Seventh Circuit answered the question in the negative, finding itself foreclosed by 19th-century Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme Court agreed to review the case — after Cato filed an amicus brief supporting the cert petition — and specifically consider whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause or its Privileges or Immunities Clause is the proper provision for incorporating the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms as against the states.

Now Cato, joined by the Pacific Legal Foundation, has filed a brief supporting those challenging the handgun ban — who are represented by Alan Gura, the lawyer who successfully argued Heller — and calling for an overruling of the Slaughter-House Cases, which eviscerated the Privileges or Immunities Clause in 1873. Slaughter-House narrowly circumscribed the rights protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause, contrary to the intentions of the Amendment’s framers and in direct contradiction to the developments in legal theory that underlay its adoption.

We also argue that in addition to ignoring the history surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment, the Slaughter-House majority violated basic rules of constitutional interpretation. Finally, restoring the Privileges or Immunities Clause would not result in the demise of substantive due process because the idea at the core of that doctrine — that the Due Process Clause imposes something more than mere procedural limits on government power — was widely accepted when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted and its authors rightly believed that the Due Process and the Privileges or Immunities Clauses would provide separate but overlapping protections for individual rights.

Again, go here to read Cato’s brief in McDonald v. City of Chicago. Related, Josh Blackman and I have put up on SSRN our article, “Opening Pandora’s Box? Privileges or Immunities, The Constitution in 2020, and Properly Incorporating the Second Amendment,” which comes out in January in the Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy. I will be blogging more about “Pandora” — and, of course, the McDonald case — in future.

CP: Cato's blog

How Will the Court Vote on "Incorporating" the Second Amendment?

2009-11-18T14:21:00.000-05:00

Yesterday I described the brief Alan Gura filed on behalf of the petitioners challenging Chicago’s gun ban in the Supreme Court — asking the Court to apply the individual right to keep and bear arms to the states.

Late last night, Orin Kerr at the Volokh Conspiracy sketched out his predictions of whether the individual justices would go for Gura’s main argument: that the indefensible Slaughter-House Cases should be overturned and thus that the Court should “incorporate” the rights at issue via the Privileges or Immunities Clause. (Cato supports this argument, as we’ll show in the brief we’ll be filing next week.) He concludes that Justice Thomas is the only vote available for this claim. According to Orin, the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Alito are too enamored with stare decisis to overturn an 1873 precedent, Justice Kennedy isn’t an originalist and likes substantive due process too much, and the other four are too afraid of Lochner and Institute for Justice-style economic liberty arguments to go there.

As George Will would say: Well. Orin could turn out to be right, but I think his analysis is too simplistic. I was just about to write my response when I saw that Josh Blackman, with whom I have a law review article forthcoming on these issues, already said it best in the comments to Orin’s post:

First, I think you present a binary choice; incorporate through Due Process OR incorporate through privileges or immunities. The question presented asked about both routes of incorporation. Neither path is by necessity mutually exclusive. As Gura’s brief makes clear, the Court could incorporate through the Due Process Clause, and alternatively recognize that the right to keep and bear arms is also among the Privileges or Immunities of Citizenship. The Court need not displace 100 years of substantive due process jurisprudence with this single case. And from a practical perspective, basically the entire Bill of Rights has been incorporated. So, unless some people start clamoring about states quartering troops in theirs homes, this would be a one time deal. Such a holding would do little to upset the apple cart, or as we put it, open Pandora’s Box.

Second, I think you may over-simplify Scalia’s views on originalism and stare decisis. Our article shows that Scalia, while on the Supreme Court, has never voted in favor of a substantive due process incorporation. The last such case was in 1982. Can Scalia really cite the doctrine that he excoriated in Lawrence, Casey, and elsewhere based solely on reliance interests? It is no secret Scalia likes guns, and he wants to incorporate the 2nd Amendment. But he does not want to enlarge substantive due process. Is he stuck between a rock and a substantively hard place? The Privileges or
Immunities Clause provides an alternative method for Scalia. He could write a classic originalist opinion tracing the right to bear arms during Reconstruction, and find that it applies to the State.

Finally, fellow Volokh conspirator Randy Barnett (and Cato senior fellow) also disagrees with Orin, offering this perspective:

When choosing between the two pending cases in the Seventh Circuit, why would
four Justices grant cert on the McDonald case in which the challenge was focused on the Privileges or Immunities Clause and deny cert on NRA case, which confined its argument to the Due Process Clause? Why would they have rejected the City of Chicago’s proposal which limited the question presented to Due Process?
Faced with this background and the actual question presented, I wonder how would Orin have briefed the case. Would he have offered any of the analysis in his post?
Would he have told the Court just to ignore the Privileges or Immunities Clause? Or might he not have assumed as an experienced litigator that the Justices could write a Due Process Clause “incorporation” opinion in their sleep–heck, their clerks could write that opinion in their sleep–and then devoted the bulk of his brief to describing the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in context?
Ultimately, Orin’s analysis is based in what he thinks will be the Justices’ dislike for the interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause described in the brief. The conservatives will hate the references to “natural rights” while the liberals will hate the references to “property.” Fair enough. But notice that the brief does not offer Alan Gura’s theory of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. All the phrases to which Orin objects are taken from quotes from the historical sources. Was Gura supposed to conceal these sources from the Court or faithfully report them? Orin may think this case is a hoot, but for the parties and the Court it is serious business.

In short, Orin’s legal realism/conventional wisdom may turn out prescient — and all the rest of us are engaged in a quixotic originalist/libertarian crusade – but I’ll put my money elsewhere.

CP: Cato's blog

Heller Counsel Argues for an Originalist Revolution

2009-11-17T14:15:00.002-05:00

Alan Gura, who successfully defended the individual right to keep and bear arms under Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller has now filed his brief in the case that seeks to apply that right to the states, McDonald v. City of Chicago. (Cato earlier filed a brief supporting Alan’s cert petition, the background to which you can read about here.)

The question presented in this case is: Whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is incorporated as against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities or Due Process Clauses. Remarkably, only 7 of the brief’s 73 pages are devoted to the Due Process Clause, which is the constitutional provision by which almost all the the Bill of Rights has been “incorporated” against the states. Indeed, the brief argues that the Due Process Clause “has incorporated virtually all other enumerated rights” and so there is no reason to make the Second Amendment an exception.

The rest of the brief is far more interesting, arguing for overturning the ill-fated Slaughter-House Cases, which eviscerated the Priviliges or Immunities Clause in 1873. Slaughter-House forced the Court to start protecting natural rights and fundamental liberties under the oddly named “substantive due process” doctrine — and it remains a bugaboo for legal scholars of all ideological stripes. Overturning it would potentially open the door to challenges against legislation that violates a host of unenumerated rights, such as the right to enter into contract or to earn an honest living.

Understandably, libertarians are excited at the prospect of Privileges or Immunities’ revival. But so too are liberals, at the thought of potentially filling an empty constitutional vessel with positive rights (to health care, education, pensions, etc.). I believe this to be an overstated threat from the perspective of constitutional interpretation — as opposed to legislation – and have an article coming out with Josh Blackman in the Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy in January making this point. (The article, titled “Opening Pandora’s Box? Privileges or Immunities, The Constitution in 2020, and Properly Incorporating the Second Amendment,” will shortly be up on SSRN, but for now you can read the abstract/introduction here.)

In any event, P or I (as it’s known) is a vastly superior way of giving people in the states the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. But it’s ambitious to argue this way rather than settle for the traditional jurisprudence. As Orin Kerr says at the Volokh Conspiracy, “It’s certainly an attention-getting way to brief the case. It’s not just arguing for a win: It’s arguing for a revolution.”

For further discussion of Alan’s McDonald brief — which Cato will be supporting with an amicus brief next week – see Lyle Deniston’s write-up at SCOTUSblog.

CP: Cato's blog

How Is Sotomayor Doing?

2009-11-16T14:13:00.000-05:00

I was one of those who opposed the nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court, mainly because the pick was based on race and gender rather than merit and she was disingenuous and obfuscatory at her confirmation hearings. Well, the Court still hasn’t decided any cases argued with Justice Sotomayor on the bench — and the first term isn’t always indicative of the kind of jurist a new justice will be – but we do have some early statistics about her performance.

It turns out that, unlike her next most junior colleague, Justice Alito — who hung back early in his tenure while learning the rhythms of the Court – Justice Sotomayor has not been a shrinking violet in her questioning of advocates. Indeed, according to a National Law Journal tally, during the 13 November arguments that just concluded, she asked 146 questions (or 11.2 per case), which is even ahead of where Chief Justice Roberts was at this point in his career. And, because Sotomayor speaks more often than her more reserved predecessor, Justice Souter, she has made a “hot” bench even hotter.

By another indicator, however, Sotomayor ranks at the bottom of the Supreme Court table: Apparently her questioning has not yet generated a single laugh (as measured by such indications in the argument transcript). Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia leads in that department — as he long has, both in absolute and per-question terms – with the Chief being the only other justice in double figures. Joining Sotomayor with a goose-egg so far this year are Justices Ginsburg and Thomas (who hasn’t asked a question since 2006). If you’re curious about last year’s final standings, see here.

For what it’s worth, all this accords with the sense I’ve gotten from the handful of times I’ve been to the Court for oral argument so far this term. To my mind, Sotomayor is still acting as a Court of Appeals judge — or maybe even a district judge – asking simpler questions about the factual record or procedural history rather than the broader issues the Court tends to grapple with. And therefore I’ll go out on a counterintuitive limb here to predict that, as Sotomayor settles into her new role, her questioning will become less frequent but more substantive.

CP: Cato's blog

First Amendment for Me, But Not for Thee

2009-11-11T20:10:00.001-05:00

A high school newspaper in Manhattan recently added a new and prestigious editor to its staff: Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy. Adam Liptak of the New York Times reports:

It turns out that Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, widely regarded as one of the
court’s most vigilant defenders of First Amendment values, had provided the
newspaper, The Daltonian, with a lesson about journalistic independence. Justice
Kennedy’s office had insisted on approving any article about a talk he gave to
an assembly of Dalton high school students on Oct. 28.
Kathleen Arberg, the
court’s public information officer, said Justice Kennedy’s office had made the
request to make sure the quotations attributed to him were accurate.

The justice’s office received a draft of the proposed article on Monday and returned it to the newspaper the same day with “a couple of minor tweaks,” Ms. Arberg said. Quotations were “tidied up” to better reflect the meaning the justice had intended to convey, she said.

I’m all for being tidy — and, for all his faults, Kennedy has indeed been friendly to the First Amendment (if not to student speech rights in the “Bong Hits for Jesus” case, Morse v. Frederick) – but public figures don’t usually get to change a story to “better reflect” the intent of their words.

Frank D. LoMonte, the executive director of the Student Press Law Center,
questioned the school’s approach. “Obviously, in the professional world, it
would be a nonstarter if a source demanded prior approval of coverage of a
speech,” he said. Even at a high school publication, Mr. LoMonte said, the
request for prepublication review sent the wrong message and failed to
appreciate the sophistication of high school seniors.

While this is hardly a major scandal — and it’s not unusual for justices to exclude the press entirely from public appearances — Kennedy’s use of a judicial editor’s pen does support the general feeling that students don’t always get a fair shake when it comes to their constitutional rights. As I said about an unrelated case in which Cato filed a brief last week (quoting the landmark Tinker case), students shouldn’t have to “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech… at the schoolhouse gate” — especially when a man charged with protecting those rights comes to talk to them about the importance of law and liberty.

H/T: Jonathan Blanks CP: Cato's blog

Taking Land for Public Uselessness

2009-11-10T10:27:00.002-05:00

Over at the Washington Examiner, Tim Carney reports that Pfizer is abandoning its New London offices and deciding what to do with the property it gained in the infamous Kelo v. New London land-grab:

The private homes that New London, Conn., took away from Suzette Kelo and
her neighbors have been torn down. Their former site is a wasteland of fields of weeds, a monument to the power of
eminent domain.

But now Pfizer, the drug company whose neighboring research facility had
been the original cause of the homes’ seizure, has just announced that it is closing up shop in New London.
To lure those jobs to New London a decade ago, the local government promised to demolish the older residential neighborhood adjacent to the land Pfizer was buying for next-to-nothing. Suzette Kelo fought the taking to the Supreme Court, and lost.
Five justices found this redevelopment met the constitutional hurdle of “public
use.”

That this purported “public use” is now exposed as the façade for corporate welfare that it always was is, of course, little comfort to Suzette Kelo and the other homeowners whose land was seized. But hopefully this will be an object lesson for other companies considering eminent domain abuse as a route to acquire land on the cheap — and especially for state and local officials who acquiesce in this type of behavior.

You can read Cato’s amicus brief for the ill-fated case here. Cato also hosted a book forum for the story of Suzette’s struggle, Little Pink House, featuring the author, Jeff Benedict, the attorney who argued the case, the Institute for Justice’s Scott Bullock, and Ms. Kelo herself, here.

CP: Cato's blog

The Right to Speak in Non-Government-Approved Ways

2009-11-09T13:32:00.002-05:00

School officials denied student Pete Palmer the right to wear a shirt supporting John Edwards’s presidential campaign at his Dallas-area high school. They cited the district’s dress code, which prohibited messages on student clothing except for those that supported school activities or district-approved organizations, clubs or teams.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the school district that this was a reasonable “time, place and manner” speech restriction. Applying the test from United States v. O’Brien, the court found that the dress code was content- and viewpoint-neutral, and served an important governmental purpose. Palmer now seeks Supreme Court review, citing seemingly contradictory precedents from the Second and Third Circuits and arguing that the regulation here flies in the face of the protection afforded to student speech by the famous case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.

Cato, joined by the Institute for Justice, the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, the Christian Legal Society, and the National Association of Evangelicals, filed an amicus brief supporting Palmer’s petition and urging the continued use of Tinker. We argue that the Court should clarify its jurisprudence in this area to stop schools from applying broad restrictions in an attempt to avoid controversy and debate—and thereby threaten the very political and religious speech at the First Amendment’s core.

To prevent the chilling of student speech, the Court should solidify Tinker’s central tenet, reaffirming that so long as speech doesn’t “materially and substantially disrupt” the educational process, students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”

The case is Palmer v. Waxahachie Independent School District. The Court will be deciding early in 2010 whether to hear it.

CP: Cato's blog

Liberty Most Deer

2009-11-07T12:04:00.000-05:00

As a footnote to Chris Moody’s post about Monday’s 20-year anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, I just came across this article about red deer refusing to cross from Germany into the Czech Republic. This, of course, is a border that was the once heavily fortified dividing line between free West Germany and captive Czechoslovakia.

Even deer who weren’t born when barbed wire, watchtowers, and armed guards prevented the natural extension of their happy grazing grounds act as if the Cold War never ended — apparently because they learned their habits from their parents, who learned them from their parents.

Still, as with the new generation of Eastern Europeans who have no memory of Communism, some young deer are starting to break the mold, taking advantage of — and even taking for granted — their newfound freedom. I wonder if the grass (and ferns, and whatever else deer eat) is any greener on the other side of the former Iron Curtain.

CP: Cato's blog

Give Us Your Tired, Your Energetic, Your Poor, Your Rich — Pretty Much Anyone Who’s Not a Criminal or Terrorist

2009-11-06T15:46:00.003-05:00

On Wednesday I blogged about how, for the first time in many years — since the last recession — H-1B skilled worker visas remain available despite the hard cap on their number. In other words, even foreigners respond to market incentives: when there are no jobs, there are fewer immigrants.

I’ve gotten some interesting email in response to that little notice, one of which I post below, along with my paragraph-by-paragraph responses.

Just read your blog entry on the H-1b visa. The problem is that this visa
has been misused by sponsoring companies, suffering from high rates of
fraud. I find it strange that Cato supports (or appears to support) a
labor tool that is anything but free market. The H-1b visa is more of an
indentured servant visa program than anything else – where employees must be
sponsored by an employer. Since employees aren’t free to find new jobs or
start their own business, it results in a captive workforce who will do whatever
the employee asks, even beyond reason. They won’t bargain for higher
wages, quit if mistreated, join unions, or do anything that might result in
their immigration status being jeopardized.

Having myself been on H-1Bs with several employers, including Cato, I agree that the program is seriously flawed, in the ways this correpondent describes and in others. Ideally, people would be able to apply for a work permit — their application gaining more “points,” say, for language, youth, skills, the needs of the economy, or whatever other criteria the political process determines are important — and then not be tied to an employer and have an opportunity to receive permanent residence and eventual naturalization if they pay their taxes, stay out of jail, etc. Or, indeed, we could admit all people who want to come here (after screening for security, criminal, and health concerns), and give them the same opportunity. But until we get to that more perfect world, I see no conflict in advocating for a repeal of the H-1B cap or pointing out how this recession shows that immigrants come for jobs, not to leech off our welfare state (if that’s the concern, then wall off the welfare state, not the country) or commit crimes.

One thing not correct in your blog is that H-1b visa holders cannot get a
green-card. They can, unfortunately most of the workers are from India so
it is difficult for those workers to get the green-card because of how,
numerically, green-cards are issued. The H-1b visa is a “dual intent” visa
meaning there is a path to permanent residence and after 6 years on the visa
holders can extend 1 year until their green-card is processed. Indian
workers call it the “green carrot” and relate it to the picture of where the
mule driver holds a carrot on a stick in front of the mule to keep him
moving. No matter how hard the mule tries, the carrot gets no closer.

The H-1B’s “dual intent” provision is categorically not a path to a green card. All it does is, as the correspondent points out, allow the worker to stay in the country during the green card application process. That process, however, and the substantive requirements for obtaining a green card, is no different for H-1B holders than it is for anyone else. Indeed, spending five or six years on an H-1B with one employer can be a detriment, inasmuch as that employer’s sponsorship application cannot take into account the skills gained during that time of employment. And yes, the nationality-based restrictions are also obnoxious.

The primary sponsors of H-1b workers are Indian outsourcing firms. In
short, the visa is used as a tool to send jobs overseas. People from Cato
may not have a problem with that because of their own views on globalization and
free trade, but the majority of Americans do. You guys are notorious at
just looking at one half of the equation when it comes to free market practices
unfortunately – which is the corporate side. Yes, corporations can move
people around the world using a variety of immigration programs. But do
the people being moved around control their own destinies or are they at the
mercy of the corporations?

Cato is not a corporate shill. Plenty of what we advocate is counter to the expressed preferences of Big [fill in your preferred Villain] because the business community often prefers stability over liberty-enhancing volatility — smaller, secure profits over potentially larger but not-guaranteed ones — and a place at the government subsidies trough over a truly free market. Moreover, and with much irony, it is the H-1B’s cap and costly bureaucratic processing that has promoted outsourcing — which in and of itself is not problematic for the American economy as a whole — by preventing American firms from bringing Indian (and other) workers here. And people on H-1Bs are “at the mercy of corporations” precisely because this visa is tied to one employer, as mentioned in the first quoted paragraph above.

Liberty doesn’t just apply to corporations and the narrow objective of free
trade. I just don’t understand how the Cato Institute and all of your
intellectuals don’t see through this visa for what it is. It deprives
people of liberty. Many American workers don’t care that “an Indian” is
being deprived of their liberty, but they should if not for moral reasons than
for economic reasons. If I have a worker that I can exploit and pay less,
now I have a bargaining tool against the worker I previously could not.
When one man is deprived of their liberty, in a way we all are.

I couldn’t agree more that our current immigration regime benefits nobody — not big business, not small business, not skilled workers, not unskilled workers, not the American economy as a whole, not certain sectors of it — with the possible exception of populist demagogues of both the left and the right. The answer to that morass isn’t to attack globalization or free trade — which is not a “narrow objective” but a fundamental mechanism for enhancing peoples’ lives all over the world — but to reform our immigration system.

For more on these and related issues, check out these recent studies put out by my colleague Dan Griswold and his trade and immigration policy team:

On the fiscal impact of low-skilled immigration

On the economic benefits of immigration reform

On the influx of immigrants pushing Americans up the income scale

CP: Cato's blog

As It Turns Out, There Are Limits on Congress's Power

2009-11-06T12:07:00.001-05:00

In 2006, Congress passed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act. One provision of the law authorizes the federal government to civilly commit anyone in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons whom the attorney general certifies to be “sexually dangerous.” The effect of such an action is to continue the certified person’s confinement after the expiration of his prison term, without proof of a new criminal violation.

Six days before the scheduled release of Graydon Comstock — who had been sentenced to 37 months in jail for receiving child pornography — the attorney general certified Comstock as sexually dangerous. Three years later, Comstock thus remains confined in a medium security prison, as do more than 60 other similarly situated men in the Eastern District of North Carolina alone.

Comstock and several others challenged their confinements as going beyond Congress’s constitutional authority and won in both the district and appellate courts. The United States successfully petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case.

Cato, joined by Georgetown law professor (and Cato senior fellow) Randy Barnett, filed a brief opposing the government. We argue that the use of federal power here is unconstitutional because it is not tied to any of Congress’s limited and enumerated powers. The government’s reliance on the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, Section 8, is misplaced because that clause grants no independent power but merely “carries into execution” the powers enumerated elsewhere in that section. The commitment of prisoners after their terms simply is not one of the enumerated powers.

While the government justifies its actions by invoking its implied power “to establish a federal penal system” — itself a necessary and proper auxiliary to certain enumerated powers — civil commitment is unrelated to creating or maintaining a penal system (let alone any enumerated power). Nor can the law at issue fall under the Commerce Clause, because civil commitment involves non-economic intrastate activity.

As the Supreme Court recognized almost 150 years ago in Ex Parte Milligan, “[n]o graver question was ever considered by this court, nor one which more nearly concerns the rights of the whole,” than the government’s unconstitutional assertion of power against its own citizens. In this spirit, the Court should affirm the Fourth Circuit’s rejection of this blatant government overreach.

United States v. Comstock will be argued on January 12. You can read Cato’s brief here.

CP: Cato's blog

Immigrants Respond to Economic Incentives

2009-11-04T09:50:00.001-05:00

As I blogged here, I got my green card in April — and am now counting down the days till I can naturalize (five years from the green card, though you can apply three months before that and processing takes a year or so). Because of my various travails over the years that led to that fortunate day this spring, I’ve learned quite a bit about immigration, both as a matter of policy and as a matter of law. Indeed, both before joining Cato and ever since, it’s been an area in which I’ve been writing and speaking — and I appreciate very much the synergy this work has had with my colleagues in the trade and immigration shop.

One oped I had in National Review Online dealt with H-1Bs, the temporary visas for highly skilled workers to work in the United States. One of the problems with H-1Bs is that they provide no path to a green card (meaning permanent residence) or citizenship — so just as hard-working, tax-paying professionals gain expertise in a particular American company or industry, just as they grow roots in an American community, they have to leave. Nevertheless, there have long been more H-1B applicants than available visas. The last few years, the annual 65,000 quota has been oversubscribed on the very first day of eligibility for each fiscal year!

Well, not any more. As this recent article points out, the recession has impacted our immigration system as well: “A coveted visa program that feeds skilled workers to top-tier U.S. technology companies and universities [the H-1B program] is on track to leave thousands of spots unfilled for the first time since 2003, a sign of how the weak economy has eroded employment even among highly trained professionals.”

This is just another indication that the free movement of goods, money, and people, will regulate even such perceived social ills as “foreigners taking American jobs.” There’s simply no need for “U.S. citizen only” provisions in (so-called) stimulus bills, or (further) immigration restrictions during bad economic times.

In other words, even foreigners respond to market incentives.

For more on Cato’s work on immigration policy, go here.

CP: Cato's blog

Health Care Bill Improves Lawyers' Financial Health

2009-11-02T16:13:00.000-05:00

The great thing for legislators about a nearly 2000 page bill — such as, oh, the House’s latest health care salvo — is that very few people bother to read the whole thing. So it’s easy to bury little gifts to favored supporters. Or big ones.

For example, check out section 2531 — that’s pages 1431-33 for those following along at home — which has gone largely unnoticed in the major news cycle. These three pages of the bill reward states that refrain from setting (or repeal) any caps on medical malpractice rewards — and the accompanying lawyers’ fees! – by requiring the Secretary of Health and Human Services to provide them an “incentive payment.”

As Hans von Spakovsky notes at NRO’s Corner, this “alternative medical liability law” aims to eviscerate cost-saving measures that protect doctors from frivolous lawsuits that increase the cost of health care to the consumer. So this has nothing to do with providing better or cheaper care, covering the uninsured, or even eliminating waste and fraud. Instead, it’s a pure sop to one of the Congressional Democrats’ key constituencies: trial lawyers.

For more information on free market health care reform alternatives, please visit Cato’s Health Care website here.

CP: Cato's blog

Defending Civil Rights and Suing Rogue Prosecutors Is Left-Wing Lawyering?

2009-10-27T20:10:00.002-04:00

The National Law Journal and the Wall Street Journal Law Blog note an apparent legal curiosity: Paul Clement, superstar head of King & Spaulding’s appellate group and Bush-administration solicitor general, now “flirts with liberalism” and has “embrace[d] left-leaning causes” to grow his practice. Is this another case of a conservative lawyer “growing” in office or “drifting” to the left, seduced by the cocktail parties and press attention of the Washington elite?

Hardly. The two cases that prompted this gnashing of teeth (or cautious optimism, depending on where the commentator resides on the political spectrum) are Perdue v. Kenny A. and Pottowattamie County v. McGhee. In Kenny A., Clement represented a group of public interest attorneys who won a big case on behalf of mistreated foster children and argued that they should be entitled to the enhanced fees the trial court awarded them for exceptional performance. In McGhee, Clement’s clients are two men who were framed by overzealous prosecutors and served 25 years in prison for crimes they didn’t commit — the convictions for which were based on the prosecutors’ fabricated evidence.

To say that these are left-wing positions is to consider the Left to be the only possible champion of justice and constitutional rights, and to paint the non-Left as standing for limitless, unaccountable governmental power. Neither of these positions is accurate, to say the least. If anything, Clement’s positions are solidly libertarian.

Indeed, Cato filed briefs in both cases, and I signed both of them. You can read our brief in Kenny A. here and in McGhee here – Clement actually called me to make sure Cato got involved in this one – and you can read my blog posts about the cases here and here, respectively.

In short, if Paul Clement has gone red, well then so have I — and trust me, there won’t be any kumbaya confabs at my place any time soon. My car’s new vanity plate does say FED 51, however — short for Federalist 51 — so feel free to call me out for flirtations with Madisonian political theory.

H/T: Manny Klausner

CP: Cato's blog

More Supreme Court Review on the Road

2009-10-22T18:02:00.000-04:00

As an update to an earlier post about my speaking schedule this fall, here are my remaining public events through Thanksgiving. All these events, other than the one on Nov. 3, are sponsored by the Federalist Society (and in some cases co-sponsored by other organizations) and all are open to the public. As always, if you decide to attend one of the presentations after learning of it from this blog post, please feel free to drop me a line beforehand, and do introduce yourself after the event.

Event info after the jump.

Oct. 26 at 12:00pm - Florida International University Law School (Miami) – Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation

Oct. 27 at 12:30pm – University of Miami Law School – Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Intepretation

Oct. 28 at 12:30pm – University of Dayton Law School – Hillary Clinton and the Emoluments Clause

Oct. 29 at 12:00pm – Northern Kentucky University Chase College of Law – October Term 2009 Overview

Nov. 3 at 12:00pm – Environmental Law Institute (Washington) – Panel on Stop the Beach Renourishment and Judicial Takings

Nov. 4 at 3:00pm – Seton Hall University Law School – Debate on the The Chrysler Bankruptcy

Nov. 5 at 12:00pm – Yeshiva University Cardozo Law School (NYC) – Immigration and the Constitution

Nov. 16 at 12:00pm – St. Louis University Law School – Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation

Nov. 17 at 12: 00pm – Washington University (St. Louis) Law School – The Looming Danger of Transnational Progressivism

Next Move: Suing the Sun for Unseasonably Cool Weather

2009-10-20T08:53:00.002-04:00

The New Orleans-based Fifth Circuit, the federal court of appeals where I once clerked, has allowed a class action lawsuit by Hurricane Katrina victims to proceed against a motley crew of energy, oil, and chemical companies. Their claim: that the defendants’ greenhouse gas emissions raised air and water temperatures on the Gulf Coast, contributing to Katrina’s strength and causing property damage. Mass tort litigation specialist Russell Jackson calls the plaintiffs’ claims “the litigator’s equivalent to the game ‘Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon.’”

In Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, the plaintiffs assert a variety of theories under Mississippi common law, but the main issue at this stage was whether the plaintiffs had standing, or whether they could demonstrate that their injuries were “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s actions. The court dismissed several claims but held that plaintiffs indeed could allege public and private nuisance, trespass and negligence. The court also held that these latter claims do not present a so-called “political question” that the court doesn’t have the authority to resolve. You can read about the Court’s ruling in more detail at the WSJ Law Blog and Jackson’s Consumer Class Actions and Mass Torts Blog.

This is actually the second federal appeals court to rule this way; last month, the Second Circuit (based in New York) held that states, municipalities and certain private organizations had standing to bring federal common law nuisance claims to impose caps on certain companies’ greenhouse gas emissions. Here’s the opinion in that case, Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company, and you can read a pretty good summary and analysis here.

Both of these cases, which herald a flood of global warming-related litigation, so to speak, owe their continuing vitality to the Supreme Court’s misbegotten 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. The 2006-2007 Cato Supreme Court Review covered that case in an insightful article by Andrew Morriss of the University of Illinois. (To get your copy of the latest (2008-2009) Review, go here.)

I should note from my own experience at the Fifth Circuit that the panel here consisted of the two worst judges on the court — Clinton appointees Carl Stewart and James Dennis — and one of Reagan’s weakest federal appellate appointments, Eugene Davis. Even Davis, however, wrote separately to note that while he agreed on the standing issue, he would have affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the suit on a different ground (that pesky proximate cause issue).

I predict that the full (16-judge) Fifth Circuit will review this case en banc –and if not that the Supreme Court will eventually take it up (if the district court on remand doesn’t again dispose of the case on causation grounds).

C: Cato's blog.

Who Is John Gupta?

2009-10-19T16:23:00.001-04:00

Apparently Ayn Rand’s popularity is growing on the subcontinent. For more on Rand’s resurgence, attend or watch online this Cato event next week.

H/T: Josh Blackman. CP: Cato's blog.

Even Lawyers Should Be Paid More for Good Performance

2009-10-16T17:05:00.002-04:00

Another oral argument I attended this week was in the case of Perdue v. Kenny A., in which Cato filed a brief at the end of August. The issue is whether a court can ever increase the statutorily set fees attorneys receive from the government when they successfully bring civil rights challenges to state action.

In order to enforce civil rights guarantees, Congress had two choices: either expand the Department of Justice to cover all civil rights cases, or privatize the system and allow free market principles to encourage private attorneys to prosecute violations. Congress chose the latter, creating a system of market incentives to encourage private attorneys to enforce civil rights and hold elected representatives responsible for the waste of taxpayer dollars lost in the defense of legitimate civil rights violations and repayment of “reasonable” attorney fees.

Here a group of attorneys won an important case for foster children in Georgia, and the court awarded them $6 million in fees based on prevailing hourly rates — the “lodestar” method — and an additional $4.5 million enhancement for the exceptional quality of work and results achieved. At Georgia’s request, the U.S. Supreme Court decided to review the case and determine whether quality of work and results are appropriately considered components of a reasonable fee.

Cato, joining six other public interest legal organizations, filed an amicus brief supporting the attorneys. We argue that the enhancement in this case is necessary to preserve incentives in the privatized market. Not only does it encourage attorneys to pursue civil rights abuses, but it provides a powerful disincentive for governments to draw out litigation in the hope that attorneys will no longer be able to afford pursue it. In addition, quality of performance and attained results are rightly considered as part of the attorney fee calculus. The enhancement here helps to promote the free market of privatized civil rights prosecutions and encourages governments to resolve civil rights cases quickly.

Unfortunately, the Court didn’t seem to be convinced at oral argument that there was a problem with the way civil rights attorneys are compensated under the lodestar method. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia, in particular, were aggressive in questioning a very well prepared Paul Clement (the former solicitor general, with whom I had the privilege to work on a different case that will be argued next month). They expressed concern about how to evaluate the “exceptional results” needed to justify a fee enhancement. Clement said that the Court could leave this to the trial judges’ discretion,to which Justice Scalia replied: “You say discretion. I say randomness.”

Only Justice Sotomayor, who was again an active questioner, suggested a standard to guide judges, citing such factors as a discrepancy between the market in which the attorney practices and the market on which fees are based, as well as the attoney’s experience (for example, the justices frequently referred to a “brilliant” second-year associate who might be paid at a partner rate). But several justices, at least, would never agree to such a standard. Even Justice Breyer, typically friendly to civil rights claims, expressed skepticism over whether millions of taxpayer dollars should be paid to already well-compensated lawyers.

Still, while it would be strange for district judges to have the ability to reduce fee awards for various reasons (such as inferior performance, even if technically victorious) while not being able to increase them, that’s the result we’ll have if the Court rules as all indications now suggest.

Cross-posted at Cato's blog.

Due Process Case to Be Decided on Procedural Grounds

2009-10-15T09:02:00.000-04:00

Yesterday I went to the Supreme Court to watch the argument in Alvarez v. Smith, a case about civil forfeiture in which Cato filed an amicus brief.

Civil forfeiture, the practice in which the police seize cars, money and other kinds of property that they say has some connection to crime, can raise various of legal and policy issues — from property rights to due process. The question in Alvarez is the basic one of whether people seeking to get their property back are entitled to a prompt hearing before a judge.

Illinois’ forfeiture law allows the State to wait as long as six months before having to prove the legitimacy of the seizure, which proceeding may then be delayed indefinitely for “good cause.” The six plaintiffs in Alvarez — three of whom were never charged with a crime — had their cars or money seized without a warrant for months or years without any judicial hearing, and sued the state and city authorities for violating their rights to due process. The Seventh Circuit found the Illinois law to be unconstitutional because of the delay between the seizure and the forfeiture proceeding and ruled that the plaintiffs must be afforded an informal hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to detain the property. The Supreme Court agreed to review the case at the request of the Cook County State Attorney.

Cato’s brief, joined by the Goldwater Institute and Reason Foundation, supports the individuals whose property was seized. Written by David B. Smith, who previously supervised all forfeiture litigation for the Department of Justice and is now the nation’s leading authority on civil and criminal forfeiture, the brief makes three arguments: 1) Because the Illinois law, unlike the federal Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, is stacked in favor of law enforcement agencies and lacks protections for innocent property owners, the Court should apply the due process analysis from Mathews v. Eldridge, rather than the more lenient test the State proposes; 2) What has become known as a Krimstock hearing has proven to be an effective and not overly burdensome means of preventing government delay and a meaningful opportunity to contest seizure; and 3) the State’s comparison of the time limits in CAFRA with those in its own law is misleading.

Unfortunately, though some justices appeared at argument inclined to rule that at least some prompt process was due — many other states require that the police quickly come before a judge to make a showing equivalent to the one necessary to get a search warrant — several seemed to want to avoid the due process question for another day because Alvarez was procedurally flawed, so to speak. That is, Justice Scalia pointed that none of the six plaintiffs have a live claim any more – three have had their cars returned, two defaulted on their claims, and the State reached agreement with one – so the case was “moot.” And Justice Stevens noted that the appellate court left it to the trial court to determine the details of the hearing to which the plaintiffs were entitled. (Of course, if the latter “problem” ends up being the key to the case, the Court will simply dismiss the appeal and let the Seventh Circuit’s ruling stand, which is good news — but only for people in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin.)

For more on the case, see George Mason law professor and Cato adjunct scholar Ilya Somin’s oped, and his related blog post at the Volokh Conspiracy.

Cross-posted at Cato's blog.

The Government Robbed Chrysler Creditors

2009-10-07T09:00:00.000-04:00

In January 2009, Chrysler stood on the brink of insolvency. Purporting to act under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, the Treasury extended Chrysler a $4 billion loan using funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Still in a bad financial situation, Chrysler initially proposed an out-of-court reorganization plan that would fully repay all of Chrysler’s secured debt. The Treasury rejected this proposal and instead insisted on a plan that would completely eradicate Chrysler’s secured debt, hinging billions of dollars in additional TARP funding on Chrysler’s acquiescence.

When Chrysler’s first lien lenders refused to waive their secured rights without full payment, the Treasury devised a scheme by which Chrysler, instead of reorganizing under a chapter 11 plan, would sell its assets free of all secured interests to a shell company, the New Chrysler. Chrysler was thus able to avoid the “absolute priority rule,” which provides that a court should not approve a bankruptcy plan unless it is “fair and equitable” to all classes of creditors.

Cato joined the Washington Legal Foundation, Allied Educational Foundation, and George Mason law professor Todd Zywicki on a brief supporting the creditors’ petition asking the Supreme Court to review the transaction’s validity. We argue that the forced reorganization amounted to the Treasury redistributing value from senior, secured creditors to debtors and junior, unsecured creditors.

The government should not be allowed, through its own self-dealing, to hand-pick certain creditors for favorable treatment at the expense of others who would otherwise enjoy first lien priority. Further, a lack of predictability and consistency with regard to creditors’ expectations in bankruptcy will result in a destabilization of existing and future credit markets.

The Court will be deciding whether to hear the case later this fall. Thanks very much to Cato legal associate Travis Cushman for his help with the brief.

Cross-posted at Cato's blog.

Supreme Court Mulls Gladiators and the “Human Sacrifice Channel”

2009-10-06T14:00:00.002-04:00

Following up on my colleague David Boaz’s post about the U.S. v. Stevens “depictions of animal cruelty” case, my takeaway from this morning’s argument is that there’s not a single vote to uphold the law. The closest the government came to sympathy for its position came when Chief Justice Roberts wondered whether, if a narrower statute proscribing the “crush videos” that were the ostensible target of this legislation, the Court might uphold this broad statute on its face but also welcome many as-applied challenges in instances of prosecutorial overreach. (For a pithy discussion of facial versus as-applied challenges, noting that the Court generally favors facial attacks in First Amendment cases, see Roger Pilon’s foreword to this year’s Cato Supreme Court Review.)

A less technical line of questioning involved the constitutionality of a statute banning a hypothetical “human sacrifice channel” or the broadcast of fight-to-the-death gladiatorial battles — from a foreign country where that sort of thing is legal. (Justice Scalia quipped that the rule cannot be that you satisfy the broad legislation’s “historical value” exception if you dress up as an ancient Roman.)

Much of the analysis about these types of extreme scenarios turns on whether the broadcast/depiction creates a market for such activities — which is the rationale for banning child pornography (i.e., fewer children are subject to sexual abuse if there is not a legal market for pictures and videos of children being sexually abused). Thus, a narrow statute banning the aforementioned crush videos would be kosher, as it were, but not the broad legislation at issue — which could potentially sweep in, to take one example, promotional videos put out by the Spanish board of tourism that include bullfighting clips.

For a more detailed report, see Lyle Denniston on SCOTUSblog (whom you can also see all week on C-SPAN’s excellent Supreme Court documentary mini-series). And again, to read Cato’s view, see our amicus curiae brief.

Cross-posted at Cato's blog.

Think Tanks Should Be Able to Opine on Public Policy Without Running Afoul of Campaign Finance Regulations

2009-10-06T12:00:00.001-04:00

In 2005, political opponents filed a complaint against the Independence Institute for not complying with the Colorado constitution and other campaign finance regulations when it spoke against a state ballot initiative. These regulations require, among other things, disclosure of the identity of anyone who has donated more than $20 to a cause and imposes registration and contribution limits on groups who have major interests in ballot issues.

The Independence Institute challenged the constitutionality of Colorado’s state ballot issue requirements and the issue is petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari in Independence Institute v. Buescher. Cato has filed an amicus brief, in cooperation with Wyoming Liberty Group, the Center for Competitive Politics, the Sam Adams Alliance, the Montana Policy Institute, and the Goldwater Institute in support of the Independence Institute. We argue that Colorado’s ballot campaign regulations run roughshod over constitutional protections for political speech and association, which lie at the very heart of the First Amendment—particularly for think tanks and other organizations that regularly comment on public policy matters. Loss of these First Amendment protections will chill think tanks’ future attempts to educate the public about issues that are the subject of ballot campaigns. The Court should thus review this case and ensure that citizens maintain their associational rights—including the right to remain anonymous when donating to non-profits—and associations their freedom of expression.

You can download the entire brief here. A special thanks to Cato Legal Associate Travis Cushman for his assistance on this brief.

Cross-posted at Cato's blog.

A New Court Term: Big Cases, a New Justice

2009-10-05T14:00:00.004-04:00

Today is the first Monday in October, and so is First Monday, the traditional start of the Supreme Court term. The Court already heard one argument – in the Citizens United campaign finance case — but it had been carried over from last year, so it doesn’t really count.

In any event, continuing its trend from last term, the Court has further front-loaded its caseload — with nearly 60 arguments on its docket already. Fortunately, unlike last year, we’ll see many blockbuster cases, including:

the application of the Second Amendment to state gun regulations;
First Amendment challenges to national park monuments and a statute criminalizing the depiction of animal cruelty;
an Eighth Amendment challenge to life sentences for juveniles; a potential revisiting of Miranda rights;
federalism concerns over legislation regarding the civil commitment of “sexually dangerous” persons;
a separation-of-powers dispute concerning the agency enforcing Sarbanes-Oxley;
judicial takings of beachfront property; and
notably in these times of increasing government control over the economy, the “reasonableness” of mutual fund managers’ compensation.

Cato has filed amicus briefs in many of these cases, so I will be paying extra-close attention.
Perhaps more importantly, we also have a new justice — and, as Justice White often said, a new justice makes a new Court. While Sonia Sotomayor’s confirmation was never in any serious doubt, she faced strong criticism on issues ranging from property rights and the use of foreign law in constitutional interpretation to the Ricci firefighters case and the “wise Latina” speeches that led people to question her commitment to judicial objectivity. Only time will tell what kind of justice Sotomayor will be now that she is unfettered from higher court precedent — and the first term is not necessarily indicative.

Key questions for the new Court’s dynamics are whether Sotomayor will challenge Justice Scalia intellectually and whether she will antagonize Justice Kennedy and thus push him to the right. We’ve already seen her make waves at the Citizens United reargument — questioning the scope of corporations’ constitutional rights — so it could be that she will decline to follow Justice Alito’s example and jump right into the Court’s rhetorical battles.

In short, it’s the first day of school and I’m excited.

Cross-posted on Cato's blog.

Cato Supreme Court Review on the Road

2009-09-23T14:58:00.002-04:00

With last week’s Constitution Day conference behind us (watch it here) — and the release of the 2008-2009 Cato Supreme Court Review — I can finally escape the office where I’ve been holed up all summer. Yes, it’s time to go on the road and talk about all these wonderful legal issues we’ve learned about over the past year, as well as previewing the new Supreme Court term.

To that end, below is my fall speaking schedule so far. All these events are sponsored by the Federalist Society (and in some cases co-sponsored by other organizations) and all are open to the public.

If you decide to attend one of the presentations after learning of it from this blog post, please feel free to drop me a line beforehand, and do introduce yourself after the event.

Sept. 24 at 11:50am – DePaul Law School, Chicago – Debate on the Second Amendment post-Heller

Sept. 24 at 4:30pm – Chicago-Kent School of Law – Panel on Rule of Law in Iraq

Sept. 29 at 5:00pm – University of Cincinnati Law School - Rule of Law and Economic Development

Sept. 30 at 12:00pm – Capital University Law School (Columbus, OH) – Review of October Term 2008/Preview of October Term 2009

Sept. 30 at 3:30pm – Ohio Northern School of Law (Ada, OH) – Debate on Ricci and Affirmative Action in Employment

Oct. 1 at 12:00pm – University of Toledo Law School – Debate on Ricci and Affrimative Action in Employment

Oct. 1 at 5:00pm – Thomas M. Cooley Law School (Auburn Hills, MI) – Immigration and the Constitution

Oct. 5 at 12:00pm – University of Pennsylvania Law School – Debate on the Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation

Oct.6 at 5:30pm – Blank Rome LLP in Philadelphia (Federalist Society Lawyers Chapter; small admission fee) – Panel on Rule of Law in Iraq

Oct. 8 at 1:00pm – Penn State-Dickinson Law School (University Park) – October Term 2009 Preview

Oct. 13 at 5:15pm – George Mason University Law School (Arlington, VA) – October Term 2009 Preview

Oct. 26 at 12:00pm – Florida International University Law School (Miami) – Topic TBA

Oct. 27 at 12:30pm – University of Miami Law School – Topic TBA

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

Use Only U.S. Law to Interpret the U.S. Constitution

2009-09-22T11:23:00.002-04:00

This fall, the Supreme Court will hear two cases involving Eighth Amendment challenges to the sentencing of juveniles to life without parole (”LWOP”) – Graham v. Florida and Sullivan v. Florida — claims that these types of sentences are “cruel and unusual.” Cato takes no position on the wisdom of these types of sentences, but when evaluating their constitutionality the Court should only consider American law.

That is, regardless of the criminological or moral merits of juvenile LWOP sentences, the Supreme Court ought not consider non-binding provisions of international human rights treaties and customary international law in its analysis (as it has in cases like Roper v. Simmons and Atkins v. Virginia). To that end, Cato joined the Solidarity Center for Law and Justice, the Sovereignty Network, and 10 other groups in a brief urging the Court to limit its constitutional analysis to domestic law and the decisions of U.S. courts.

Our brief argues that the Court should leave to the political branches the decision of whether to transform international norms into domestic law and only allow duly ratified international agreements to override domestic law — in the way the Court has set out in cases such as Medellin v. Texas. It further contends that if the Court believes this is one of the rare cases where international norms are relevant, it should follow the test it laid out in Sosa v. Alvarez Machain, which addressed the (unrelated) Alien Tort Statute: The relevant norm must be widely accepted by the civilized world and as clearly defined as the historic “law of nations” norms regarding safe conduct permits, ambassadorial rights, and piracy on the high seas.

The brief also cautions that reliance on non-binding and indefinite international norms will undermine the democratic process and rule of law, casting considerable uncertainty over many U.S. laws.

More generally, while looking to foreign and international example is prudent when designing constitutions and drafting legislation — or even adjudicating complex international legal disputes — it is simply not relevant to interpreting the nation’s founding document.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

Prosecutors Should Not Be Allowed to Fabricate Evidence

2009-09-21T11:20:00.000-04:00

In 1977, county attorney David Richter and assistant county attorney Joseph Hrvol worked side by side with police to investigate and “solve” the notorious murder of a former police officer in Pottawattamie County, Iowa. The prosecutors fabricated evidence and used it to charge and convict Curtis McGhee and Terry Harrington, sending them to prison for 25 years.

After the convictions were overturned for prosecutorial misconduct, McGhee and Harrington sued the county and prosecutors. The defendants in that civil suit invoked the absolute immunity generally afforded prosecutors to try to escape liability. After the Eighth Circuit ruled against them, the Supreme Court agreed to review the case.

On Friday, Cato joined the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the ACLU on a brief supporting the men unjustly imprisoned. We argue that prosecutors should be responsible for their role in manufacturing a false “case,” just as police officers would be under the same circumstances. As the Court has held, prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity only during the prosecutorial phase of a case, not its investigatory phase. Were prosecutors to receive absolute immunity here, citizens would have no protection from or recourse against prosecutors who frame the innocent by fabricating evidence and then using that evidence to convict them.

To read Cato’s brief in the case of Pottawattamie County v. McGhee, see here.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

"We Don’t Put Our First Amendment Rights In the Hands of FEC Bureaucrats"

2009-09-09T17:20:00.002-04:00

I (and several colleagues) have blogged before about Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the latest campaign finance case, which was argued this morning at the Supreme Court. The case is about much more than whether a corporation can release a movie about a political candidate during an election campaign. Indeed, it goes to the very heart of the First Amendment, which was specifically created to protect political speech—the kind most in danger of being censored by politicians looking to limit the appeal of threatening candidates and ideas.

After all, hard-hitting political speech is something the First Amendment’s authors experienced firsthand. They knew very well what they were doing in choosing free and vigorous debate over government-filtered pablum. Moreover, persons of modest means often pool their resources to speak through ideological associations like Citizens United. That speech too should not be silenced because of nebulous concerns about “level playing fields” and speculation over the “appearance of corruption.” The First Amendment simply does not permit the government to handicap speakers based on their wealth, or ration speech in a quixotic attempt to equalize public debate: Thankfully, we do not live in the world of Kurt Vonnegut’s Harrison Bergeron!

A few surprises came out of today’s hearing, but not regarding the ultimate outcome of this case. It is now starkly clear that the Court will rule 5-4 to strike down the FEC’s attempt to regulate the Hillary Clinton movie (and advertisements for it). Indeed, Solicitor General Elena Kagan — in her inaugural argument in any court — all but conceded that independent movies are not electioneering communications subject to campaign finance laws. And she reversed the government’s earlier position that even books could be banned if they expressly supported or opposed a candidate! (She went on to also reverse the government’s position on two other key points: whether nonprofit corporations (and perhaps small enterprises) could be treated differently than large for-profit business, and what the government’s compelling interest was in prohibiting corporations from using general treasury funds on independent political speech.)

Ted Olson, arguing for Citizens United, quickly recognized that he had his five votes, and so pushed for a broader opinion. That is, the larger — and more interesting — question is whether the Court will throw out altogether its 16-year-old proscription on corporations and unions spending their general treasury funds on political speech. Given the vehement opposition to campaign finance laws often expressed by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, all eyes were on Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, in whose jurisprudence some have seen signs of judicial “minimalism.” The Chief Justice’s hostility to the government’s argument — “we don’t put our First Amendment rights in the hands of FEC bureaucrats” — and Justice Alito’s skepticism about the weight of the two precedents at issue leads me to believe that there’s a strong likelihood we’ll have a decision that sweeps aside yet another cornerstone of the speech-restricting campaign finance regime.

One other thing to note: Justice Sotomayor, participating in her first argument since joining the Court, indicated three things: 1) she has doubts that corporations have the same First Amendment rights as individuals; 2) she believes strongly in stare decisis, even when a constitutional decision might be wrong; and 3) she cares a lot about deferring to the “democratic process.” While it is still much too early to be making generalizations about how she’ll behave now that she doesn’t answer to a higher Court, these three points suggest that she won’t be a big friend of liberty in the face of government “reform.”

Another (less serious) thing to note: My seat — in the last row of the Supreme Court bar members area — was almost directly in front of Senators John McCain and Russ Feingold (who were seated in the first row of the public gallery). I didn’t notice this until everyone rose to leave, or I would’ve tried to gauge their reaction to certain parts of the argument.

Finally, you can find the briefs Cato has filed in the case here and here.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

What Is "Unreasonable" Compensation? And Who Gets to Decide?

2009-09-04T14:25:00.001-04:00

As could be expected, the effects of the financial crisis — and people’s reaction thereto — are starting to make their way to the least political branch of government, the judiciary. The Supreme Court this term will be hearing several cases that could have serious repercussions on our economic recovery, one of which led us to file an amicus brief. Here’s the situation:

The Investment Company Act of 1940 places on investment advisers a fiduciary duty with respect to the compensation they receive for the services they provide their clients. In the case of Jones v. Harris Associates, shareholders in various mutual funds contend that their adviser fees were excessive and violated the ICA. The Seventh Circuit, the federal appellate court based in Chicago, affirmed the judgment of the district court that the fees were not excessive but also expressly disapproved of the methodology for evaluating such claims used by the Second Circuit (based in New York). Judge Frank Easterbrook’s opinion explains that the ICA creates a fiduciary duty but does not act as a rate regulator, and that judicial price-setting does not accompany fiduciary duties. Judge Richard Posner, writing for five judges, dissented from the denial of an en banc rehearing. The Supreme Court agreed to review the case to settle the circuit split.

Our brief supports the investment adviser and makes three arguments:

All persons have a fundamental human right to whatever compensation their contracting partners freely and honestly choose to pay them.
Courts have no power to second-guess the reasonableness of any salary or compensation agreement honestly and freely signed by both contracting parties.
The ICA’s fiduciary duty requires only fair dealing, not any particular outcome.

Thanks to Cato adjunct scholar Tim Sandefur for spearheading this effort, and to Cato intern Matthew Aichele for helping with much of the attendant busywork.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

Beach v. Florida

2009-09-04T14:08:00.003-04:00

Cato Adjunct Scholar and Pacific Legal Foundation Senior Staff Attorney Tim Sandefur published an excellent op-ed in the National Law Journal this week on the upcoming Supreme Court case Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection:

The case involves a Florida statute determining the boundaries of
oceanfront property. Under a 1961 law, the state drew a brand-new line
separating public and private land on certain beaches, meaning that some land
that would have been privately owned would belong instead to the state. A group
of property owners filed suit, arguing that the law deprived them of property
without just compensation, violating the state and federal
constitutions.

Last December, Florida’s highest court rejected their arguments. It held
that, while the new boundary gave the state ownership of the beach land, the
former owners actually had no such right to begin with. Despite more than a
century of Florida law to the contrary, the court announced that the owners
actually only had a right to “access” the ocean, and because the state promised
to allow them to keep crossing the land to reach the water, it actually hadn’t
taken anything away when it seized the land itself.

Thus, by simply reinterpreting state property law, the court allowed the
state to take property without compensation with a mere stroke of a pen. Yet the
U.S. Constitution forbids states from confiscating property – even through legal
legerdemain – without payment.

[...]

[T]he U.S. Constitution also guarantees every American’s right to due
process of law and to protection of private property. If state judges can
arbitrarily rewrite a state’s property laws, those guarantees would be
meaningless. More than four decades ago, Justice Potter Stewart warned that,
without a constitutional limit on the states’ power to determine the nature of
property, states could “defeat the constitutional prohibition against taking
property without due process of law by the simple device of asserting
retroactively that the property it has taken never existed at all.”

It is well-worth a full read here.

Despite the dreadful decision in the Kelo case several years ago, the fight to maintain the fundamental right to private property continues in our courts and legislatures. Tim and PLF have been doing yeoman’s work in the fight for property rights, and I am proud to team Cato up with them and the NFIB Legal Center in filing an amicus brief on behalf of the rightful property owners in this case. You can download the PDF of the brief here.

[Cross-posted from Cato's blog.]

Sotomayor Confirmed, Constitutional Debate Continues

2009-08-06T16:17:00.001-04:00

All Americans should take pride in seeing our first Hispanic Supreme Court justice (not counting Benjamin Cardozo). While this moment should have belonged to Miguel Estrada—who was denied even a vote by an unprecedented Democratic filibuster—we should nevertheless celebrate Sonia Sotomayor’s rise from very humble beginnings to reach the highest court in the land. Although her selection represents the very worst of racial politics—she is not a leading light of the judiciary and would not have been considered had she not been a Hispanic woman—her career achievements show that the American Dream endures.

What makes the American Dream possible, however, is the rule of law, which in this country is ultimately guaranteed by the Constitution. The Constitution provides for a very specific government structure, with checks on each branch’s powers designed to maximize liberty and eliminate arbitrary and capricious rule. To that end, officers of the judicial branch—judges—are to make their decisions irrespective of the race, religion, or riches of those who come before them. And judges are to interpret the Constitution as written text. If they set aside the text and rule based on their own notions of fairness, then they act as unelected legislators or, worse, extra-constitutional amenders of our founding document.

Nominee Sotomayor knew all this, which is why the testimony she gave at her confirmation hearings disclaimed many of her previous speeches and writings, even going so far as to reject President Obama’s “empathy” standard—the idea that a judge applies the law differently when a litigant is sympathetic in some politically correct way. While she was evasive most of the time—reason enough to vote against her—when she did say something about judicial philosophy, it was often indistinguishable from the words of John Roberts or Samuel Alito (as evidenced by the frustration of left-wing commentators). And for good reason: in poll after poll, the American people overwhelmingly support a vision of the judicial role as one of enforcing the law as written, not of imposing their own policy preferences or vision of justice.

Kudos from this exercise go to those Republicans whose hard questions and thoughtful statements elevated the discussion of the Constitution beyond mere abstractions, so Americans could better understand the significance of ideological differences over the judicial role, or the use of foreign law in interpreting the Constitution, or property rights, or employment discrimination.

In walking away from so many controversial positions, Sonia Sotomayor established a new standard to which all future nominees will at least have to pay lip service. While confirmation was almost a foregone conclusion from the start because of the Democrats’ strong Senate majority, the Republicans played well the cards they had been dealt by engaging in a serious discussion about constitutional interpretation and jurisprudential philosophy.

Cross-posted at Cato's blog.

Sarbanes-Oxley’s Harms Are Magnified by the PCAOB’s Unconstitutional Structure

2009-08-04T15:06:00.001-04:00

Passed with scant deliberation amid a stock market panic, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 vastly expanded the federal government’s role in regulating corporate governance and the accounting industry. As part of that effort, Congress created a new agency to “audit the auditors.” Known as the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, the agency has broad rulemaking and enforcement powers to set accounting standards, investigate accounting firms, punish criminal violations, and make whatever rules “may be necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”

Remarkably, the PCAOB (pronounced “peek-a-boo”) also has the power to fund its own budget by levying taxes on publicly traded companies. Despite giving the PCAOB all this power, however, Congress insulated it entirely from presidential oversight. Unlike with an ordinary “independent agency,” the president has no power whatsoever to appoint or remove PCAOB officials. Those officials may be removed only “for cause” by the SEC, not the president; and SEC officials may themselves be removed only for cause.

The Free Enterprise Fund challenged the constitutionality of the PCAOB and appealed to the Supreme Court. Cato’s supporting brief focuses on the PCAOB’s practical policy consequences, illustrating how the PCAOB’s unconstitutional structure has created incentives for out-of-control spending, agency aggrandizement, and lack of coordination between regulators. Our brief also highlights the PCAOB’s efforts to impose American accounting standards abroad, which has caused confusion and invited retaliation from foreign regulators.

I previously blogged about this case here and here.

Cross-posted at Cato's blog.

A Chance to Rethink How We Regulate Political Speech

2009-08-03T13:08:00.003-04:00

At the March 24 argument in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the U.S. government argued that Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (otherwise known as McCain-Feingold) permits the FEC to ban corporations, including ideological nonprofits like Citizens United, from making independent expenditures on films, books, or even “a sign held up in Lafayette Park.” The jurisprudential justification for this extraordinary and shockingly expansive view of the government’s power to suppress political speech traces to the Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce. In Austin, the Court held that Michigan had a compelling state interest in banning political speech funded with wealth accumulated using the corporate form. Though the Court contended that such speech, because it bears little correlation to public support for the political ideas expressed, constituted a “different type of corruption,” in reality it upheld Michigan’s statute as a “counterbalance” to the “distorting” and “unfair” influence corporate funds could have on the outcome of elections.

This relative-equality rationale—suppressing disfavored speakers to enhance the voice of other government-favored speakers—is antithetical to core First Amendment protections and elsewhere has been expressly rejected by the Court (in Buckley v. Valeo and, more recently, in Davis v. FEC). Accordingly, to decide Citizens United’s appeal, the Court ordered rebriefing and reargument on Austin’s continuing validity.

On Friday, Cato filed its brief, the second we’ve filed in the case. We argue that Austin, and the part of McConnell v. FEC that upheld Section 203’s facial validity, are not entitled to stare decisis deference and should thus be overturned. These relatively recent decisions are poorly reasoned, have engendered no reliance interests (no one relies on less freedom of speech), and have spawned an unworkable and irrational campaign finance system in which the government rations different levels of permissible political speech to otherwise equally situated speakers.

The case will be reargued September 9, in a special session about a month before the official start of the Court’s new term.

Cross-posted at Cato's blog.

Senate Panel Endorses Sotomayor

2009-07-28T14:30:00.001-04:00

The judiciary committee’s vote to endorse Sonia Sotomayor is not surprising. None of the Democrats are from red states and so have little to fear from voters, while the quixotic Lindsey Graham—in what can only be described as a triumph of hope over experience—was the only Republican to have set aside legitimate qualms and voted for the “wise Latina.” But voting on a Supreme Court nomination is more than a matter of deciding whether a nominee is “qualified”—even if Sonia Sotomayor had been a leading light of the judiciary rather than just the best available Hispanic woman—or deferring to the president. Instead, Senator Dick Durbin had it right when he said during John Roberts’s confirmation hearings that “no one has a right to sit on the Supreme Court” and that the “burden of proof for a Supreme Court justice is on the nominee.”

Given Sotomayor’s repeated rejection of the idea that law is or should be objective or discernible from written text, her inability in oral and written testimony to even state a position on important cases and legal doctrine beyond an acceptance of precedent—by which she would no longer be bound in her new role—leaves me with an abiding concern about the damage she could do to the rule of law in this country. I am similarly hard-pressed to accept hearing-seat conversions that contradict over 15 years of speeches and articles: most notably on the idea that judges’ ethnic backgrounds—and even “physiological differences”—should affect their rulings and on using foreign law to inform constitutional interpretation. Because of her evasion, obfuscation, and doubletalk, I like Sotomayor less now than when she was first nominated.

And so, in following the “burden of proof” paradigm and also respecting the logic of Senator Arlen Specter, who curiously evoked Scottish law at President Clinton’s impeachment trial, I would vote that the case for confirming Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court is “not proven”—under American law.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

Sotomayor Doesn't Deserve a Supreme Court Seat

2009-07-22T16:13:00.002-04:00

Having sat through the entire gavel-to-gavel coverage of last week’s confirmation hearings, I still don’t know if I would vote to confirm Sonia Sotomayor if I were a senator, I really don’t. Deciding how to vote on this is more than a simple matter of deciding whether she is “qualified” to sit on the Supreme Court—which is hard enough given there is no fixed qualification standard.

It also has to include how much deference you want to give the president, in general terms but also taking into account that Sotomayor will likely be confirmed and you want to position yourself politically for the next nominee. And it has to include, of course, how your constituents feel; while it’s cowardly to follow opinion polls blindly, you are accountable to those who sent you to Washington. There are many other considerations, both political and legal.

But I’m not a senator—or even a senator’s aide—so I don’t have to make that decision. As a constitutional lawyer, however, I can say that—even as most of Sotomayor’s opinions are uncontroversial—it is impossible to overlook the short thrift the judge gave to the judicial process in Ricci v. DeStefano and Didden v. Port Chester. I am similarly hard-pressed to accept hearing-seat conversions that contradict over 15 years of speeches and articles: most notably against the idea that judges’ ethnic backgrounds—and even “physiological differences”—should affect their rulings.

Given Sotomayor’s repeated past rejection of the idea that law is or should be objective, stable, or discernible from written text, her inability during her testimony to explain her judicial philosophy—or even state her position on important cases and issues beyond an acceptance of precedent (by which she would no longer be bound in her new role)—leaves me with an abiding concern about the damage she could do to the rule of law in this country. Because of the nominee’s evasion, obfuscation, and doubletalk, I like her less now than I did before the hearings.

And so, on second thought, I do know how I would vote. During John Roberts’s confirmation hearings, Sen. Dick Durbin said that “no one has a right to sit on the Supreme Court” and that the “burden of proof for a Supreme Court justice is on the nominee.” I will follow this very apt “burden of proof” paradigm and respect the logic of Sen. Arlen Specter, the Republican-turned-Democrat former judiciary committee chairman who at President Clinton’s impeachment trial curiously evoked Scottish law to vote “not proven.” Given the impropriety of citing foreign law (another issue on which the nominee failed to explain her “conversion” in hearing testimony), I would vote that the case for confirming Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court is “not proven”—under American law.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

Sotomayor Playing Out the Clock

2009-07-16T13:51:00.001-04:00

As she began to do more and more yesterday, the nominee has started today’s hearings with a series of painfully drawn-out non-answers to Senator Kyl’s questions.

Kyl is pointing out the conflict between Sotomayor’s claim that in Ricci she was simply following precedent and the Supreme Court’s finding that there was no precedent on point—and so Sotomayor’s panel summary disposition was improper.

Sotomayor’s responses have ranged from explaining again the procedural posture of the case, to references to irrelevant background cases (not binding precedent), to recounting en banc voting procedures in the Second Circuit. It is clear that, even as the Republicans reload and regroup at every break and recess, Sotomayor has been counseled to talk and talk—again, in an excruciatingly slow rate—without really saying anything.

CP Townhall and Cato's blog.

Lack of Deep Thinking = Belief in the Living Constitution?

2009-07-15T17:44:00.000-04:00

In a twist on the “lack of deep thinking” idea, part of what might be going on in Sotomayor’s head—why she keeps answering questions about judicial philosophy with reference to precedent rather than constitutional first principles is because she’s not an originalist. How can we hope for her to tell us her understanding of the meaning of the constitutional text, after all, if that text’s meaning changes with the times?

For example, Stuart Smalley Al Franken asked Sotomayor point blank, “do you believe the right to privacy includes the right to have an abortion?” The nominee began here response with: “The Court has said….” That is, it is not the Constitution—whatever your view of it may be, whether you think it contains a right to abortion or not—that is the supreme law of the land, but what nine black-robed philosopher-kings say. Of course, if your (non-)theory of constitutional interpretation is to keep “improving” the document—and to keep one step ahead of public opinion, so judges can effect social “progress”—then it’s irrelevant what the Constitution said before the Supreme Court put its gloss on it.

And if you subscribe to this “living Constitution” or “active liberty” theory, then naturally the life experiences of a “wise Latina,” along with lessons from foreign and international law—which, Sotomayor said as recently as her April speech to ACLU, get a judge’s “creative juices flowing”—are all valid parts of your jurisprudential toolkit.

CP Townhall and Cato's blog.

Sotomayor Displays a Lack of Deep Thinking

2009-07-15T13:42:00.000-04:00

It strikes me that Sotomayor has been fairly forthright in her responses to questioning, not hiding too much behind the tired cliché that she can’t answer a question because it could lead to prejudging a case—certainly far less than Ruth Bader Ginsburg and even John Roberts. Still, on several important issues, such as property rights, national security law, abortion, and even her overall judicial philosophy, she has appeared disingenuous in saying that she has no firm views on the subject—hiding behind precedent again and again as if first principles didn’t exist. In other words, she says a lot—displaying a broad knowledge of cases and legal doctrine—without answering larger questions. She answers questions about what the law should be with what the law is, questions about what the Constitution says with what the Supreme Court has said about the Constitution.

This would be barely appropriate for a nominee to a lower court, who is, of course, bound by precedent. But senators rightly want to know a Supreme Court nominee’s preferred legal theories, what her view of the Constitution is unencumbered by others’ attempts to interpret that document.

The more Sotomayor speaks, the more it becomes clear that these types of nonanswers, this inability to see (or lack of desire to express) a big picture view, is her own essence. It continues a pattern that is evident from her judicial opinions, which are mostly unremarkable and, in the neutral sense of that term, unimpressive. For all her career success and a personal story we should all celebrate, she is an average judge who apparently gives little thought to the broad swath of law and where her rulings fit into that.

That is, Sonia Sotomayor is not a Cass Sunstein or Larry Tribe or Elana Kagan or (fellow circuit judge) Diane Wood. She is not a scholar or an ideologue. Her liberality is reflexive and warmed-over, a product of the post-modern educational environment that formed her in the 1970s—complete with ethnic activism—but not an intellectual edifice. This does not mean she isn’t a danger to liberty and the rule of law, or that her votes and opinions won’t harm the Constitution. But it does indicate that, for all her bluster about being a “wise Latina,” she is little more than a left-leaning empty robe.

CP Townhall and Cato's blog.

Sotomayor Waffles on Property Rights

2009-07-14T15:39:00.001-04:00

The hearing began after lunch with Senator Grassley probing Sotomayor’s views on Kelo v. New London and the Fifth Amendment’s protection of property right—one of the questions I would ask her. The nominee apparently thought the senator (who’s not a lawyer) needed a lesson in what went on in Kelo and how the Court ruled. Grassley, having been briefed by counsel, didn’t seem to care for that, pushing Sotomayor on whether she thought Kelo was correctly decided and how she views constitutional property rights generally.

Sotomayor said Kelo was a judgment of the Court that she accepts, but that any future case she would have to judge on its own merits. Well, of course, but that wasn’t the question on the table. Exasperated, Grassley asked Sotomayor whether a taking with no compensation would be constitutional. The “wise Latina” couldn’t formulate a proper response, smiling and explaining that what constitutes a “taking” is subject to legal analysis. Well, yes, but that still doesn’t answer the question. Finally, Sotomayor concluded that if a taking violated the Constitution, she would have to strike it down.

In short, according to Sotomayor, if something is unconstitutional, a judge can’t allow it. The technical term we lawyers use for this kind of sophisticated reasoning is “circular”—with the judge here getting to decide based on no discernible criteria whether something is constitutional.

For more on the outrageous takings Judge Sotomayor has allowed, see George Mason law
professor Ilya Somin’s analysis of the Didden v. Port Chester case. (Somin, also a Cato adjunct scholar, will be testifying at the hearings later this week.)

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

Update on the Sotomayor Hearings

2009-07-14T15:32:00.000-04:00

After yesterday’s bloviating—much reduced by Joe Biden’s departure from the committee—today we’ve gotten into some good stuff. Sotomayor is obviously well-prepared. She speaks in measured, dulcet tones, showing little emotion.

Judiciary Committee Chairman Leahy gave her the opportunity to explain herself on Ricci and on the “wise Latina” comment—which she has repeated in public speeches at least six times going back 15 years—and then built up the nominee’s background as a prosecutor and trial judge. Ranking Member Sessions and Senator Hatch (himself a former chairman of the committee) pounded Sotomayor on Ricci, asking her how she reconciles a race-based decision with clear Supreme Court precedent—and how her panel decided the case in two paragraphs despite the weighty statutory and constitutional questions.

Sessions in particular pointed out the inconsistency between her statement yesterday that she was guided by “fidelity to the law” and her history of calling the appellate courts as being the place where “policy is made” and profession of inability to find an objective approach of the law divorced from a judge’s ethnicity or gender. Sotomayor’s responses were not convincing; rather than agreeing with Justice O’Connor’s statement that a wise old man and a wise old woman would come out the same way on the law, the “wise Latina” comment plainly means the exact opposite.

And so the back-and-forth continues. One refreshing thing I will note is that only twice has the nominee said she can’t answer a question or elaborate on a response: on abortion, saying Griswold, Roe, and Casey are settled law; and on guns, declining to discuss whether the constitutional right to bear arms can be used to strike down state (as opposed to federal) laws.

The former is a clear—but not unexpected—cop-out because, unlike a lower court judge, the Supreme Court justice revisits the nature and scope of rights all the time. The latter is actually the correct response in light of the three cert petitions pending before the Court in the latest round of Second Amendment litigation. Still, her discussion of the Second Amendment left much to be desired given her ruling in Maloney; as Jillian Bandes pointed out recently, you can’t discuss incorporation without a solid understanding of Presser.

[Cross-posted at Townhall and at Cato's blog.]

Sotomayor and "Secret Law"

2009-07-14T13:41:00.000-04:00

Sotomayor didn’t have much to say in response to Senator Feingold’s inquiries regarding national security law and civil liberties post-9/11, but the Wisconsin lawmaker’s questions about “secret law”—on which he didn’t press the nominee’s non-answers—made me think of the following: Both Ricci (the infamous firefighters race discrimination case) and Didden were “unpublished” summary dispositions.

If Sotomayor had not been nominated to the Supreme Court, causing hundreds if not thousands of lawyers to comb through her judicial opinions, would anyone have uncovered these blatant attempts to sweep controversial legal issues under the rug? Are Ricci and Didden Sotomayor’s secret law?

CP Townhall and Cato's blog.

Opening Day at Judiciary Park: Sotomayor on Deck

2009-07-13T20:30:00.000-04:00

The first day of the Sotomayor hearings yielded many baseball references but little in the way of home runs and strikeouts—or surprises. Democrats lauded Sotomayor’s rags-to-riches story and career achievements. Republicans questioned the “wise Latina’s” commitment to objectivity, whether she would be a “judicial activist” and—most interesting to me—whether she planned to use foreign law in helping her to interpret the Constitution. These would clearly be the lines of attack and counterattack.

It was all “set pieces”—prepared statements that often said more about the senators themselves than about the nominee. The stars of the show were unquestionably Senators Sessions (R-AL), Graham (R-SC), and Franken (D-SNLMN). Sessions, the ranking member, is armed for bear and has clearly been reading the memos my colleagues around town have been writing. Graham marches to his own (very candid) drummer, pronouncing that Sotomayor would be confirmed unless she had a “complete meltdown.” Franken… well he’s just happy to be on the big stage on his sixth day in office.

Assuming Sotomayor is confirmed, however, this will not be that big a political victory for President Obama. With Democrats holding a 60-40 margin in the Senate, confirmation has long been expected, and the political markets have already discounted for it. The president will likely see a temporary blip of support, particularly among Hispanics, but not as much as one might think—because those who are high on Sotomayor already support Obama. Moreover, most people will soon forget the Supreme Court and go back to worrying about their personal economic situation—which the president’s policies are certainly not helping.

In a way, this week’s hearings and the confirmation process generally have more downside potential for the administration than upside. Not because of the small chance Sotomayor won’t get confirmed—which would be a real blow—but because issues such as affirmative action, property rights, gun rights, and the use of foreign law are all being thrust to the forefront of the news cycle. These issues, and the debate over judicial philosophy generally, are all winners for the Republicans—if they play their cards right.

In any event, tomorrow the real fun begins—with the blue team tossing softballs at the nominee and the red team sending the high heat.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

The Sotomayor Hearings

2009-07-09T17:27:00.002-04:00

Nothing has changed in the six short weeks since Sonia Sotomayor was nominated to the Supreme Court: she remains a symbol of the racial politics she embraces. While we celebrate her story and professional achievements, we must realize that she — an average federal judge with a passel of unimpressive decisions — would not even be part of the conversation if she weren’t a Hispanic woman.

As Americans increasingly call for the abolition of affirmative action, Sotomayor supports racial preferences. As poll after poll shows that Americans demand that judges apply the law as written, the “wise Latina” denies that this is ever an objective exercise and urges judges to view cases through ethnic and gender lenses.

At next week’s hearings, Sotomayor will have to answer substantively for these and other controversial views — and for outrageous rulings on employment discrimination, property rights, and the Second Amendment. To earn confirmation, she must satisfy the American people that, despite her speeches and writings, she plans to be a judge, not a post-modern ethnic activist. After all, a jurisprudence of empathy is the antithesis of the rule of law.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

Ricci v. DeStefano: A Victory for Merit Over Racial Politics

2009-06-29T11:55:00.003-04:00

Ricci is a victory for merit over racial politics—which is appropriate given that the ruling overturns a lower court panel that included Sonia Sotomayor.

In the blockbuster decision we’d been awaiting all term, the Court reached the correct result: The government can’t make employment decisions based on race. While the city’s desire to get more blacks into leadership positions at the fire department is commendable, it cannot pursue this goal by denying promotions simply because those who earned them happen to have an inconvenient skin color.

This ruling is the latest in a series of steps the Court has taken to strike down race-conscious actions that violate individual rights—and thus is a blow both to the Obama administration (which sided with the city in Ricci) and to the nomination of Judge Sotomayor. Those who bring cases before the courts deserve much more than empathy or even “sympathy”—the word Justice Ginsburg uses in her dissent—they deserve equal treatment under the law.

[Cross-posted on Cato's blog.]

Mourning the Loss of a Great American Capitalist

2009-06-26T10:23:00.001-04:00

While the big news of the day wouldn’t seem to have a public policy angle, Michael Jackson’s death allows us to remember that such phenomenal career achievements can only be possible in an economic system that rewards and harnesses talent.

The King of Pop’s creativity allowed him and his family to make hundreds of millions of dollars, yes, but it also created thousands of jobs in the music and marketing industries and brought joy to fans around the world. Whatever his personal eccentricities — perhaps, in part, as a result of them — Jackson represents a capitalist success story.

No central planner could have invented him, and no government bureaucracy could have transformed pop music in the way he did.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

"Sweet" Victory in Oregon

2009-06-25T17:02:00.001-04:00

As a follow-up to Jason Kuznicki’s post from January, I am pleased to report that yesterday Oregon Governor Ted Kulongoski signed HB 2817—a bill that eliminates the cartelization of the moving business in the Beaver state.

The old law required the Oregon Department of Transportation to notify existing moving companies of businesses that wanted to enter into their market. What’s more, those companies were given a veto over the would-be market entrants thereby locking out all competition to maintain artificially high prices—all with the government’s help.

The owner of a new moving company, Adam Sweet, enlisted the help of Pacific Legal Foundation lawyer and Cato adjunct scholar Tim Sandefur to litigate against the old law. That lawsuit, once it cleared challenges for dismissal, prompted several pieces of legislation that culminated into the bill that the governor signed yesterday.

Congratulations to Mr. Sweet, Tim, and PLF for their well-fought victory for economic liberty for the entrepreneurs and consumers of Oregon!

More details from PLF here.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

A Victory for Judicial Minimalism But Not Good Public Policy

2009-06-22T17:54:00.002-04:00

In the case of Northwest Austin Municipal District Number One (“NAMUDNO”) v. Holder, the Supreme Court issued a narrow decision today that avoided ruling on the constitutionality of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.

Section 5 requires any change in election administration in certain states and counties—mostly but not exclusively in the South—to be “precleared” by the Department of Justice in Washington. As I wrote earlier, this is a remnant of the Jim Crow era, and southern states’ massive resistance to attempts to enforce the 15th Amendment.

The ruling correctly allows a small utility district (and other political subdivisions) to seek relief—known as a “bailout”—from the 1965 Voting Rights Act’s onerous pre-clearance requirements. There is simply no reason for jurisdictions that have, at worst, gone decades without any voter intimidation or disenfranchisement—where the Act succeeded in stamping out or preventing racial discrimination—to continue to go before the Department of Justice for the most innocuous changes in state and municipal election procedures.

Here, for example, an electoral district that wasn’t even created until 1987 wants to move its polling locations from private garages to public schools, for ease of voting. Since Congress amended the Act in 1982, only 17 of 12,000 covered jurisdictions have been able to come out from under the thumb of federal oversight. Congress clearly never intended it to be so difficult to escape having to seek federal approval for such minor changes in election procedure.

This is one “bailout” that actually saves taxpayer money and makes common sense.

Unfortunately, the constitutionality of the Act’s Section 5—in the absence of the “exceptional conditions” the Court cited in 1966 as justifying “extraordinary legislation otherwise unfamiliar to our federal system”—remains in doubt. While it is a close call whether the Court need resolve that issue to dispose of NAMUDNO, Section 5’s validity as a matter of constitutional law and public policy is assuredly not a close call.

As Chief Justice Roberts notes in his majority opinion: “The evil that § 5 is meant to address may no longer be concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance.”

Indeed, blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are exceedingly rare. Minority candidates run for and hold office at unprecedented rates—particularly in the South. The racial gap in voter registration—the primary concern of the VRA—is higher nationwide than it is in the covered states; in some covered states, blacks register and vote at higher rates than whites.

As Justice Thomas says in his partial dissent: “Admitting that a prophylactic law as broad as § 5 is no longer constitutionally justified based on current evidence of discrimination is not a sign of defeat. It is an acknowledgement of victory.”

[Cross-posted from Cato's blog.]

Response to My Comments About Sotomayor

2009-06-02T11:02:00.000-04:00

As might be expected, I have received much email responding to my CNN.com commentary about Obama’s Supreme Court pick. Some of it has been favorable, some less so (and some simply incoherent). One particular email covered most if not all concerns — and quite thoughtfully at that — so I thought I would share this exchange with a reader who emailed me his comments:

I read your piece “Sotomayor Pick Not Based on Merit”, where you
write, “in over 10 years on the Second Circuit, she has not issued any important
decisions”.

Granted that I’m a layman, not a legal scholar or anything - this list seems quite impressive, and,
as a whole, pretty non-ideological.

In reviewing this list, I found myself disagreeing with her here and there,
but I couldn’t find something that really irked me. Can you?

According to the authors, “Since joining the Second Circuit in 1998,
Sotomayor has authored over 150 opinions, addressing a wide range of issues, in
civil cases.” And that “To date, two of these decisions have been overturned by
the Supreme Court; a third is under review and likely to be reversed.” 2 out of
over 150, is not a bad record at all.

You also write that she’s “far less qualified for a seat on the Supreme
Court than Judges Diane Wood and Merrick Garland or Solicitor General Elena
Kagan.”

I did a bit of research on them, and I’m not sure why you reached that
conclusion. They are all qualified, in some respects Wood and Kagan are a bit
more impressive, but you give the impression that she’s not highly qualified,
and I don’t see evidence for that. On the contrary, she seems highly qualified -
she has a long judicial and academic record, she has dealt with a myriad of
issues, and has authored a vast amount of rulings, which, as far as I’ve seen,
don’t appear to be ideological or particularly “activist.” She strikes me as
someone balanced and sensible, with a slight tilt to the left.

You also write, “this does not a mean that Sotomayor is unqualified to be a
judge — or less qualified to be a Supreme Court justice than, say, Harriet
Miers” - but, c’mon, how can you even compare her to Miers? Miers was truly
unqualified. She’s hardly intellectually impressive in any way, to put it
mildly, and nothing about her record was impressive or even remotely suggesting
she’s qualified to serve as a Justice. She was basically a manager of a law
firm, with zero qualifications to serve as a SC justice. By even mentioning her
name while discussing Sotomayor, you’re giving the impression there’s an analogy
there, where there’s really none. Sotomayor is light-years ahead of Miers. You
can’t be serious.

You also make a big issue over Ricci v. DeStefano. Well, I
personally would side with the firemen, and it’s unfortunate that Sotomayor
hasn’t, but to be fair, she hasn’t even written a decision about that.We don’t
know what her reasoning was. She merely signed, along with the rest of the
panel, to uphold the lower court’s decision. It’s hard to build an entire case
against her based on something like that. She has written over 150 other
decisions, why not focus on them? Why pick one, that doesn’t even have any
arguments in it, and make it the central issue, when there are over 150 reasoned
decisions to analyze?Why not review them, and give the public a deeper
assessment, rather than focusing on ONE, which doesn’t even have any arguments
or reasoning in it?

I’m generally a Cato fan, I get the mailings every day, I’m a moderate
libertarian by philosophy, I’m just not sure why Cato is opposing her
nomination. I like to think of Cato as non-partisan, just as I am, but on this
issue your and Pilon’s opposition/criticism smacks from political partisanship
and is not based on the evidence. So it seems to me.

Here is my response:

Thanks for writing and for the thoughtful comments. A few points:

1. My argument is explicitly NOT that her opinions are disagreeable. I’ve
waded through a fair number and read every public report on them produced thus
far (including the very helpful SCOTUSblog summary you cite). Like you, some I
agree with — most, actually, because most cases at this intermediate appellate
level are not controversial (legally or politically), even if complex — some I
don’t. But there’s just not much “there” there — intellectual depth, scholarly
merit, etc. — at least by the elevated standards for elevation to the Supreme
Court and in comparison to more accomplished jurists like Wood and Garland.
She’s a competent judge, but we have 500 of those in the federal judiciary
alone. (And none of this is to disparage her tremendous personal story; I write
this from Princeton, where she had a truly impressive four years.)

2. Her reversal rate (I think there are six cases now) is a non-issue. The
Supreme Court reverses over 60% of cases it hears and hears fewer than 2% of
cases it is asked to review. So, statistically, we can say nothing about
Sotomayor in that sense. A couple of her reversals are a bit strange, but on
technical issues that, again, don’t lend much to the overall debate.

3. Yes, she’s much more qualified than Miers (though it’s a little unfair
to say Miers was a mere “law firm manager” — she was White House counsel and
apparently a decent lawyer in private practice). I threw that line in
there to show I can pick on Republican nominees too.

4. While Roger has discussed suspicions of Sotomayor’s activism or
radicalness — and I think it’s clear she has more of those tendencies than Wood
or Kagan — this is not the thrust of the my CNN commentary. We just can’t tell
from her opinions, which are all over the map — other than the speeches at
Berkeley and Duke and then the Ricci case.

5. Ricci is important for two reasons: a) on the merits, the
decision is blatant racial discrimination — and the Supreme Court looks likely
to overturn Sotomayor’s panel; b) perhaps more importantly, the failure to
grapple with the complex constitutional and statutory issues is a serious
dereliction of judicial duty — as pointed out by Jose Cabranes in his dissent
from denial of en banc rehearing. Regardless of the merits of the case, the way
it was handled — as a per curiam summary affirmance released late on a Friday,
meant to sweep the case under the rug — is outrageous. Sotomayor was 100%
complicit in that.

6. In no way are my (or Roger’s) comments partisan. Cato’s interest here
isn’t in any particular personality but rather: 1) that official appointments be
made irrespective of racial/ethnic/identity politics, and 2) even more
importantly, that the Supreme Court interpret the Constitution in a way that
treats the judicial enterprise not as one of enforcing social justice or
otherwise rewriting the law it when a result is inconvenient. The talk of
“empathy” is disturbing precisely because it is the antithesis of the rule of
law. And this is why Republican Judiciary Committee members must generate a
public debate on judicial philosophy and not merely attempt to tear down this
nominee. If they don’t demand substantive answers on serious constitutional
questions, they will be complicit in the deterioration of our confirmation
processes.

I look forward to following and commenting further as the confirmation process plays itself out.

[Cross-posted from Cato's blog.]

Obama’s Sotomayor Nomination: Identity Politics over Merit

2009-05-26T14:48:00.001-04:00

In picking Sonia Sotomayor, President Obama has confirmed that identity politics matter to him more than merit.

Judge Sotomayor is not one of the leading lights of the federal judiciary and would not even have been on the shortlist if she were not Hispanic.

She has a mixed reputation, with a questionable temperament and no particularly important
opinions in over 10 years on the Second Circuit. Most notably, she was part of the panel that summarily affirmed the dismissal of Ricci v. DeStefano, where the City of New Haven denied firefighter promotions based on an admittedly race-neutral exam whose results did not yield the “correct” racial mix of successful candidates. Sotomayor’s colleague José Cabranes—a liberal Democrat—excoriated the panel’s actions and the Supreme Court will likely reverse the ruling next month.

If this is the kind of “empathy” the president wants from his judges, we are in for a long summer—and more bitter confirmation battles in the future.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

More Politicization of the Department of Justice

2009-05-26T14:30:00.002-04:00

At the last election, Democrats complained mightily of George Bush’s having politicized the Department of Justice: firing prosecutors, suborning legal memos justifying an expansion of executive power, etc., etc. Well, it now seems at best that the pot was calling the kettle an abuser of power.

Early in the administration, when the DC Voting Rights Act last made the news cycle, it came out that newly confirmed AG Eric Holder sought a second opinion from the acting solicitor general when the Office of Legal Counsel affirmed its 45-year position that giving DC residents representation in Congress could not be done without amending the Constitution. The bill is now stuck because of an amendment that was added to it relaxing the District’s strict — even after Heller — gun regulations, but this issue will resurface.

Now, in the most recent development in the “Is Hillary Clinton Constitutional?” saga the OLC reversed its own position from 1987 just in time for federal prosecutors to file a motion to dismiss a lawsuit challenging Clinton’s appointment that cites the new memo (see footnote 21). Indeed, the motion was filed the same day Acting Assistant Attorney General David Barron — who had previously rebuffed Holder on the DC Voting Rights Act (though we still have to see what the next confirmed OLC head says, be that Dawn Johnsen or someone else) – signed the new OLC memo.

The issue is that Clinton’s appointment to the cabinet — as well as that of Interior Secretary Ken Salazar – violates the Emoluments (sometimes called Ineligibility) Clause of Article I, section 6 because both she and Salazar were sitting Senators when cabinet salaries were increased. Congress later passed short laws reversing these raises for the duration of both officials’ tenures but, as I’ve argued previously – and as OLC head Chuck Cooper spelled out in the 1987 memo – there is no “net accounting” proviso which somehow erases the constitutional defect. While the new memo relies heavily on historical practice – several presidents going back to William Howard Taft (most recently Bill Clinton in appointing Lloyd Bentsen to be Treasury Secretary) have proceeded in this manner — the fact that political branches have acted in a certain way doesn’t speak to the constitutionality of that action.

In short, again the Obama Justice Department has found a politically expedient way of dealing with pesky constitutional issues. In this case, that way involved issuing a memo to buttress a motion being filed that very same day in federal court.

H/T: Tom Fitton of Judicial Watch, which is involved in the suit challenging Clinton’s appointment.

[Cross-posted from Cato's blog.]

Sarbanes-Oxley Under Attack... From the Supreme Court!

2009-05-18T15:45:00.006-04:00

Today the Supreme Court agreed to review a case brought by our friends at the Competitive Enterprise Institute that challenges the constitutionality of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB, pronounced “peek-a-boo”). The constitutional problem with the PCAOB — there are many policy problems — is that its officers are appointed in an unconstitutional manner.

Under the Appointments Clause of Article II, section 2, the president has the exclusive power to appoint and remove government officials. The members of the PCAOB – which enforces the massive regulatory scheme Sarbanes-Oxley imposes on public companies – are appointed by the SEC, however, which then has limited supervisory/removal power. While this structural defect may seem like a minor technicality, what it means is that the awesome power to set accounting standards — not least Sarbox section 404, which has cost the economy over a trillion dollars — impose taxes, and levy criminal and civil penalties is vested in a bunch of unaccountable bureaucrats. Entities with similar authority, even those having a modicum of political independence, such as the IRS Commissioner and Federal Reserve governors, are all vetted by the president and the Senate.

The court below (the D.C. Circuit), however, held that PCAOB members are inferior officers and, as such, Congress “may limit and restrict the power of removal as it deems best for the public interest.” But this gets the Constitution backwards; Congress isn’t allowed to insulate important decisionmakers from political accountability. As CEI’s press release says:

If the President can pick and remove the PCAOB members, as the Appointments
Clause requires, he will be on the hook for their policy failures, and thus have
an interest in making them develop sound policies that protect investors and
don’t stifle economic growth. He won’t be able to blame the red tape on an
unaccountable agency whose officials he doesn’t select or control.

The Court will hear the case, Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB — which I previously blogged about here – in late fall.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

Handicapping the Justicial Horserace

2009-05-13T14:34:00.002-04:00

The increase in chatter in Washington about Justice Souter’s replacement is a clear signal that pundits have gotten about as much mileage as they can over speculation and want to have an actual nominee to dissect.

Even though the administration has been evaluating candidates since the inauguration (and before), there’s no real reason for President Obama to announce a replacement before the Court’s term ends in late June.

The only limiting factor is that the president needs to have a new justice in place by the time the Court resumes hearing cases in October. So, clearly, this politically savvy president will be weighing his legislative priorities against the relative amount of political capital he’ll have to spend to confirm possible nominees. Similarly, Republicans seem to be keeping their powder dry, hopefully in preparation for a serious public debate of competing judicial philosophies and theories of constitutional interpretation.

As far as handicapping goes, the smart money is now on Solicitor General Elena Kagan—because she was recently confirmed by a comfortable margin, has significant support in the conservative legal establishment, and is young (49)—but don’t count out either Judge Diane Wood or Judge Sonia Sotomayor. Or dark horse candidates like Senator Claire McCaskill. It’s really any woman’s ballgame at this point, and will be until Barack Obama—who famously holds his cards close to his vest—announces his pick, on his time.

For a geometric discussion (X-axis = desirable criteria; Y-axis = confirmability) of the above political calculus, see here.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

Supreme Speculation

2009-05-08T14:45:00.002-04:00

With no hard news to report and the Supreme Court not in session — they’ll release opinions in the remaining cases on successive Mondays (plus the Tuesday after Memorial Day) beginning May 18 — Washington is abuzz with speculation over potential high court nominees. While Senator Orrin Hatch earlier this week said he expected an announcement this week, the White House is far more likely to take its time vetting candidates, with no real pressure to announce a pick until the Court recesses at the end of June.

Nobody other than the president himself really knows who’s favored, but ABC News’s Jan Crawford Greenburg — who will be contributing to this year’s Cato Supreme Court Review and speaking at our Constitution Day conference September 17 — has some fascinating scuttlebutt:

No clear favorite has emerged, but the pick has prompted an internal
struggle between legal and political officials within the administration,
sources say.

Political officials like Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel are favoring Sotomayor, who would be an
historic pick as the Court’s first Hispanic justice.

Obama, the thinking goes, could score huge points with Hispanics, an
important and increasingly powerful constituency, by nominating Sotomayor or
another Latino. Sotomayor has a compelling life story, moving from the projects
to the nation’s most elite educational institutions and then onto the federal
bench.

But Sotomayor has not dazzled or distinguished herself on the appeals court
as a forceful theoretician or writer — something Obama, the former
constitutional law scholar who will drive this decision, is likely to want in
his Supreme Court nominee, sources close to the process said. Moreover, she’s
also been criticized for abrasiveness — which could be problematic on the high
court.

Legal officials in the Administration want Obama to tap a candidate who
would be a more obvious force on the Court, bringing both intellectual prowess
and a proven ability to build coalitions. They favor either Kagan or Wood —
prospects who could be considered judicial rock stars capable of going toe to
toe with Scalia and Roberts.

I would expect Senators Claire McCaskill (D-MO) and/or Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) also to be on the shortlist — more likely the former because she was one of Obama’s first supporters in the Senate (and whose replacement would be appointed by a Democratic governor). Senators have historically been fairly easy to confirm because of the courtesy extended to them by their erstwhile colleagues. Still, we haven’t had such a nominee — or anyone other than sitting appellate judges — in the poisonous post-Bork world, so all bets are off.

Were it not for Ricci v. DeStefano, Sotomayor would be a shoe-in on the simple formula of Princeton+Yale Law+Second Circuit+Hispanic woman. Now, and also for the reasons Jan cites, that is looking less likely. I still favor Wood because she has a proven judicial temperament, sterling qualifications in technical fields like antitrust and trade regulation, and would be no worse — and quite possibly better — than the other contenders on constitutional issues. If I were putting money on it, however, I would have to go with Kagan precisely because she was so recently vetted and confirmed (61-31, with Arlen Specter voting ”no” under Scottish law because he felt she hadn’t sufficiently answered his questions).

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

9/11 Memorial? Good. Eminent Domain Abuse? Bad.

2009-05-07T17:34:00.002-04:00

The power of eminent domain, embodied in the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, is so great that it nearly invites abuse, even when the government uses its power for constitutional, and even honorable, reasons.

Case in point: The U.S. Park Service has designed a memorial for Flight 93, the one that crashed in rural Pennsylvania on 9/11. The plans have been in the works for some time, with the government and representatives of Flight 93’s victims working with the property owners—even explicitly assuring them in 2002 that eminent domain would not be used.

As time passed, however, and the self-imposed deadline to have a memorial in place for the 10-year anniversary of the tragedy grows nearer, the government has become impatient and now plans to condemn the land of the seven owners (representing about 500 of the planned 2,200 acre memorial and national park) who have not yet worked out a deal with the Park Service.

While there are two sides to every story, it seems that the property owners have been flexible and open to negotiation—a far cry from the extorting hold-outs against whom eminent domain is supposed to be invoked:

“It’s absolutely a surprise. I’m shocked by it. I’m disappointed by it,”
said Tim Lambert, who owns nearly 164 acres that his grandfather bought in the
1930s. The park service plans to condemn two parcels totaling about five acres —
land, he said, he had always intended to donate for the memorial.

“To the best of my knowledge and my lawyer, absolutely no negotiations have
taken place with the park service where we’ve sat down and discussed this,”
Lambert said.Lambert said he had mainly dealt with the Families of Flight 93 and
said he’s provided the group all the information it’s asked for, including an
appraisal.

Even if some takings of property are warranted—a 9/11 memorial certainly fits the “public use” requirement—look at the abuse of power we have here. Setting aside the question of why Lambert’s five acres are so crucial to a 2,200-acre project (and whether the memorial needs to be that large in the first place), why the strong-arm tactics?

Instead of letting an otherwise legitimate contract negotiation—the very foundation of our private property system—run its course, the government is resorting to robbing people because they had the misfortune to own the land near the place a historic tragedy occurred. This type of abuse is why eminent domain must be used sparingly, and why courts must be vigilant in enforcing the Fifth Amendment’s protection of property rights.

H/T: Nicki Kurokawa.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

More Property Rights Shenanigans on the West Coast

2009-05-07T11:14:00.001-04:00

Cato recently filed an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to review a Ninth Circuit decision that tramples on property rights. (See also this oped I co-authored with co-counsel.)

Well, tomorrow the Ninth Circuit hears another case involving property rights violations, and this time the plaintiffs, in exchange for a building permit, were forced to give up their right to vote. Arguing for the beleaguered property-owners will be none other than Cato adjunct scholar Tim Sandefur. You can read more about the case in Tim’s own blogpost on PLF’s site.

Here’s the basic principle with these cases: just as the government can’t take your property (for public use) without just compensation, it can’t attach arbitrary regulations and fees. After all, if you own an acre of land and the government tells you you can’t do anything on it — be it run around or drain puddles or build – it might as well have “taken” it by eminent domain. And if it says you can do these things only if you give up some other entitlement you have — not necessarily money, but, say, the right to put up signs criticizing the local government – it has imposed an unconstitutional condition on your enjoyment of your property.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

Can You Sue for a "Psychic Offense"?

2009-05-05T17:40:00.002-04:00

The City of San Diego leases portions of Balboa Park and Fiesta Island to the San Diego Boy Scouts, which use the land to operate a camp and aquatic center. The Boy Scouts use the leased areas for their own events but otherwise keep them open to the general public — and have spent millions of dollars to improve and maintain facilities on the properties, eliminating the need for taxpayer funding. While the Boy Scouts’ membership policies exclude homosexuals and agnostics, the Scouts have not erected any religious symbols and do not discriminate in any way in administering the leased parklands.

Nevertheless, a lesbian couple with a son and an agnostic couple with a daughter challenged the leases under the Establishment Clauses of the U.S. and California Constitutions. Although none of the plaintiffs has ever tried to use the parklands or otherwise had any contact with the Boy Scouts, the Ninth Circuit found they had standing to proceed with their lawsuit because they were offended at the idea of having to contact Boy Scout representatives to gain access to the facilities. The court denied en banc review over a scathing dissent by Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain.

The Boy Scouts have asked the Supreme Court to review the case — whose outcome conflicts with other federal courts of appeal — and Cato joined the Individual Rights Foundation in filing a brief supporting that petition. Cato’s brief argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision dangerously confers standing on anybody wishing to challenge the internal policies of expressive associations having any business with local government; chills public/private partnerships of all kinds for reasons disconnected from the beneficial services civic organizations provide the public; and generally represents a radical extension of standing jurisprudence — opening the courthouse doors to anyone claiming to be subjectively offended by any action and manufacturing litigation out of political debates.

The Supreme Court is likely to decide whether to take up the case of Boys Scouts of America v. Barnes-Wallace before the start of the next term this fall.

[Cross-posted from Cato's blog.]

Republican Strategy on the Supreme Court Vacancy

2009-05-01T12:00:00.000-04:00

President Obama is not the only one with a difficult decision to make in the face of mounting pressure from various groups. The Republicans will have to decide what posture to take: combative or deferential, political or analytical.

With Obama still at the height of his popularity, and with solid Democratic control of the Senate (even without Arlen Specter and Al Franken), the GOP is unlikely to sustain a filibuster or generate significant opposition to any but the most extreme nominee — such as the radical transnationalist Harold Koh, whose nomination to be the State Department’s head lawyer is currently pending.

What Republicans should do instead is force a full public debate about constitutional interpretation and judicial philosophy, laying out in vivid detail what kind of judges they want. Instead of shrilly opposing whomever Obama nominates on partisan grounds, now is the time to show the American people the stark differences between the two parties on one of the few issues on which the stated Republican view continues to command strong and steady support nationwide. If the party is serious about constitutionalism and the rule of law, it should use this opportunity for education, not grandstanding.

[Cross-posted from Cato's blog.]

Who Will Replace Justice Souter?

2009-05-01T08:00:00.000-04:00

You could call it the end of an error. David Souter, the “stealth justice” who George H. W. Bush nominated mainly to avoid a confirmation battle and who so disappointed conservatives, is finally free to leave a city he never took to and return to his native New Hampshire.

Little more can be said about Justice Souter. He has always been inscrutable, at first leaning right, shifting toward the middle in the landmark 1992 cases of Planned Parenthood v. Casey (abortion) and Lee v. Weisman (prayer at high school graduation), and ending up at the left end of the Court alongside Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer — all the while employing an unpredictable jurisprudential method. And he has always been reclusive, refusing reporters’ and scholars’ interview requests and being the biggest opponent of video cameras inside the Court. Perhaps most memorably, Souter gained notoriety after his vote in Kelo v. New London (allowing the taking of a private home for the benefit of a developer) spurred property rights activists to petition for the use of eminent domain to turn his farm into the “Lost Liberty Hotel.”

Speculation now turns to possible replacements, and what President Obama will do with his first chance to fill a seat on the high court. Will he risk a big political battle on this issue so early in his term, or will he appoint someone more confirmable but less pleasing to his base?

He is under great pressure to appoint a woman, and the three leading female candidates are new Solicitor General Elena Kagan, Second Circuit Judge Sonia Sotomayor, and Seventh Circuit Judge Diane Wood. Kagan would be an almost-certain pick a year from now, but having been just confirmed to be the so-called Tenth Justice, she might be seen as too green for elevation. Sotomayor — because she is Hispanic and despite a mixed judicial record — was the odds-on favorite until the Court took up the employment discrimination case of Ricci v. DeStefano (argued just last week), an appeal of a bizarre opinion Sotomayor joined that denied the claims of firefighters who had been passed over for promotion because of their race. That leaves Wood, a renowned authority on antitrust, international trade, and federal civil procedure, whose age (58) suggests that this is likely the last vacancy for which she will be considered. Wood offers a seriousness of purpose and no ideological ax to grind, and is thus the best nominee supporters of constitutionalism and the rule of law can hope for at this time. (Full disclosure: I took two classes from Judge Wood in law school.)

[Cross-posted from Cato's blog.]

NAMUDNO v. Holder

2009-04-29T12:00:00.000-04:00

As I walk away from the Court, with the sounds of the NAACP rally fading in the distance, I’m no clearer on how this case will be resolved than when I went into the building early this morning.

This uncertainty mostly results from the rather technical issues surrounding the Voting Rights Act’s “bailout” provision, as well as how narrowly the Court will want to construe the municipal utility’s challenge (as-applied, facial, or some other novel formulation).

What is clear is that the “liberal” justices, especially Ginsburg and Breyer, were downright hostile to the idea of curtailing federal supervision of state voting practices, while the “conservative” justices (not including Thomas, who was characteristically silent) found disingenuous assertions that VRA violations were systemic, or any more pervasive in the covered (mostly southern) jurisdictions than in non-covered ones.

Justice Kennedy sided strongly with the latter group, but, again, that may not mean much for the final contours of the Court’s decision.

However the case comes out, it is important to remember that even a complete striking of Section 5 does not leave voters who have been discriminated against without recourse in federal court; Section 2 has and will continue to be used to remedy VRA violations on a case-by-case basis (and without Section 5’s onerous preclearance requirements).

[Cross-posted from Cato's blog.]

Blogging from the Supreme Court -- NAMUDNO v. Holder

2009-04-29T09:50:00.001-04:00

I write this from the Bar Members’ line waiting to be let into the Supreme Court courtroom for the final argument of the term.

Today the Court hears Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No.1 (”NAMUDNO”) v. Holder. This is a challenge to the controversial Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which requires, among other things, any change in election administration in certain states and counties to be “precleared” by the Department of Justice in Washington. This is, of course, a remnant of the Jim Crow era, and southern states’ massive resistance to attempts to enforce the 15th Amendment.

In 1965, Congress included Section 5 — which would otherwise be an unconstitutional infringement on peoples’ right to run their own elections locally — as a temporary remedy to an emergency situation. The section has been amended and extended several times (e.g., to add linguistic minorities, Pacific Islanders, etc.), most recently in 2006. But in this last renewal, Congress, despite introducing more than 15,000 pages into the record, failed to even allege the existence of the type of systemic voting discrimination as existed in the 1960s — because, of course, it doesn’t exist any more, and other parts of the VRA exist to cover specific discriminatory incidents.

Accordingly, a small utility district in Austin, Texas, contests Section 5’s continuing validity (if it cannot escape the section’s clutches via a confusing and little-used “bailout” provision). Specifically, NAMUDNO wants to change the location of its polling station to a public garage (from a less convenient location) — a move that obviously lacks discriminatory intent, and showcases the minutiae that the DOJ now has to micromanage.

Cato legal scholars support NAMUDNO’s challenge because, barring the widespread systemic unconstitutional actions of the Civil Rights Era, Section 5 violates our most basic principles of self-government and federalism, and is emblematic of governmental overreach.

[Cross-posted from Cato's blog.]

In Defense of "Libertarian Crusades"

2009-04-28T13:31:00.003-04:00

We in the public interest legal community — especially on the libertarian or conservative side — are used to taking slings and arrows from all quarters. The media doesn’t understand our quaint obsession with following the text of the Constitution. The so-called progressives seethe at our evil defense of property rights and the freedom of contract. Even the business community blanches at our refusal to leave their sacred regulatory protections untouched in our attack on statism.

But what we don’t expect is to see federal judges openly and wantonly question our motives — least of all in an actual opinion. Yet this is precisely what Judge Jacques “Jack” Weiner did last Thursday in dissenting from a Fourth Amendment seizure/Fifth Amendment takings case. The case, Severance v. Patterson, involves a challenge to a Texas law that caused the seizure of beachfront property after Hurricane Rita pushed the vegetation line landward. The purpose of the law, the Open Beaches Act, is to ensure public access to the beach regardless of erosion and other natural land migrations (a.k.a. a “rolling easement”). The Fifth Circuit panel ended up affirming the dismissal of part of the claims and asking the Texas Supreme Court for a ruling on state-law issues implicated in others.

But the legal details aren’t important. What I want to highlight is Weiner’s dissent, which begins with the following “Context” (a section title not commonly found in judicial opinions; see pages 22-23 here):

Although undoubtedly unintentionally, the panel majority today aids and abets
the quixotic adventure of a California resident who is here represented by
counsel furnished gratis by the Pacific Legal Foundation. (That non-profit’s
published mission statement declares that its raison d’être includes
“defend[ing] the fundamental human right of private property,” noting that such
defense is part of each generation’s obligation to guard “against government
encroachment.”) The real alignment between Severance and the Pacific Legal
Foundation is not discernable from the record on appeal, but the real object of
these Californians’ Cervantian tilting at Texas’s Open Beaches Act (“OBA”) is
clearly not to obtain reasonable compensation for a taking of properties either
actually or nominally purchased by Severance, but is to eviscerate the OBA,
precisely the kind of legislation that, by its own declaration, the Foundation
targets. And it matters not whether Ms. Severance’s role in this litigation is
genuinely that of the fair Dulcinea whose distress the Foundation cum knight
errant would alleviate or, instead, is truly that of squire Sancho Panza
assisting the Foundation cum Don Quixote to achieve its goal: Either way, the
panel majority’s reversal of the district court (whose rulings against Severance
I would affirm) has the unintentional effect of enlisting the federal courts
and, via certification, the Supreme Court of Texas, as unwitting foot-soldiers
in this thinly veiled Libertarian crusade. It is within this framework that I
shall seek to demonstrate how the panel majority misses the mark and why
Severance’s action should be dismissed, once and for all, for her lack of
standing to assert either a Fifth Amendment takings claim for reasonable
compensation (because Severance has had nothing taken by the State) or a Fourth
Amendment unreasonable seizure claim (because that which was putatively seized
did not belong to Severance at the time; and even if it had, there was nothing
unreasonable about the purported seizure).

Apparently in Judge Weiner’s world, it is beyond the pale for an organization to provide pro bono legal services that also advance some larger ideological mission. Somebody tell the NAACP or ACLU — or the Supreme Court for that matter, which invites amicus briefs from just the kinds of groups Weiner excoriates. Cato itself routinely files such briefs, of course, and on several occasions has joined with PLF.

Chief Judge Jones pithily dispatches her colleague’s grandiloquence in the majority’s first footnote (see bottom of page 2 here):

Notwithstanding the hyperbolic and unsupported assertions in Part I of the
dissent (“Context”), the judges of the court endeavor not to decide appeals
based on who the litigants are, who their lawyers are, or what we may believe
their motives to be. Whether that rule is observed in light of Part I of the
dissent, however, the reader must determine.

And I won’t even get into Weiner’s mixed metaphors and schoolboy Latin – he meant qua, not cum – other than to say “hit the road, Jack.”

(Full disclosure: I clerked on the Fifth Circuit and am familiar with Weiner’s squishy, unreliable jurisprudence; he’s very nice in person, but something happens in chambers — left-wing clerks? — that detracts from his effectiveness. One caveat: Weiner is a great friend of the taxpayer; the IRS does not win in his courtroom.)

For commentary from the Volokh Conspiracy, see here. For PLF’s press release, see here. Hat tip: Cato adjunct scholar Tim Sandefur (whose day job is with PLF, though he did not work on this case).

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog."]

The Government Shouldn’t Tilt The Speech Playing Field in Its Own Favor

2009-04-28T11:42:00.001-04:00

New Hampshire passed a law prohibiting the transfer of doctors’ prescription history to facilitate drug companies’ one-on-one marketing — a practice known as “detailing” — because it believes detailing drives up brand-name drug sales and, in turn, health care costs. The state knew that the First Amendment prevented it from banning detailing itself, so it made the practice more difficult indirectly.

Yet data collection and transfer is protected speech — think academic research, or the phone book — and government efforts to regulate this type of speech also runs afoul of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Solveig Singleton, “Privacy as Censorship: A Skeptical View of Proposals to Regulate Privacy in the Private Sector” (Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 295). New Hampshire also engages in gross viewpoint discrimination: it exempts insurers’ efforts to persuade doctors to use generic drugs, and runs an “academic detailing” program to discourage brand-name drug use.

Remarkably, the First Circuit reversed a district court ruling that had invalidated the statute as unconstitutional, somehow finding that the statute regulates conduct rather than speech and that, in any event, the judiciary should defer to the legislative branch’s judgment. Two companies that collect and sell health information and analysis filed a petition asking the Supreme Court to review the case. Cato, joining Washington Legal Foundation, Reason Foundation, and a group of current and former state officials, has filed a brief supporting that petition.

Our brief argues that the Supreme Court should grant review because: 1) the speech at issue is worthy of First Amendment protection; 2) this case is a good vehicle for examining First Amendment issues attending state attempts to control health care costs (other states have passed similar laws); and 3) the lower court’s holding that a state may restrict speech to “level the playing field” conflicts with the Court’s precedent regarding both commercial speech and campaign finance regulation.

The Supreme Court will be deciding over the summer whether to review IMS Health v. Ayotte, with a decision expected after the “Long Conference,” which precedes the beginning of the new term in October.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

The Way to Stop Discrimination on the Basis of Race is to Stop Discriminating on the Basis of Race

2009-04-22T16:09:00.003-04:00

Today the Supreme Court heard argument in Ricci v. DeStefano, the “reverse discrimination” case in which the city of New Haven refused to certify the results of a race-neutral promotion exam whose objective results would have required, under civil service rules, the promotion of only white and Hispanic (but no black) firefighters.

The firefighters who were thus denied promotions sued the city, claiming racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Remarkably, a panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals—including oft-mentioned Supreme Court contender Sonia Sotomayor—summarily affirmed the district court’s ruling against the firefighters, though Judge José Cabranes (a Clinton appointee) later excoriated the panel for not grappling with the serious constitutional issues raised by the case.

The Cato Institute filed a brief, joined by the Reason Foundation and the Individual Rights Foundation, pointing out the absurd incentives at play: if the lower court’s ruling stands, employers will throw out the results of exams (or other criteria) that produce racial disparity, even if those exams are race-neutral, entirely valid, and extremely important to the employer and (as in this case) the public.

Today the Court seemed starkly divided. The “liberal” justices hinted that an employer should be allowed to be “race conscious” to avoid Title VII lawsuits alleging “disparate impact” against minorities in hiring and promotions. The “conservatives” were disturbed that the only reason the firefighters weren’t promoted was their race. Nobody seemed persuaded by the government’s request—really an attempt to avoid taking a firm stand on a controversial issue—that the judgment be vacated and the case remanded for further factual development and legal rulings by the lower courts. Justice Kennedy will likely be the swing vote, and I predict that he will side with the conservatives, albeit narrowly in a separate concurrence as he did in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.1, the race-based school assignment case from 2007.

It was in Parents Involved that Chief Justice Roberts wrote: “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”
Quite so. The Supreme Court should thus reverse the Second Circuit, establishing that an employer can only discount test results when there is a “strong basis in evidence” that the test is somehow biased against a particular racial group.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

Yes, California, There is an Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms

2009-04-20T17:40:00.002-04:00

Last June, the Supreme Court ruled in District of Columbia v. Heller that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and bear arms, at least in the home for self-defense. While the Court’s ruling was a watershed in constitutional interpretation, it technically applied only to D.C., striking down the District’s draconian gun ban but not having a direct effect in the rest of the country.

Well, today the Ninth Circuit (the federal appellate court covering most Western states) ruled that the Second Amendment restricts the power of state and local governments to interfere with individual right to have guns for personal use. That is, the Fourteenth Amendment “incorporates” the Second Amendment against the states, as the Supreme Court has found it to do for most of the Bill of Rights. I rarely get a chance to say this, but the Ninth Circuit gets it exactly right.

Here’s the key part of Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain’s opinion:

We therefore conclude that the right to keep and bear arms is “deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition.” Colonial revolutionaries, the
Founders, and a host of commentators and lawmakers living during the first one
hundred years of the Republic all insisted on the fundamental nature of the
right. It has long been regarded as the “true palladium of liberty.” Colonists
relied on it to assert and to win their independence, and the victorious Union
sought to prevent a recalcitrant South from abridging it less than a century
later. The crucial role this deeply rooted right has played in our birth
and history compels us to recognize that it is indeed fundamental, that it is
necessary to the Anglo-American conception of ordered liberty that we have
inherited. We are therefore persuaded that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment and applies it against
the states and local governments.

In short, residents of Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington now join D.C. residents in having their Second Amendment rights protected. And courts covering other parts of the country — most immediately the Seventh Circuit, based in Chicago — will have their chance to make the same interpretation in due course.

Just as interesting — and potentially equally significant — is the footnote Judge O’Scannlain drops at the end of the above text in response to arguments that the right to keep and bear arms, regardless of its provenance as a fundamental natural right, is now controversial:

But we do not measure the protection the Constitution affords a right by the
values of our own times. If contemporary desuetude sufficed to read rights out
of the Constitution, then there would be little benefit to a written statement
of them. Some may disagree with the decision of the Founders to
enshrine a given right in the Constitution. If so, then the people can
amend the document. But such amendments are not for the courts to ordain.

Quite right.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

Yes We Can!

2009-04-09T13:43:00.003-04:00

Congratulations are in order to Kim Jong Il on his unanimous re-election as Supreme Leader of North Korea.

I didn't realize we'd translated the Cato Constitution into Korean.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

Dance Like Thomas Jefferson's Watching

2009-04-08T17:30:00.002-04:00

As Thomas Jefferson’s birthday approaches (April 13) – and tonight being the first night of Passover, which Jews celebrate to commerate their deliverance from slavery – I thought I’d comment on a disturbing tale that reminds us again that “the price of liberty is eternal vigilance.”

In celebration of Thomas Jefferson’s (265th) birthday last year, about 20 D.C.-area libertarians gathered at the Jefferson Memorial just before midnight. The plan was to have a music-through-headphones dance party for the father of the Declaration of Independence (i.e., each person would dance to the tune of his individual iPod). I was actually supposed to attend, but for some reason did not make it.

It was a short-lived party, however, with an ending that would almost certainly have made our nation’s third president frown in disapproval.

Shortly after the silent bopping started, U.S. Park Police officers began to disperse the partygoers. After shooing and pushing revelers (who were drunk only on liberty) off the memorial, one officer confronted the lone remaining dancer, Brooke Oberwetter, and told her to leave. Oberwetter calmly asked what law or rules she was violating. The officer provided no explanation but continued to insist that she leave. Not satisfied with the officer’s response, Oberwetter stood her ground — until the officer pushed her against a stone pillar, handcuffed her, and led her away.

Now, nearly one year later — after the citation against her (for “interfering with an agency function,” whatever that means) was neither dropped nor pursued – Oberwetter filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the arresting officer, Kenneth Hilliard, and the Secretary of the Interior, Kenneth Salazar (whose office oversees the Park Police). Oberwetter argues that Hilliard and the Park Police violated her First Amendment rights by interrupting and preventing her expressive activity and freedom of assembly. She also alleges that here Fourth Amendment rights were violated when she was arrested without probable cause and with excessive force.

The complaint, available here, is a model of legal writing. Pithy, legally sound, and eminently readable, I cannot recommend it more highly to law students and young lawyers. This is perhaps not surprising because Oberwetter’s counsel is none other than my friend Alan Gura, who last year successfully argued D.C. v. Heller before the Supreme Court.

Here’s a recent TV news story about the case and here’s Radley Balko’s (formerly of Cato, now at Reason) original post about the incident.

Full disclosure: While our tenures never crossed, Oberwetter is a former Cato employee -- and a social acquaintance. I wish Brooke and Alan the best in their fight against such arbitrary use of government power to oppress basic liberty. (As Alan told me, a good rule of thumb for police: if you can't think of any charges, even a few weeks later, it was probably a bad arrest.) And I hope the incident gets Kevin Bacon thinking sequel.

[Cross-posted from Cato's blog.]