Is Hillary Clinton Unconstitutional?

So Hillary Clinton is “on track” to be the nation’s top diplomat, huh? Well, setting aside the wisdom of that decision — forget ideology; does she have both foreign policy expertise and a good working relationship with the President-elect? — it appears that there may be genuine constitutional problems with her expected nomination. To wit, Article I, section 6, clause 2 reads:

No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be
appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which
shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased
[sic] during such time…

That is, under this “Emoluments Clause,” members of Congress are expressly forbidden to take any appointed position within the government which was created or whose pay has been increased during their current term in office. Now, a January 2008 executive order, promulgated in accordance with a statute from the 1990s that addressed cost of living adjustments for certain federal officials, raised the Secretary of State’s salary, thus constitutionally prohibiting any then-serving senator who remains in office from taking charge of Foggy Bottom. (Sen. Clinton’s current term began in January 2007 and expires in January 2013.)

Not surprisingly, this is not the first time such a conflict has arisen in executive appointments and nominations and, equally not surprisingly, Congress has on several occasions legislated around it: To enable one of its own to assume executive office, Congress simply decreases the pay of that office to the pre-raise level for the full tenure of that specific appointee.

Although this legerdemain has been around since at least the Taft Administration — and was most recently used when President Clinton picked Sen. Lloyd Bentsen to be his Treasury Secretary – the move is called the “Saxbe Fix” after Sen. William Saxbe, whom President Nixon nominated for Attorney General.

The Saxbe Fix is not uncontroversial. UCLA law professor Eugene Volokh, for example, cites Steptoe and Johnson partner John O’Connor’s objection that the Saxbe Fix is inadequate for circumventing the Emoluments Clause. To O’Connor’s thinking, while simply lowering the salary — resulting in no “net” increase — does prevent the nominee from directly benefiting from a vote he or she cast, it would not substantively address the Framers’ intent to limit the size and scope of the federal government. That is, if, contrary to the Emoluments Clause’s terms, Congress can restore its Members’ eligibility for appointment by reducing the office’s salary, the Emoluments Clause ceases to serve its function as providing a constitutional disincentive for regular increases in the salaries of federal offices.

One could also argue that in this specific case, Congress did not act to increase anybody’s salary; it was that long-ago Congress that even gave that option to the president — and only in the form of an aross-the-board COLA, not some shady or opportunistic self-dealing. But, of course, if we are to follow the text of the Constitution, there is no exception for offices “the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased” by a non-shady COLA granted via statutorily-enabled executive order.

Whether anyone could challenge Hillary Clinton’s appointment in the courts is another matter. Perhaps someone denied a passport, or who has had some other adverse action done to them by a Clinton-led State Department, would have standing to sue. In any event, in this time of constitutionally questionable bailouts, it cannot hurt to be vigilant even about the most obscure text from our nation’s governing document.

Much more on this issue can be found in Eugene’s fascinating post here.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

Peek-a-boo, I See a Challenge to Sarbanes-Oxley in the Supreme Court

An intriguing case that alleges a high-profile violation of the president’s exclusive power to appoint and remove government officials is winding its way through the courts. Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board challenges the constitutionality of a key part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.

Congress passed Sarbox, as the law is called, in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals to protect investors from shoddy accounting practices perceived as being rife in publicly traded companies. (We now know that Sarbox’s regulatory burden costs the economy much more than the fraud it prevents and detects, but never mind.) Among other things, the law created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board — PCAOB, pronounced “peek-a-boo” — a private board exercising government power. Its members are not appointed by the SEC, which has limited removal power. In short, the president has neither any appointment nor removal power, in seeming violation of Article II, section 2 of the Constitution.

[Cross-posted from Cato's blog.]

On Monday, the D.C. Circuit, now consisting of nine members after Judge Raymond Randolph took senior status as of November 1, split 5-4 in denying en banc review of a panel decision in the government’s favor. Judges Janice Rogers Brown, Merrick B. Garland, Karen LeCraft Henderson, Judith W. Rogers, and David S. Tatel voted against rehearing while Chief Judge David B. Sentelle and Judges Douglas H. Ginsburg, Thomas B. Griffith and Brett M. Kavanaugh supported it. Interestingly, the three Clinton appointees and one George H. W. Bush appointee voted in the majority, while both Reagan and two of the three George W. Bush appointees dissented. The other George W. Bush appointee, Judge Brown, who is considered to be the most libertarian (she gave the B. Kenneth Simon Lecture at Cato’s 2007 Constitution Day conference) but also the most inscrutable, turned out to be the wild card. (But she won’t be the swing vote for long because President Obama will have two vacancies to fill on the court.)

Lawyers for the Free Enterprise Fund, who include our friends at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, had earlier indicated that if they failed to get en banc review, they would seek certiorari in the Supreme Court. The narrow split in the D.C. Circuit probably enhances the chance that the justices would agree to hear the case, except that the Court this year has shown a reluctance to take on especially newsworthy (i.e., both controversial and significant) constitutional cases.

Whither Fusionism?

One of the victims of the Bush presidency, along with limited government and the Republican Party, has been “fusionism,” the idea that conservatives and libertarians ought to come together to oppose the forces of socialism (and The Left generally). Indeed, this Tuesday’s election probably saw the highest-ever percentage of libertarians — depending on how you count them – vote for the Democratic presidential candidate (at least in the modern era, with the possible exception of the Nixon years). This despite that Democratic candidate being commonly seen as the most statist major-party candidate in history.

Cato adjunct scholar Ilya Somin who blogs at the Volokh Conspiracy and in his day job is a law professor at George Mason (currently visiting at Penn) — Ilya being a popular name among libertarian legal community – today puts up a smart post on the state of the erstwhile libertarian-conservative. Here’s a snippet:

Obviously, a lot depends on what conservatives decide to do. If they choose the
pro-limited government position advocated by Representative Jeff Flake and some
other younger House Republicans, there will be lots of room for cooperation with
libertarians. I am happy to see that Flake has denounced “the ill-fitting and
unworkable big-government conservatism that defined the Bush administration.”
Conservatives could, however, adopt the combination of economic populism and
social conservatism advocated by Mike Huckabee and others. It is even
possible that the latter path will be more politically advantageous, at least in
the short term.

Indeed, if conservatives choose some version of the Huckabee-Palin route, fusionism is dead — and so, might I add presumptuously, is the Republican Party. That just ain’t where the majority of the nation is, or where it’s heading (though, as Ilya says, that direction may be politically advantageous in certain parts of the country under certain circumstances).

But this type of discussion may be beside the point; libertarian-conservative (in the sense of socially conservative, economically squishy) fusionism may have run its course, a relic of the Cold War. The new fusionism may well be fiscally conservative and socially tolerant (not necessarily liberal, just not wanting government to do anything about the way people live their private lives), including folks who might call themselves conservative cosmopolitans, crunchy cons, South Park conservatives, or indeed libertarians. Or they might eschew labels altogether but are sick of the rot coming from (or to) Washington. In other words: Purple America,

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

What's Next for the Third Branch?

The new president will have a chance to significantly reshape the judiciary. President Bush managed to confirm only 321 judges—about 50 fewer than Presidents Reagan or Clinton—so there are plenty of vacancies to fill. Moreover, Congress has not created any new circuit court positions since 1991, while federal appellate filings increased by about 50 percent since that time; only four percent more district judges have been created during the same period, while filings to those courts increased by about 25 percent. We can expect, perhaps even in the “first 100 days,” a new judgeship bill that will add to the vacancies President-elect Obama will have to fill. 56 percent of federal judges are now Republican appointees, and the Ninth Circuit (based in San Francisco and sprawling across nine western states) is the only federal appeals court with a majority of judges appointed by Democratic presidents. Obama will be able to change the former statistic and swing control of all but three circuits (of the thirteen) to Democratic appointees. And then, of course, we have the two or three Supreme Court nominations the new president will probably have in the next four years: Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter are each likely to be off the Court by 2012. It is not for nothing that pundits consider judges to be one of the most undervalued policy areas in this long, strange campaign.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]