America's Empire Deficit

I finally finished Colossus, and highly recommend it. Niall Ferguson is both provocative and well-researched, timely and fundamental. The point is that when America gets involved in overseas adventures -- for whatever reason, from the most realist to the most humanitarian -- it inevitably acts like an empire. The sooner it admits this and takes on the role unapologetically, the greater its success can be.

The question, then, is how to organize the "nation-building" -- or, to avoid using the somewhat loaded word "nation," the reconstruction/development work. One view argues for expanding the military, developing more "civilian affairs" capacity. After all, we already have engineers of all sorts, lawyers, doctors, and all sorts of other professionals in the military. Building that capacity would take advantage of the military's existing command and control structure, and recognize that in this brave new world the army exists to run a place, not just make war.

I think that's a stop-gap, and an answer that perhaps works in Iraq's unique environment at this point in time (during a counterinsurgency when we don't have a large enough civilian capacity), but is not the correct structural solution. In fact, this is an easier call than the decision about the circumstances under which we should nation-build or whether to be in the business at all.

The British India Civil Service (ICS) is a good model for what we need, I think -- a civilian body ready to be mobilized as needed, a Peace Corps with teeth that would work in conjunction with the military. More on such a Civilian Response Readiness Corps (as was proposed in legislation sponsored last term) in future as I develop my thinking in consultation with the folks around me.

But one final point: Ferguson diagnoses three deficits "that together explain why the United States has been a less effective empire than its British predecessor." These deficits are 1) economic, 2) manpower, and 3) attention. Ferguson discounts the economic deficit (foreign debt, growing entitlement liabilities as Baby Boomers age, trade imbalance, etc.) because all other pretenders to the American throne would be harder hit if America falters. For example, it is the Chinese who are financing our consumption, and the Europeans are in much worse shape in terms of a graying population and unsustainable welfare state. I don't completely buy this, because the disturbing trend toward populism and protectionism could certainly plunge us into serious economic troubles, yielding even less taste for empire -- and who cares if the rest of the world comes with us?

To cure the manpower deficit Ferguson proposes enlisting immigrants, foreigners, and the unemployed. As I've said before, with somewhat of a bias given my own immigration situation, I'm all for creating a foreign legion. As for the other two categories, I think we're pretty much maxed out. The armed forces have already lowered their recruitment standards, and are offering quite attractive enlistment bonuses, so we're sopping up as much "excess labor capacity" as we can.

I agree with Ferguson, however, that the attention deficit, America's lack of will -- caused in part by the unforgiving political cycle -- restricts long-term strategic thinking. We are impatient for quick results and unwilling to engage in a long slog. That is, the Bush administration theory on transformation of the Middle East may be sound when considered over a minimum 50-year period, but short-term dynamics prevent us from engaging in the steps that would allow us to bear those long-term fruit. (This is perhaps similar to the Social Security debate, among others.)
As Ferguson puts it, the trouble with "an empire in denial" is that it makes two mistakes when it intervenes in troubled states' affairs. "The first may be to allocate insufficient resources to the nonmilitary aspects of the project. The second, and more serious, is to attempt economic and political transformation in an unrealistically short time frame." These two points help explain why our vastly powerful economy and extraordinary military capability has had such a disappointing record of regime change/restructuring.

Think about it: Of our interventions of the past century, only Germany, Japan, and Korea can be considered successful. What do those three engagements have in common? American troops are still there over 50 years later. Put another way, in 1945 who would you rather be, America's Third World ally (like the Philippines) or its enemy (Japan).

As Nietzsche said, it's all about the "will to power." Post-modern Europe has long lacked it; has America gone the same way?