Bush Opponents Upset That Bush Lost in the Supreme Court

In an interesting side-note to the Medellin decision, the case’s convoluted procedural history made for some rather strange political bed fellows. The Court’s decision, anchored by the “conservative wing” (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Alito) and joined by the “moderate” Kennedy and (writing separately) the “liberal” Stevens effectively clears the last remaining roadblock to Texas’s imposition of the death penalty on the murderer Jose Erenesto Medellin. Consequently, Tuesday’s result disappointed death penalty abolitionists, who join on the losing side those who want international law to have direct applicability in the United States. That’s right, by ruling against President Bush’s executive overreach — which at least three members of the Court’s “liberal” wing implicitly ratified — the Court angered cosmopolitan liberals. Go figure.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

I Am the Very Model of a Modern Major General

Yesterday, in addition to announcing its decision in the Medellin case (which I blogged about here), the Supreme Court heard argument in two cases relating to the War on Terror.

First, in Munaf v. Geren, two U.S. citizens (also citizens of Jordan and Iraq, respectively) held captive in Iraq by U.S. forces — as part of Multi-National Force-Iraq, which may but should be a key determinant – challenged their detention and potential transfer to Iraqi authorities for what they fear will be torture as part of criminal prosecution in Iraqi courts. This seems to be an easier case than Boumediene, a case argued in December wherein Guantanamo detainees challenge their containment and the military commissions by which they are to be tried. (My Cato colleague Tim Lynch blogged about that case here and here, and also filed an amicus brief.)
Whatever hope the detainees had was probably dashed by the incoherent presentation made by Northwestern Law School Clinical Professor Joseph Margulies on their behalf. As Lyle Denniston of SCOTUSblog put it, “when several Justices of the Supreme Court tell an attorney they do not understand his argument, and they do so because the argument was, indeed, fundamentally confusing, the chances of winning may be significantly reduced.” Ouch. Margulies turned what should be relatively straightforward issues into a convoluted maze, and those of us in the audience were not the only ones shaking our heads.

The second argument, and the one relating to the title of this blog post, involved the prosecution of the guy who was caught smuggling explosives into the U.S. from Canada in an attempt to blow up LAX at the turn of the century. (Is it ok to use that expression for the 1999-2000 period yet?) In United States v. Ressam, Attorney General Mukasey exercised the AG’s historical (but not much used of late) prerogative to argue before the high court, defending the 10-year additional prison term slapped on the Milennial bomber for “carrying an explosive” while “committing a felony” — the felony being lying to the border guard. Having learned from Margulies’s example, Mukasey did a workmanlike job and sat down with 14 minutes remaining in his allotted time. The case will turn on some rather technical statutory analysis which I’ll spare you, but it was refreshing to see an appellate advocate who was clearly not there to hear his own voice.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

Supreme Court to President Bush: Don't Mess With Texas

Yesterday the Supreme Court slipped the Gordian knot of a case that could have come straight from a law school exam, involving federalism, treaty interpretation, the scope of executive power, criminal procedure, and conflicts between international and domestic law. The issues in Medellin v. Texas boiled down to: 1) Whether a particular decision of the International Court of Justice is automatically binding on Texas courts and, if not, 2) Whether President Bush made it binding by issuing a memorandum to then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales. The Court answered in the negative on both counts by a 6-3 margin.

The result of this decision is that neither the ICJ (the so-called “World Court”) nor the president acting alone can force states to review criminal cases involving foreign nationals. The underlying treaty at issue – which gives foreign nationals accused of a crime the right to meet with consular officials – is not enforceable in the absence of implementing legislation from Congress. The ICJ ruling is similarly not self-executing, and does not gain legal effect merely because the president tells the states to abide by it.

The Supreme Court has thus protected America’s carefully calibrated system of federalism and checks and balances by preventing an international court from overriding a state’s duly enacted (and constitutionally sound) law. Just as importantly, the Court correctly rejected the argument that the president has the power to enforce against the states a treaty that is, in the absence of congressional action, enforceable only by diplomatic means. Telling state courts how to do their jobs is simply not among the powers of the nation’s chief executive.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

New Yok Times Gets It Wrong, Story at 11

The New York Times Magazine’s most recent issue (March 16, 2008) simultaneously features a shariah apologetic and an accusation that the Supreme Court is in the pocket of big business.
In the former, Harvard law professor Noah Feldman prescribes the election of Islamist parties and entrenchment of Allah’s law (as interpreted by a council of scholars) as the cure to the Muslim world’s ailments. In the latter, GW law professor Jeffrey Rosen contends that liberal and conservative elites — like NYT readers? — have colluded to do in the common man. There is so much wrong with these analyses, one hardly knows where to begin. (For a point-by-point takedown of the Rosen piece, see Eric Posner’s post on Slate’s new legal blog.)

Feldman, who “had a small role advising the Iraqi [constitutional] drafters,” sees shariah as both a proto-aspirational document somewhat akin to our Declaration of Independence and a source of law more legitimate than duly constituted (secular) legal codes. But both of these things cannot be: Either shariah is the law of God as strictly interpreted (on what authority?) by man or it is a non-binding sentiment, much like American politicians’ references to America’s Judeo-Christian values. Advocates of shariah would be the first to admit that if you’re going in for God’s law, you can’t summarily ignore its anachronisms. Let people live under shariah if they so desire, but be wary of its negative externalities.

Rosen, meanwhile, sees a conspiracy involving anyone who has ever studied the “economic analysis of law” (and uses phrases like “negative externalities”) while holding up as a paragon of judicial virtue a jurist who said he was “ready to bend the law … against the corporations.” At the same time, Rosen posits that the Chamber of Commerce destroyed Ralph Nader’s noble crusade to help the consumer and hoodwinked the Court — even, at times, that model of “liberal judicial restraint,” Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg — by hiring a bunch of rich lawyers (presumably not the same rich lawyers who reap all the punitive damages from the state tort claims that Rosen lauds). These sentiments distort legal history and misunderstand the proper role of the judiciary; to paraphrase a salient point then-nominee John Roberts made at his confirmation hearings, the little guy should win when the law is on his side, and the big corporation should win when the law is on its side.

In short, those of us who believe in the rule of law rather than men and in a Constitution that circumscribes the powers of government are heartened by both the outcry against Rowan Williams and the Supreme Court’s near-unanimous view that corporations are people too (indeed, they are, but legal persons composed of human directors, officers, employees, and investors). But then perhaps we are all in on the conspiracy.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

California Attempts to Silence State Contractors

Imagine that you do business in California. Maybe you’re in construction, or health care, or auto repair. Now imagine some or all of your income comes from state contracts; using the above examples, perhaps you build schools, or take care of patients on Medi-Cal, or fix broken-down LAPD squad cars. Now imagine that the state comes in and says, aha, because we pay your bills — again, on contracts relating to construction, health care, auto repair, etc. — and we love unions, you can’t talk to your employees about any negative aspects of unionization. Ridiculous, right? Who is a customer to tell you what to do with money that’s already in your pocket?

Well, that’s precisely what the great state of California is trying to do with a new statute that small businesses are challenging in the case of Chamber of Commerce v. Brown. It’s a little bit more complicated than I outline above because the case implicates highly technical provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (and previous Supreme Court interpretations thereof), but the gist is that California is attempting to silence employers by tying speech restrictions to unrelated state spending. For reasons that the petitioners ably present in their briefs and that I summarize in a podcast and in Cato’s own amicus brief, the Supreme Court should strike down this statute.

In any event, that’s the background to my trip to the Court to hear argument in Chamber v. Brown today. (The plaza in front of the courthouse steps was remarkably free of demonstrators after yesterday’s hoopla surrounding the DC Gun Ban case.) I’ll save you the detailed summary of the argument, but suffice it to say that the outcome will almost certainly go against California. It’s always dicey predicting the scorecard, but based on oral argument it will probably be 7-2, 6-3, or maybe 6-1-2. On one side, Justices Scalia and Alito and Chief Justice Roberts were safely on the side of free speech; Justices Justice Souter surprisingly led the charge against California’s interpretation of labor law; Justice Breyer, though skeptical, will likely write his own opinion agreeing in the Court’s opinion for separate reasons or possibly calling for remand rather than strict reversal; and Justice Thomas was silent but is expected to join the majority. On the other side, Justices Stevens and Ginsberg seem to have no problem with California’s regulation. On his own side as usual, Justice Kennedy’s vote seems to be up for grabs, but – based on his decisions in previous labor and regulatory preemption cases – I would bet on him siding with the majority.
In short, California employers will live to speak another day.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

Keystone Cops, D.C. Auxiliary

In a new plan to combat crime on the streets of our fair city, Mayor Adrian Fenty and Police Chief Cathy Lanier are encouraging residents to submit to voluntary searches of their homes in exchange for amnesty if the residents have illegal guns (or drugs). (”Excuse me, ma’am, mind if I take a look around… “)

Well, this isn’t illegal — consent is, after all, one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement — but it is head-scratchingly poor public policy. Those who don’t want to give up their contraband won’t consent to searches, those who want to get rid of it will find a way to do that without signaling “check here again next week,” and the police will waste their resources rifling through the homes of people with nothing to hide.

Maybe D.C. should pass a law outlawing gun ownership. Oh wait, they already did that and are fighting to keep it in the face of, um, the Second Amendment. (The Supreme Court hears argument in D.C. v. Heller next Tuesday.)

The bottom line is that voluntary home searches, like outright gun prohibitions, only hurt law-abiding citizens. Those who have already chosen to engage in crime will not be deterred merely because their actions violate gun-related ordinances in addition to the laws against robbery, rape, murder, etc. The only guns swept up in this “amnesty” will be those kept by people trying to protect their families from the criminals the police fail to catch.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog.]

RIP WFB

We knew it had to happen but still it’s a shock. A classical liberal – and libertarian enabler — in so many ways, William F. Buckley, Jr. was the quintessential public intellectual without whom public intellectual life is now hard to fathom.

Though not a great philosophical influence on me personally — I came around to his writing later even than I started reading National Review (originally finding it, to use both Buckleyesque language and irony, sesquipedalian) – the institution he created and movement he fostered certainly affect my life daily. Before think tanks emerged to counter the left-wing takeover of the academy and public discourse, before cable channels provided alternatives to network news, long before the Reagan Revolution, Buckley famously began standing athwart history yelling stop.

All this while embodying the prolific, polymathic, bon vivant style that appeals to those of us who ever dreamed of inhabiting that realm of ideas between academia and the real world and having great fun doing it. Well played, Mr. Buckley, well played.

Batteries and Bullets Sold Separately

This week, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which is based in New Orleans and covers Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi, struck down a Texas statute that criminalized the promotion and sale of sex toys. The Fifth Circuit — where I clerked my first year out of law school — thus became the first and only jurisdiction in the country to recognize the individual right to bear both arms (in the 2001 case of U.S. v. Emerson) and dildoes. (Yes, the statute actually uses the word “dildo” as an example of a prohibited ”obscene device,” which is otherwise defined as a device “designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs.”)

The Fifth Circuit’s analysis correctly rests on the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas, which found that Texas’s anti-homosexual sodomy statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment right to engage in private intimate conduct free from government intrusion. Put simply, there is no state interest compelling enough to overcome the individual right to freedom in the bedroom.

Besides Texas, only three states have a similar obscene devices statute: Mississippi, Alabama, and Virginia. The Mississippi Supreme Court has upheld its state’s statute, while neither the Alabama nor Virginia Supreme Courts have entertained such challenges. The legislatures of Louisiana, Kansas, and Colorado had also enacted obscene-device bans, but the laws did not survive review by their respective state supreme courts.

The Eleventh Circuit (covering Alabama, Georgia, and Florida), however, just last year rejected a similar Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the Alabama statute. While the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review that ruling, the Fifth Circuit’s decision now squarely opens up a “circuit split,” which means the issue is ripe for the Court to take up next term.

The Court has not wanted to touch sex toys cases with, um, a 10-foot pole. But it now has the opportunity to enforce this particular individual right in the same year it (fingers crossed) throws out the D.C. gun ban.

(Cross-posted at the Cato blog.)

Ted Kennedy's New Civil Rights Bills

I’ve taken issue with plenty of things Ted Kennedy has done in the past, most recently his suggested reforms to the judicial confirmation system. My response [$] to his proposals was essentially that he ought to go back to Civics 101 and learn the difference between law and politics, and between the respective powers of the judicial and legislative branches.

Apparently, someone on Kennedy’s staff has done just that because this week the good senator introduced two bills designed essentially to remedy what he sees as Supreme Court error in the field of employment discrimination. This action naturally caught the attention of the New York Times editorial page:

One of the most troubling rulings was in the case of Lilly Ledbetter, a
supervisor at a Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company plant who was paid less than
her male colleagues after she was given smaller raises over several years. The
court’s conservative majority ruled that Ms. Ledbetter had not met the 180-day
deadline to file her complaint. It insisted that the 180 days ran from the day
the company had made the original decision to give her a smaller raise than the
men.

….

The Fair Pay Restoration Act, one of Senator Kennedy’s bills, would undo
the injustice of the Ledbetter decision by establishing that the 180-day
deadline runs from when a worker receives the unequal pay, not when the employer
decided to discriminate. It would make clear that each discriminatory paycheck
restarts the clock.

Kennedy’s other bill, the Civil Rights Act of 2008, would
reverse more bad decisions. One of these is a 2001 ruling that says that people
who are discriminated against in programs using federal funds can sue only for
intentional discrimination, not for actions that have a discriminatory
effect.

Kennedy, wittingly or not, has just demonstrated how our constitutional system of checks and balances and separation of powers should work — as well as illustrating the difference between law and politics.

The Fair Pay Restoration Act is Congress’s proper (legislative) response to the Supreme Court’s proper (judicial) decision in the Ledbetter case. The Court had no choice but to rule the way it did under the relevant (and constitutionally valid) law, even if the result was arguably unjust. The correct response is, as has happened here, to propose a bill changing that law, not to urge judges to ignore it and rule as they see fit.

Similarly, the Civil Rights Act of 2008 is a legislative attempt to correct a perceived failing in employment discrimination law as correctly interpreted by the judiciary. The wisdom of allowing people to sue for actions that have “discriminatory effect” without an intent to discriminate — whatever that means and however it can be established for legal purposes — is debatable, but it is only through congressional action (with the president’s assent or properly overridden veto) that the law can change.

The bottom line is that judges — including the highest court in the land — have the power only to interpret the law (constitutional and otherwise), not rewrite it or otherwise legislate from the bench. I’m glad that Kennedy has thus decided, for this week at least, to use his lawful authority to legislate from the legislature — instead of merely railing against a judiciary that does nothing more nor less than its job.

(Cross-posted at Cato's blog.)

The Supreme Court Helps Out the Economy

Today the Supreme Court, in one of the most important securities law rulings in years, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, decided that fraud claims are not allowed against third parties who did not directly mislead investors but were business partners with those who did. Investors, the Court said in a narrow 5-3 ruling (Justice Breyer took no part in the case), may only sue those who issued statements or otherwise took direct action that the investors had relied upon in buying or selling stock – whether that involved public statements, omissions of key facts, manipulative trading, or other deceptive conduct. One impact of the decision is likely to be the end of a $40 billion lawsuit against financial institutions growing out of the Enron scandal.

Although this was the result expected by Court-watches, the split decision – along the usual “liberal/conservative” lines, with Justice Kennedy writing the opinion as he has tended to in such situations – was a bit of a surprise. The opposite result would have been disastrous for Wall Street, with massive ramifications on the economy as a whole. It would also have greatly expanded the court-created private right of action that is not expressly spelled out in the relevant securities laws. Ultimately, the Court’s ruling in Stoneridge wisely prevents an implied cause of action against the whole marketplace in which those who do directly mislead investors do business.

Happy to be an Urbane Libertarian

I’m surprised none of my colleagues have commented on this, but one of the interesting throw-away lines in Jamie Kirchik’s Ron Paul expose in The New Republic is his calling certain Ron Paul supporters as being “nothing like the urbane libertarians who staff the Cato Institute or the libertines at Reason magazine.” I can’t speak for my fellow Cato-ites — and will let my friends at Reason comment on their moniker — but I for one will take “urbane” any day of the week and thrice on Sunday.

A Capital Waste of Time

Yesterday the Supreme Court heard argument in Baze v. Rees, otherwise known as the “lethal injection case.” Contrary to popular perception—and the wishes of certain activist groups—Baze considers neither the constitutionality of lethal injection as a method of execution nor the validity of the death penalty itself. Instead, the issue is whether the particular three-chemical formula used by most states that employ lethal injection causes undue pain and suffering such that the method violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of “cruel and unusual punishment.” The Court’s decision—likely to be 5-4 with Justice Kennedy the swing vote as always—may turn on what weight the justices place on the availability of other “ drug cocktails” that purportedly accomplish the same result with less chance for “undue pain and suffering.” But that critical point raises two further (non-legal) questions: 1) Whether the case is about little more than delaying executions that will take place regardless of this particular ruling; and 2) Why haven’t all the relevant states simply adopted the “better” chemical protocols and rendered this case moot? Ultimately, this high profile case is a waste of judicial resources.

(Cross-posted at the Cato blog.)

The Most Important Committee You've Never Heard Of

Today I have a piece in the Daily Standard, co-authored with my good friend Richard Brand, on recent reforms to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.

The End of the Year at the Supreme Court

I summarize and opine on the latest goings-on at the Supreme Court here.

Christmas in Fallujah

Billy Joel, whose music was the soundtrack of my adolescence, has written a new song, the anti-Iraq War "Christmas in Fallujah." Interestingly, he refuses to perform it because, he says, it deserves a "younger voice." It's a good song, though I don't really agree with the message. You can watch Cass Dillon's performance of it here.

So if it's Hillary vs. Huckabee, where do we move?

The Hollywood liberalatti is fond of saying that if X candidate is elected president, they’ll move to France. Fine (though Alec Baldwin once gave me the finger when I asked him what he was still doing here). But what shall we lovers of liberty do if, come next November, we are faced with the possibility of having presidential candidates from both major parties who clearly have no understanding of this country’s founding principles? To wit, here’s one of Hillary Clinton’s latest sound bites on health care:

“We can talk all we want about freedom and opportunity, about life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, but what does all that mean to a mother or father who can’t take a sick child to the doctor?”

Iowa-leading Mike Huckabee, meanwhile, “combines pure moralism with incoherent populism: He wants Washington to impose a nationwide ban on smoking in public, show more solicitude for Americans of modest means and impose more protectionism, thereby raising the cost of living for Americans of modest means.” (Hat tip: George Will.)

In other words, on the one hand we can forget about Jefferson and Madison and on the other hand we can turn their republic into an anti-market nanny state.

Given that choice, we’re left with another one: Estonia or New Zealand?

Me on TV and Radio re International War Crimes

Tomorrow from 1:30 to 2:30 EDT I'll be on Voice of America's "Straight Talk Africa" discussing "the role of the International Criminal Court in on-going war crime cases concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, northern Uganda and the Sudanese region of Darfur." Live streaming video and audio here.

Constitutional Reform in Latin America?

Yesterday I went over to the Organization of American States (OAS) for a roundtable on “Constitutional Reform in the Americas.” The event featured opening remarks by the OAS Secretary General, followed by country-specific presentations by experts on Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Venezuela.

I won’t bore you with the details, but three themes emerged:

1) The ever-expanding constitutions of many Latin American countries, both to strengthen strongmen (Chavez) and to add to the copious list of positive rights (Brazil). This is not good for either constitutionalism or rule of law because on the one hand you have the country’s founding document being changed at the whim of a single man and on the other a constitution bloated with such things as the fundamental right to, e.g., four weeks’ paid annual vacation decreases in legitimacy. To paraphrase an old Argentine lawyer who advised that country’s last significant amendment process in 1993-94, “constitutional inflation leads to rule of law devaluation.” Alternatively, the Latin American counterpart to the old saw about French constitutions being filed in libraries’ periodicals section is that Latin ones are filed as encyclopedias.

2) The desire to constitutionalize (or rebalance constitutional structures relating to) the “special rights” of indigenous peoples. There is nothing wrong per se with wanting to recognize that certain native peoples preceded the arrival of European colonists/conquerors (British-American in the U.S., Spanish and Portuguese in Latin America) and that these people should not be exploited as a result of their having been vulnerable to colonization. But to enact wholesale nationalizations and special privileges on the basis of race, or caste, or tribe — let alone raise these perversities to the constitutional level as is being proposed in Bolivia — is a political and legal travesty.

3) The battle over political reform is no longer, if it ever was, between left and right or socialism and neoliberalism (the common Latin American term for pro-market policies and the Washington Consensus), but rather between democracy and authoritarianism. This may not represent that much of a change from the past — the populist governments that plagued the region in the 20th century could be alternately left or right wing — but it does confirm that the “consolidating democracy” project of the ’80s and ’90s has stalled if not taken a reverse. That is, the narrative that those of us studying Latin America in college and grad school in the late ’90s to early 2000s learned — the Third Wave of democratization, Latin America finally being on the right path but just needing time to grow economically – underestimated some nasty undercurrents of resistance.

In short, the roundtable was equal parts fascinating and frustrating. You can watch it (in Spanish) here.

[Cross-posted at Cato's blog here.]

This Week at the Supreme Court

Notwithstanding last week’s agreement to hear the D.C. guns case — the announcement of which managed to be both later than originally expected and earlier than expected after the decision’s postponement – the Court has gone back to putting itself out of business by reducing its workload to nothingness. (How’s that for judicial restraint?)

The Court has granted review to 51 cases this term, putting it about at the same pace as last year, when only 68 cases were decided after argument. This is down from the 70-low-80s of the previous 15 years (except 92 in 1997-98), which itself is down from the 100-110 pace before that (and, for example, 129 in 1973).

But forgetting the numbers game, this week the Court is hearing four arguments, in cases involving: 1) private causes of action under ERISA (Larue v. DeWolff); 2) the deductibility of financial advisers’ fees from trust/estate taxes (Knight v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue); 3) whether New Jersey may construct a natural gas facility on the Delaware River over Delaware’s objection (New Jersey v. Delaware); and 4) the federal preemption of a (Maine) state law that blocks the delivery of Internet-bought tobacco to teenagers (Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Assn.). Not too exciting, other than that case 3 comes in under the Court’s rare original jurisdiction (meaning no state or lower federal court first ruled on the matter).

On Friday, the justices are scheduled to hold a private conference to discuss more pending cert petitions, with orders on those expected next Monday. The safe bet is that they’ll deny them all — though there is one interesting case (McDermott v. Boehner) where one sitting congressman is suing another over the latter’s disclosure to reporters of an illegally taped (and embarrassing) phone conversation. Stay tuned.

[NB: I recently started contributing to Cato's blog, so this is cross-posted here.]

Podcast of AFF Panel

You can listen to my take on private military contractors from last week's roundtable here.