Use Only U.S. Law to Interpret the U.S. Constitution

This fall, the Supreme Court will hear two cases involving Eighth Amendment challenges to the sentencing of juveniles to life without parole (”LWOP”) – Graham v. Florida and Sullivan v. Florida — claims that these types of sentences are “cruel and unusual.” Cato takes no position on the wisdom of these types of sentences, but when evaluating their constitutionality the Court should only consider American law.

That is, regardless of the criminological or moral merits of juvenile LWOP sentences, the Supreme Court ought not consider non-binding provisions of international human rights treaties and customary international law in its analysis (as it has in cases like Roper v. Simmons and Atkins v. Virginia). To that end, Cato joined the Solidarity Center for Law and Justice, the Sovereignty Network, and 10 other groups in a brief urging the Court to limit its constitutional analysis to domestic law and the decisions of U.S. courts.

Our brief argues that the Court should leave to the political branches the decision of whether to transform international norms into domestic law and only allow duly ratified international agreements to override domestic law — in the way the Court has set out in cases such as Medellin v. Texas. It further contends that if the Court believes this is one of the rare cases where international norms are relevant, it should follow the test it laid out in Sosa v. Alvarez Machain, which addressed the (unrelated) Alien Tort Statute: The relevant norm must be widely accepted by the civilized world and as clearly defined as the historic “law of nations” norms regarding safe conduct permits, ambassadorial rights, and piracy on the high seas.

The brief also cautions that reliance on non-binding and indefinite international norms will undermine the democratic process and rule of law, casting considerable uncertainty over many U.S. laws.

More generally, while looking to foreign and international example is prudent when designing constitutions and drafting legislation — or even adjudicating complex international legal disputes — it is simply not relevant to interpreting the nation’s founding document.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

Happy Kelo Day

As our friends at the Institute for Justice will tell you, today is the third anniversary of Kelo v. New London, the property rights case that made my colleague Bob Levy’s list of the “Dirty Dozen” worst cases in modern Supreme Court history. This was the case where the Fifth Amendment’s “public use” requirement was found to impose essentially no restriction on the government’s eminent domain power. In some senses this was a lost battle leading to great progress in the war to preserve property rights, with legislatures in numerous states enacting anti-Kelo legislation in the wake of concerted grassroots activism against the decision.

This morning the Supreme Court found a curious way of winking at Kelo Day. As I was scrolling down the orders list — a many-paged list of administrative actions, mostly cert denials — I happened upon the following notation:

07-1247 GOLDSTEIN, DANIEL, ET AL. V. PATAKI, FORMER GOV. OF NY
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Alito would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari.

Now, it’s exceedingly rare for individual justices to have the clerk record how they voted on a cert petition, but here Justice Alito did just that, and in a case that rang a bell in my mind I couldn’t place. Then I realized that Goldstein v. Pataki was the appeal by a group of home- and business-owners who are likely to lose their property to a development that is to provide a new home to the the New Jersey Nets plus 16 high-rise office and apartment towers and a hotel. Thus, not only is Justice Alito as friendly a vote on this issue as was his predecessor Justice O’Connor (who wrote an impassioned Kelo dissent) but he is apparently an emphatic one. See a bit more here. This is not necessarily a surprise — and it still leaves us one vote short — but, again, the notation on the order list is a neon light to Supreme Court watchers.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

Even Argentina's Good Policies Undermine Its Rule of Law

Much as I hate to rain on my Cato colleague Juan Carlos Hidalgo’s understandable happiness at Argentina's decriminalization of personal consumption/possession of small amounts of drugs, this doesn’t exactly represent a ray of hope in the country's otherwise gloomy policy mix. Not because I believe in the War on Drugs – I can’t imagine anybody at Cato does – but because it was a court that reached this decision instead of a policymaking body.

Imagine the outcry if the U.S. Supreme Court simply decreed a policy it didn’t like to be unconstitutional – I know, with Justices Stevens and Kennedy at the apogee of their powers, it’s not a far stretch. Better yet, recall the poison the Court injected into our legal and political systems when it short-circuited the political process by inventing a right to abortion in Roe v. Wade (again, I’m not saying anything about the underlying policy arguments).

So it is here: Instead of having the Argentine Congress change the law, the nation’s Supreme Court (by a vote of 4-3) simply decreed that criminalizing drug use is unconstitutional. Reports are still sketchy, but this sounds like precisely the kind of judicial fiat developing (or any) countries need to avoid if they want to strengthen the rule of law.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

Dispatch from the ASIL Conference III

Some wrap-up notes from the ASIL conference that concluded on Saturday:

1. The second panel I attended Thursday covered the very timely “Civil Liberties in Times of Crisis.” Air Force Colonel Morris Davis — who resigned as chief prosecutor at Guantanamo — opened with a criticism of the military tribunals as unworkable; he agreed that terrorism detainees held in Gitmo (let alone Iraq) don’t have constitutional rights, but the politicization of the process has delegitimized what should be an open, transparent, and efficient processing of enemy combatants. Covington & Burling partner David Remes, who has represented many of the detainees, called for simply applying the criminal justice paradigm to international terrorists (as with the blind sheik after the first WTC bombing and with Timothy McVeigh). Hofstra’s Julian Ku continued that line by supporting the extension of constitutional rights to foreigners and applying international law domestically. Human Rights First’s Elisa Massimino called for the U.S. to be a shining city upon a hill (my characterization, certainly not her words) in terms of being an example on human rights — and linked American political power to its respect for international law.

Then came Q & A, which as it happened centered mostly on a very short question that I asked: Is there a difference between national security and law enforcement, and if there is what are the consequences for the handling of detainees suspected of being terrorists? Col. Davis said that national security is the correct paradigm but that the military commissions have been poorly executed by political appointees. David Remes, to his credit, explained that the real difference between national security and criminal justice is one of policy, and it is not up to the courts to make those kinds of decisions.

My view: I agree with Davis that national security courts (along the lines proposed by Jack Goldsmith and Neal Katyal) are the only way to go in this world of post-modern asymmetrical warfare. National security and law enforcement are different governmental functions, and to conflate the two (like John Kerry did in 2004) or to suggest that constitutional rights apply to everyone everywhere (but international law is supreme in the U.S.) is to throw out the most basic understandings of political theory.

2. On Friday I attended a very interesting panel on the Economic Security and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (the latest reform of which I wrote about here). On CFIUS, everyone seems satisfied with the latest reform (which increased openness and aims to prevent political blow-ups like Dubai PortsWorld) and is comfortable with handling of Sovereign Wealth Funds, which Dan Ikenson and Jim Dorn have written about recently. [Also, note that last week Canada’s equivalent of CFIUS blocked a foreign acquisition for the first time time ever. The purchasing company was from… the US! The Canadian company is a leading satellite reconnaissance developer (e.g., sees through clouds and ice, apparently finding oil/mineral deposits in the Arctic).

3. I also attended a hugely overcrowded — people spilled out into the hallway, and I ended up sitting on the floor beside the panelists’ table — panel on “Restoring Rule of Law in Post-Conflict and Stabilization Operations.” I’ve written about these issues before in the context of Iraq, and this panel mainly provided anecdotes about Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Bosnia. A young British researcher also proposed international trusteeships as a useful mechanism (a la the old — or not so old, see Kosovo — UN protectorates). A difficult set of issues, not least because of questions over the legitimacy of outside intervention, how to achieve post-conflict justice and social reconciliation, and how to advise a legal system without being seen as imposing foreign values.

4. The final events I attended were a roundtable discussion by various foreign ministries’ legal advisers and an address by Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N. Both of these were disappointing in that all these people are learned and experienced but didn’t really have anything new to say. If only John Bolton were up there…

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

Dispatch from the ASIL Conference II

This morning I attended two panels at the ongoing American Society of International Law Conference. The first was “The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals,” which refreshingly did not simply rehash the formation of the International Criminal Court but dealt with the meatier issues of how to decide whom to prosecute, what kind of justice to pursue, etc. The panelists, all academics who had played various roles associated with, for example, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, discussed precisely the issue that most interests me: how to draw the line between law and politics. If you overshoot and try to prosecute thousands of perpetrators of unspeakable crimes, spread across multiple countries, your political support will collapse. If you amnesty everyone, there is no justice. Tough decisions have to be made such that there is some justice, which is better than no justice.

One interesting anecdote from this first panel involved the quixotic attempt by Col. Luke Lea and a motley band of doughboys to capture Kaiser Wilhelm at the end of World War One. The panelist who told this story — which was relevant because the plan was to prosecute the Kaiser as a war criminal – misnamed Col. Lea as having been a Texan, when anyone worth his salt knows that it’s “Luke Lea of Tennessee.”

(Ok, ok, the only reason I knew this factoid was because when I interned for former Senator Bill Frist (R-TN) over a decade ago, I was charged with writing an essay on Lea as part of a project to document the lives of all Tennessee senators. Lea was a one-termer who, upon losing the Democratic nomination after the passage of the Seventeeth Amendment — direct election of senators – volunteered for the Great War.)

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

Dispatch from the ASIL Conference

Yesterday afternoon marked the beginning of the 102nd meeting of the American Society of International Law (ASIL). ASIL is a venerable organization that takes international law seriously, inviting vigorous discussion and rigorous study of a panoply of issues. Which is not to say that its members don’t skew in a particular way on many issues of the day. Generally speaking, cosmopolitans and those who study and promote international law — especially in academia – are toward the left side of the political spectrum. A left-wing bias in this field means a favorable disposition toward universal norms, global jurisdiction by a world court, and otherwise the imposition of elite consensus on domestic courts and polities. Still, the ASIL membership is not nearly as bad in those tendencies as, say, the ABA’s international law practice group — and, as I said, it invites speakers and writers from a variety of perspectives. Moreover, a fair bit of ASIL’s activities relate to private and commercial international law, with which libertarians should have little beef.

In any event, this year’s conference kicked off with the tenth annual Grotius Lecture, given by Jordan’s ambassador to the United States, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein. Prince Zeid, educated exclusively in the West, has had a truly distinguished career, and seems to be a voice of enlightenment from a dark part of the world. His remarks, however, on the topic “For Love of Country and International Criminal Law,” skewed both technocratic and rhetorical: He implored the world community to overcome legal obstacles to helping the victims of genocide and war crimes while at the same time recognizing that international courts are not welfare agencies. And of course, somehow, yes somehow, we have to reconcile somewhat outmoded notions of sovereignty with a brave new world of globalized crime. I don’t pretend to give his lofty discourse justice, but in the end it was both intellectual and bland.

What was not bland was the commentary of the good prince’s discussant, David Scheffer of Mayer Brown and Northwestern University Law School. Prof. Scheffer, a high-ranking official in the Albright State Department, first drew a round of applause by announcing that the previous speaker was, without doubt “a future Secretary-General of the United Nations.” (Sounds about right.) Then he crescendoed into an excoriation of pretty much every lawyer in the Bush administration for ignoring international law and making the United States into the red-headed stepchild of the community of nations. Again, it would take more time than it’s worth to fisk his entire approach but suffice it to say the learned professor seems to have a hard time distinguishing law from policy and politics. There is much for which to criticize the Bush administration, but violating international law wouldn’t make my top 100 list.

And that is where the rubber hits the rubber on so many of these issues: Much, if not most, if not all, of international law comes down to diplomacy — the willingness of countries to adhere to their obligations and convince others to do so. As described by Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner in their brilliant book The Limits of International Law, the behavior of nation-states cannot be predicted, and should not be judged, based on whether they sign this piece of paper or that one. For example, states have interests and there is no international mechanism to force states to comply with treaties that at any given time contravene those interests. Period. (It is often in their interest to comply with their international or binational obligations, of course, because few states want to become, literally, pariahs.) There is so much to say on this, and I will certainly be writing about it in future.

And when it comes to the International Criminal Court (ICC) – the chief bone of contention that many of the attendees to this week’s conference have with the American practice of public international law — what’s important is that U.S. troops treat people much better than their Congolese or Indonesian or Venezuelan counterparts, regardless of which countries submit to the jurisdiction of the ICC. That’s some reality-based law for you.

In sum, an eyebrow-raising start to the conference — and a reminder of the strange position of those of us interested and educated in international legal and political issues but skeptical of public international law.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

Bush Opponents Upset That Bush Lost in the Supreme Court

In an interesting side-note to the Medellin decision, the case’s convoluted procedural history made for some rather strange political bed fellows. The Court’s decision, anchored by the “conservative wing” (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Alito) and joined by the “moderate” Kennedy and (writing separately) the “liberal” Stevens effectively clears the last remaining roadblock to Texas’s imposition of the death penalty on the murderer Jose Erenesto Medellin. Consequently, Tuesday’s result disappointed death penalty abolitionists, who join on the losing side those who want international law to have direct applicability in the United States. That’s right, by ruling against President Bush’s executive overreach — which at least three members of the Court’s “liberal” wing implicitly ratified — the Court angered cosmopolitan liberals. Go figure.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

I Am the Very Model of a Modern Major General

Yesterday, in addition to announcing its decision in the Medellin case (which I blogged about here), the Supreme Court heard argument in two cases relating to the War on Terror.

First, in Munaf v. Geren, two U.S. citizens (also citizens of Jordan and Iraq, respectively) held captive in Iraq by U.S. forces — as part of Multi-National Force-Iraq, which may but should be a key determinant – challenged their detention and potential transfer to Iraqi authorities for what they fear will be torture as part of criminal prosecution in Iraqi courts. This seems to be an easier case than Boumediene, a case argued in December wherein Guantanamo detainees challenge their containment and the military commissions by which they are to be tried. (My Cato colleague Tim Lynch blogged about that case here and here, and also filed an amicus brief.)
Whatever hope the detainees had was probably dashed by the incoherent presentation made by Northwestern Law School Clinical Professor Joseph Margulies on their behalf. As Lyle Denniston of SCOTUSblog put it, “when several Justices of the Supreme Court tell an attorney they do not understand his argument, and they do so because the argument was, indeed, fundamentally confusing, the chances of winning may be significantly reduced.” Ouch. Margulies turned what should be relatively straightforward issues into a convoluted maze, and those of us in the audience were not the only ones shaking our heads.

The second argument, and the one relating to the title of this blog post, involved the prosecution of the guy who was caught smuggling explosives into the U.S. from Canada in an attempt to blow up LAX at the turn of the century. (Is it ok to use that expression for the 1999-2000 period yet?) In United States v. Ressam, Attorney General Mukasey exercised the AG’s historical (but not much used of late) prerogative to argue before the high court, defending the 10-year additional prison term slapped on the Milennial bomber for “carrying an explosive” while “committing a felony” — the felony being lying to the border guard. Having learned from Margulies’s example, Mukasey did a workmanlike job and sat down with 14 minutes remaining in his allotted time. The case will turn on some rather technical statutory analysis which I’ll spare you, but it was refreshing to see an appellate advocate who was clearly not there to hear his own voice.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

Supreme Court to President Bush: Don't Mess With Texas

Yesterday the Supreme Court slipped the Gordian knot of a case that could have come straight from a law school exam, involving federalism, treaty interpretation, the scope of executive power, criminal procedure, and conflicts between international and domestic law. The issues in Medellin v. Texas boiled down to: 1) Whether a particular decision of the International Court of Justice is automatically binding on Texas courts and, if not, 2) Whether President Bush made it binding by issuing a memorandum to then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales. The Court answered in the negative on both counts by a 6-3 margin.

The result of this decision is that neither the ICJ (the so-called “World Court”) nor the president acting alone can force states to review criminal cases involving foreign nationals. The underlying treaty at issue – which gives foreign nationals accused of a crime the right to meet with consular officials – is not enforceable in the absence of implementing legislation from Congress. The ICJ ruling is similarly not self-executing, and does not gain legal effect merely because the president tells the states to abide by it.

The Supreme Court has thus protected America’s carefully calibrated system of federalism and checks and balances by preventing an international court from overriding a state’s duly enacted (and constitutionally sound) law. Just as importantly, the Court correctly rejected the argument that the president has the power to enforce against the states a treaty that is, in the absence of congressional action, enforceable only by diplomatic means. Telling state courts how to do their jobs is simply not among the powers of the nation’s chief executive.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]