An Alternative History of the Global War on Terror

On Monday I went to AEI's first Bradley Lecture of the season, where Lynne Olson gave a talk on her book, Troublesome Young Men, about the backbenchers' rebellion that ousted Neville Chamberlain and installed Winston Churchill as PM in May 1940.

Equally interestingly, earlier that day Newt Gingrich gave a fascinating speech with his vision of what the last six years might have looked like had the administration (and rest of the government and country) taken the Islamofascist threat as seriously as is deserves to be taken. The above link has video, audio, and an as-prepared draft of the speech. Ah, Newt, if only your style of governance had been a little smarter -- you coulda still been the Speaker during 9/11.

How to Join Al Qaeda

Here's the application form (translated) for an Al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan.

Hat tip: NRO's Steve Schippert on The Tank blog.

The War as They See It

Yesterday seven NCOs (non-commissioned officers) published an op-ed in the NYT, essentially saying the war is lost because we're still playing whack-a-mole with the insurgency and the Iraqi people will never trust us. Blackfive fisks it.

Ali Baba and the 40 Insurgents

Interesting tidbit: When US forces ask locals for the whereabouts of insurgents, they inquire about Ali Baba.

Meeting of the Mind-Sets

Former Pentagon historian John M. Rosenberg had a piece in the Stars & Stripes on Thursday about the different mentalities that State Department officials and military folks bring to the table here at the Embassy. More specifically, he details the rather obvious clash of cultures and attitudes. (Sample: "the preppy young functionaries of State occasionally murmur their displeasure over having to occupy the same space with what they consider as the boorish, tobacco-dipping soldiers; while the young enlisted are prone to deride the soft, whiney civilians.")

It's a fascinating issue, and the crucible-forged accentuation of inter-agency conflicts typical to any complex government operation. I will no doubt have my own thoughts to share once I return Stateside and can begin to process some of these larger-picture themes of my time here.

Iran & Al Qaeda

That's who takes over if we leave, the former on the Shia side, the latter on the Sunni. Forgetting all that's gone on before, that's why this mission is important going forward.

America's Empire Deficit

I finally finished Colossus, and highly recommend it. Niall Ferguson is both provocative and well-researched, timely and fundamental. The point is that when America gets involved in overseas adventures -- for whatever reason, from the most realist to the most humanitarian -- it inevitably acts like an empire. The sooner it admits this and takes on the role unapologetically, the greater its success can be.

The question, then, is how to organize the "nation-building" -- or, to avoid using the somewhat loaded word "nation," the reconstruction/development work. One view argues for expanding the military, developing more "civilian affairs" capacity. After all, we already have engineers of all sorts, lawyers, doctors, and all sorts of other professionals in the military. Building that capacity would take advantage of the military's existing command and control structure, and recognize that in this brave new world the army exists to run a place, not just make war.

I think that's a stop-gap, and an answer that perhaps works in Iraq's unique environment at this point in time (during a counterinsurgency when we don't have a large enough civilian capacity), but is not the correct structural solution. In fact, this is an easier call than the decision about the circumstances under which we should nation-build or whether to be in the business at all.

The British India Civil Service (ICS) is a good model for what we need, I think -- a civilian body ready to be mobilized as needed, a Peace Corps with teeth that would work in conjunction with the military. More on such a Civilian Response Readiness Corps (as was proposed in legislation sponsored last term) in future as I develop my thinking in consultation with the folks around me.

But one final point: Ferguson diagnoses three deficits "that together explain why the United States has been a less effective empire than its British predecessor." These deficits are 1) economic, 2) manpower, and 3) attention. Ferguson discounts the economic deficit (foreign debt, growing entitlement liabilities as Baby Boomers age, trade imbalance, etc.) because all other pretenders to the American throne would be harder hit if America falters. For example, it is the Chinese who are financing our consumption, and the Europeans are in much worse shape in terms of a graying population and unsustainable welfare state. I don't completely buy this, because the disturbing trend toward populism and protectionism could certainly plunge us into serious economic troubles, yielding even less taste for empire -- and who cares if the rest of the world comes with us?

To cure the manpower deficit Ferguson proposes enlisting immigrants, foreigners, and the unemployed. As I've said before, with somewhat of a bias given my own immigration situation, I'm all for creating a foreign legion. As for the other two categories, I think we're pretty much maxed out. The armed forces have already lowered their recruitment standards, and are offering quite attractive enlistment bonuses, so we're sopping up as much "excess labor capacity" as we can.

I agree with Ferguson, however, that the attention deficit, America's lack of will -- caused in part by the unforgiving political cycle -- restricts long-term strategic thinking. We are impatient for quick results and unwilling to engage in a long slog. That is, the Bush administration theory on transformation of the Middle East may be sound when considered over a minimum 50-year period, but short-term dynamics prevent us from engaging in the steps that would allow us to bear those long-term fruit. (This is perhaps similar to the Social Security debate, among others.)
As Ferguson puts it, the trouble with "an empire in denial" is that it makes two mistakes when it intervenes in troubled states' affairs. "The first may be to allocate insufficient resources to the nonmilitary aspects of the project. The second, and more serious, is to attempt economic and political transformation in an unrealistically short time frame." These two points help explain why our vastly powerful economy and extraordinary military capability has had such a disappointing record of regime change/restructuring.

Think about it: Of our interventions of the past century, only Germany, Japan, and Korea can be considered successful. What do those three engagements have in common? American troops are still there over 50 years later. Put another way, in 1945 who would you rather be, America's Third World ally (like the Philippines) or its enemy (Japan).

As Nietzsche said, it's all about the "will to power." Post-modern Europe has long lacked it; has America gone the same way?

The Changing Goals of the Best and Brightest

I've been reading Niall Ferguson's Colossus, a briskly written brief for liberal imperialism -- and consequent criticism of United States for hampering overseas missions by going over-the-top in denying their imperialstic natures. I'll save a large reaction for later, but wanted to share one passage I recently enjoyed:

[Few], if any, of the graduates of Harvard, Stanford, Yale or Princeton aspire
to spend their lives trying to turn a sun-scorched sandpit like Iraq into the prosperous caoitalist democracy of Paul Wolfowitz's imaginings. America's brightest and best aspire not to govern Mesopotamia but to manage MTV, not to rule the Hejaz but to run a hedge fund. Unlike their British counterparts of a century ago, who left the elite British universities with an overtly imperial ethos, the letters ambitious young Americans would like to see after their names are CEO, not CBE [Commander of the British Empire].

This is interesting to me particularly because I have absolutely no interest in managing any business, running a hedge fund, or anything else so mercantile. (The only lucrative dream I have might be to write a best-selling book.) Yet, of course, for so many of my college and law school classmates, all that is indeed the height of their aspirations.

It's probably a good thing; this is why America is such an economic powerhouse. And of course it's also a good thing to have more talented people see the private sector as the place for them, rather than trying to expand government. But it is striking that fewer young Americans now aspire to public service than they did even a few decades ago. (Forget the Victorian Brits, recall Kennedy's eponymous Best and Brightest.) This trend has reversed itself since 9/11, to be sure, but I wonder how much.

Europeans Heighten Threat Levels

The English are feeling the pinch of recent terrorist threats and have raised their security level from "Miffed" to"Peeved." Soon, though, security levels may be raised yet again to "Irritated" or even "A Bit Cross." Londoners have not been "A Bit Cross" since the blitz began in 1940 and tea supplies all but ran out. Also, terrorists have been re-categorized from "Tiresome" to "A Bloody Nuisance." The last time the British issued a "Bloody Nuisance" warning level was during the great fire of 1666.

Also, the French government announced yesterday that it has raised its terror alert level from "Run" to "Hide." The only two higher levels in France are "Collaborate" and "Surrender." The rise was precipitated by a recent fire that destroyed France's white flag factory, effectively paralyzing the country's military capability.

It's not only the English and French who are on a heightened state of alert. Italy has increased the alert level from "Shout Loudly and Excitedly" to "Elaborate Military Posturing." Two more levels remain: "Ineffective Combat Operations" and "Change Sides."

The Germans also increased their alert state from "Disdainful Arrogance" to "Dress in Uniform and Sing Marching Songs." They also have two higher levels: "Invade a Neighbor" and "Lose."

Belgians, on the other hand, are all on holiday as usual, and the only threat they are worried about is NATO pulling out of Brussels.

The Spanish are all excited to see their new submarines ready to deploy. These beautifully designed subs have glass bottoms so the new Spanish navy can get a good look at the old Spanish navy.

The Russians, meanwhile, are saying that the terrorists double-crossed them by violating the terms of the Zawahiri-Ivanov non-aggression pact. They are determined to beat al Qaeda at its own game by employing two-man suicide bomber teams...

NB: Much of this post is an edited version of an email that's been forwarded around. The last paragraph is 100% my own.